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Policing Boilerplate: Reckoning and
Reforming Rule 34’s Popular—yet
Problematic—Construction
AMIR SHACHMUROVE*
“;5:undamental change can be accomplished by the addition of new systems on top of old ones.”1
At the beginning, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure created a most
liberal regime for the discovery of facts and winnowing of issues, awarding
parties such essential tools as interrogatories, as set forth in Rule 33, and
requests for production, governed by Rule 34. In the last two decades, in
response to the seeming failure of this construct to achieve an efficient and
just determination of every action, courts have begun to police the use of
boilerplate objections to requests for production. Recognizing no distinction
between types of boilerplate and acknowledging neither the textual differences within the rules nor the asymmetries too often implicated, judge after
judge has found waiver to be the proper penalty for boilerplate’s utilization.
Unfortunately, in so doing, an apparent juridical majority has run afoul of
those well-established principles of construction from which no court may
deviate. As a result, the existing jurisprudence is quite a muddle, a perpetual
and indeterminate clash of prose and precept, rife with both laudatory notions and cloaked defects.
This article not only traces the history and details the provisions involved in this hushed yet weighty controversy, including Rules 1, 26, 33, 34,
and 37, but also delineates precisely where and how so many have erred.
Having pinpointed their mistakes, this article then goes farther. In its final
*
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Mrs. Lisa Warm Bonfanti, a warm and crazy blonde—and the friends who imparted an unrivaled sense of home to very different places: Mr. David P. Borghardt, a brother in spirit; Ms.
Yolanda Collins, Mr. John P. Mulvey, and Mr. Tro Peltekian, watchful guardians and pleasant
company; and Mrs. Gina Delatte-Richard, Mrs. Jodi H. Fryoux, and Mrs. Kristie D. Causey,
three sprightly women of exceptional caliber and infectious laughter. As always, a heartfelt
and loving thanks to Ms. Lindsey L. Dunn is due. Finally, while any errors made and any
views expressed herein are the author’s> this article’s genesis lies in a conversation between
him and an old friend, the Honorable (and much wiser) William V. Gallo.
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section, it tentatively proposes emendations to certain rules that would permit waiver’s finding upon boilerplate’s use in responses to requests for pro8
duction.
A historical account, a snapshot of every relevant rule, an explanation
of those few controlling principles of construction, and a theory of law and
policy—all these things appear within, a guide to more than just Rule 34.
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INTRODUCTION

When the pretrial discovery mechanism eventually encapsulated in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure2 was first conceived, a promise and a vision
lay behind its overhaul of a more stubborn and disordered infrastructure.3
Unfettered to this stultifying past, the rules codified the law’s newest excavatory tools, each shaped so as to facilitate the proof and filtering of inconsequential facts and irrelevant issues. Yet, as their authors conceded, the ultimate effectiveness of these devices, including the interrogatory, deposition,
request for admission, and demand for production, would depend upon the
advent and preservation of a certain level of cooperation seemingly inconstant with the adversarial ideal.4 Cognizant of this detail, modern discovery’s
inventors nonetheless banked upon the realization of this collaborative ethic.
With each passing decade, however, reality deeded otherwise. As cases
grew in quantity and complexity, rust crept into a once elegantly simple apparatus> and the rules’ fifth machine5 began to groan. Costs and delays
mounted until the likelihood of any single matter’s efficient ad4udication
struck many as chimerical. Bemoaning this actuality and stirred by hopes
both base and lofty, many clamored for something to be done to alleviate
uncontrolled discovery, so often a rancorous morass, and unrestrained attorney latitude> so often this 'uagmire’s apparent catalyst.6 So changes, rule-byrule and case-by-case, ensued, all at odds with the wide-open system so optimistically welded in 1938.
2. For convenience and simplicity> this !rticle uses the words 5rules- to refer to two
or more Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 5Rule- to a specific one of these rules, and 5advi<
sory committee- or 5standing committee- to those committees involved with the rules’ drafting and review. See Fabio Arcila, Jr., Discoverymania: Plausibility Pleading as Misprescription, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1487, 1487 n.5 (2015) (doing the same). An additional typographical
note: many cases cited in this !rticle predate Hecember 1> 2013> the amended rules’ effective
date. As such, when the substantive language did not alter, a case quoting those words may be
cited, but because it references a prior iteration, it may appear incorrect. However, where a
relevant change did take place, such fact will be noted, and no pre-amendment case cited.
3. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 922, 973 (1987) [hereinafter Subrin, Equity].
4. William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery
Reform, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 703, 714 (1989); see also John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil
=iscovery’s 5atal 5laws, 84 MINN. L. REV. 505, 517 (2000).
5. Rules 26 through 37 appear in the Title V of the rules.
6. See, e.g., The Sedona Conference, The Sedona Conference Cooperation Proclamation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 331> 331 A2000@ A5FCEourts have seen escalating motion practice>
overreaching, obstruction, and extensive, but unproductive discovery disputes—in some cases
precluding adjudication on the merits altogether—when parties treat the discovery process in
an adversarial manner.-@$ Brian Morris> The 2015 Proposals to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Preparing for the Future of Discovery, 41 N. KY. L. REV. 133, 133634 (2014).
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In the course of this evolution, one problem—the use of boilerplate responses> broadly defined as 5FrEeady-made or all-purpose language that will
fit in a variety of documents>-7 to requests for production made in accordance
with Rule 34—has elicited an almost unanimous rejoinder. Presented with
such objections, courts have proceeded to find any valid protestation to have
been waived. :n proponents’ views> Rules 22> 33> and 34 compel such an
order, as does the rules’ overarching purpose and discovery’s hoary aims.
With only a few discordant notes sounded, prose, policy, and purpose are
thereby marshalled to a certain hallowed end. Unfortunately, in the process,
a grave error has been made, as this estimable approach cannot be wholly
squared with the relevant provisions, properly construed, or their pivotal peculiarities, accurately appraised. As a result, an interpretation intended to ensure the rules’ more perfect state has inter4ected another kind of incoherence
into an already creaking interpretive structure, and a decree that only drafters
may issue has been fabricated, with the latest amendments to Rule 34 falling
tantalizingly short.8
In four substantive parts, this Article elucidates this unwieldy body of
law, reveals its weaknesses, and proposes a partial solution. So as to properly
set the parameters of any procedural analysis, Part II defines four pertinent
terms—absolute, conditional, administrative, and substantive boilerplate—
and wades through every provision and doctrine relevant to boilerplate’s po<
licing. Having set forth this debate’s governing laws> Part ::: first tells three
tales and then summarizes present precedent, differentiating among the
courts’ disparate yet confusingly intermingled ratiocinations. Thereafter> Part
:+ challenges this body of law’s foundations in two sections. Necessarily,
Part IV.A précises the interpretive principles which govern any rule’s con<
struction. Applying these tenets, Part IV.B pinpoints the six major oversights
pervasive (but obscured) within this jurisprudential and scholarly debate. To
rectify this surprising tenuousness, Part V recommends tentative changes to
Rules 22> 34> and 37. Without these or similar changes> today’s nearly reflex<
ive judicial approach to boilerplate cannot survive thorough dissection; without them, it must be discarded by the most belabored of courts, even if a
5hellFishE-9 flood lingers still.

7. Boilerplate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); United States v. Needham, 718 F.3d 1190, 1199 (9th Cir. 2013) (Berzon, J., concurring) (citing definition).
8. On December 1, 2015, new versions of Rules 1, 26, 34, and 27 went into effect.
See Daniel M. Braude & Marianna Codispoti, Will Changes to Federal Rules Reduce Scope
of Discovery?, LAW360 (Dec. 11, 2015), https://www.law360.com/articles/736030/willchanges-to-federal-rules-reduce-scope-of-discovery (summarizing these changes).
9. In re Chicago Invs., LLC, 470 B.R. 32, 84 n.352 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (quoting
Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 364 (9th Cir. 1996) (quoting Krueger v. Pelican Prod. Corp., No. CIV-87-2385-A (W.D. Okla. Feb. 24, 1989))).
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TERMS AND LAWS

DEFINITIONS

The term boilerplate refers to a response which states the legal grounds
for an objection without specifying how the request is particularly deficient
and how the objecting party would be harmed if it were forced to comply.10
Even novice lawyers are familiar with the most common forms of boilerplate,
including: A1@ 5overbroad- or 5overly broad-$ A2@ 5irrelevant-$ A3@ 5vague>5ambiguous>- 5unclear>- 5undefined>- or not stated with 5particularity-$ A4@
5oppressive>- 5harassing>- or likely to impose a burden 5unfair- or 5undue-$
A3@ 5propounded with the intent to harass> delay> and abuse-$ A2@ 5redundant-$
A7@ 5e'ually available to the propounding party- from either their own rec<
ords or sources under their own control; and (8) not subject to disclosure due
to sundry protections, most often the work product doctrine and the attorneyclient privilege.11 At their worst, particularly when deployed with outward
abandon> these ob4ections appear 5designed to evade> obfuscate> and obstruct
discovery.-12
Though frequently damned by the catch-all phrase 5boilerplate>- not all
eight of these familiar demurrals are alike in character. The first seven implicate issues of convenience; the assumed difficulty and expensiveness of obtaining the requested information lies behind their assertions. For purposes
of this Article, this heptad, as well as their infinite analogues, will be categorized as administrative boilerplate.13 In contrast, the eighth objection flaunts
10. St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 511612
(N.D. Iowa 2000); see also, e.g., Sanchez-Medina v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 265 F.R.D. 24, 27
(D.P.R. 2009) (adopting the same definition of boilerplate articulated in St. Paul Reinsurance
Co., 198 F.R.D. at 511612); Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 399, 400 (S.D. Fla. 2008)
(emphasizing that a party objecting that a request is vague, overly broad, or unduly burdensome 5must explain the specific and particular ways in which a request is vague, overly broad,
or unduly burdensome-@$ 8ooima v. Zacklift :nt’l> 200 F.R.H. 444> 442 AH...H. 2002) (same).
11. See, e.g., United States ex rel. /’Connell v. Chapman ,niv.> 243 F.R.H. 242> 240
(C.D. Cal. 2007); Klesch & Co. v. Liberty Media Corp., 217 F.R.D. 517, 524 (D. Colo. 2003);
McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th Cir. 1990);
City Consumer Servs. v. Horne, 100 F.R.D. 740, 747 (D. Utah 1983).
12. Kristensen v. Credit Payment Servs., Inc., No. 2:12-cv-0528-APG-PAL, 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165489, at *12, 2014 WL 6675748, at *4 (D. Nev. Nov. 25, 2014).
13. A full count of such synonyms would be impossible to faithfully reproduce; the
English language is too pliable a tool. Cf. DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 82
(2011) (describing the concept of suppressed ambiguity as follows: 5FLEike the word bank, the
adjective stubborn is ambiguous and will be interpreted in a way that makes it coherent with
the context.- Aemphasis in original@@$ Richard .. 8ay> Adherence to the Original Intentions in
Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 226, 230
A1011@ A5Words are only meaningless marks on paper or random sounds in the air until we
posit an intelligence which selected and arranged them.-@$ !mir .hachmurove> Purchasing
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a unique quiddity.14 Often consecrated by history,15 the protestations it encompasses implicate substantive, even venerable, entitlements bestowed by
common or statutory law and not assumed inconveniences, whether temporal
or financial. Recognizing this fundamental divide in underlying justification,
this Article sets this species apart by use of the almost paradoxical term substantive boilerplate.
Whether substantive or administrative, lawyers tend to employ these
types of boilerplate in a handful of common ways. Often, a response begins
with an introductory section that enumerates every conceivable boilerplate,
and every subsequent response expressly incorporates this prelude.16 In other
cases, no introduction greets the reader, and identical boilerplate is retyped
in each answer. Wherever placed, such indiscriminate boilerplate will be
dubbed absolute boilerplate throughout this Article. In contrast, possibly just
as often> a series of 5prophylactic> boilerplate ob4ections>- followed by
clauses like 5sub4ect to and without waiving- the ob4ections> grace each and

Claims and Changing Votes( 6stablishing “Cause” under &ule /71*(a), 89 AM. BANKR. L.J.
511, 530 n.142 (2015) [hereinafter Shachmurove, Claims].
14. While the most well-known privileges arose under the common law, In re Grand
Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d 1140, 1149 (3d Cir. 1997), many have been reduced to statutes,
see example Ombudsman Servs. of N. Ca. v. Superior Court, 65 Cal. Rptr. 3d 456, 462 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2007) (noting that by adopting CAL. EVID. CODE 011 5the Legislature clearly intended
to abolish common law privileges and to keep the courts from creating new nonstatutory privileges as a matter of 4udicial policy- Ainternal 'uotation marks omitted@@. There is, moreover,
an evolving federal common law of privilege whose relevance depends upon Federal Rule of
Evidence 501. FED. R. EVID. 501; 7w. Mem’l Hosp. v. !shcroft, 362 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir.
2004); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d 976, 979-81 (6th
Cir. 2003@. 7onetheless> the federal courts’ power to concoct new privileges is highly circum<
scribed. See Aramburu v. Boeing Co., No. 93-4064-SAC, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20681, at
*869, 1994 WL 810246, at *3 (D. Kan. Sept. 22, 1994) (analyzing Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493
,... 112 A1000@@. .till> while Federal Rule of Evidence 301 5manifested . . . FCongress’sE
affirmative intention not to freeBe the law of privilege>- the creation of new exemptions is
5generally disfavored.- In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 103 F.3d at 1149; see also, e.g., Carman v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 114 F.3d 790, 794 (8th Cir. 1997). This calculus changes,
however> 5where the information sought is protected by a state privilege.- Pearson v. Miller>
211 F.3d 37> 27 A3d Cir. 2000@. :n such cases> 5[a] strong policy of comity between state and
federal sovereignties impels federal courts to recognize state privileges where this can be accomplished at no substantial cost to federal substantive and procedural policy.- ,nited .tates
v. King, 73 F.R.D. 103, 105 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); see also, e.g., In re Admin. Subpoena Blue
Cross Blue .hield of Mass.> :nc.> 400 F. .upp. 2d 312> 300 AH. Mass. 2003@ A5When the forum
state has recognized a particular privilege, a court may take that into account when deciding
whether to recogniBe that privilege as part of federal law.-@.
15. See 8 JOHN WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 87 (John
McNaughton ed., rev. ed. 1961).
16. Robert K. Wise, Ending Evasive Responses to Written Discovery: A Guide for
Properly Responding (and Objecting) to Interrogatories and Document Requests Under the
Texas Discovery Rules, 65 BAYLOR L. REV. 510, 567668 (2013).
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every rejoinder.17 Throughout this piece, such responses, which may be either
substantive or administrative, will be referred to as conditional boilerplate.
Sometimes, if not more often than not, lawyers sprinkle conditional and absolute boilerplate in a single document, a preamble littered with the latter
appended (or not).
To summarize, four distinct types of boilerplate regularly appear in responses to requests for production: (1) absolute and administrative; (2) absolute and substantive; (3) conditional and administrative; and (4) conditional
and substantive.18
B.

SOURCES OF AUTHORITY

Revolutionary when adopted in 1938,19 reflecting the decidedly equitable predilections of Roscoe Pound,20 Edson Sunderland,21 and Charles E.
Clark,22 the rules engendered a whole new and far more liberal regime in
regard to nearly every facet of federal procedure.23 Among the many transformations thereby effected, 5[t]he pre-trial deposition-discovery mechanism- set forth in Rules 22 to 37 was seen as a most significant 5innova<
tionFE>- 5investFedE . . . with a vital role in the preparation for trial.-24 The
assumption 5that discovery would be lawyer-directed with minimal judicial
involvement- girded Aand still underlies@ this system> 25 as did the belief that

17. Id. at 568.
18. Obviously, they appear elsewhere, including responses to interrogatories.
19. The rules’ formulation was authorized in 1934 by An Act to Give the Supreme
Court of the United States the Authority to Make and Publish Rules in Actions at Law, Pub.
L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072); see also Charles E.
Clark & James Wm. Moore, A New Federal Civil Procedure—The Background, 44 YALE L.J.
387, 387 (1935). The drafted rules became effective on September 16, 1938 by virtue of congressional inaction. CHARLES E. CLARK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CODE PLEADING 37638
(2d ed. 1947).
20. Jay Tidmarsh, Pound’s Century, and 'urs, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 526629
(2006).
21. Charles E. Clark, Edson Sunderland and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
58 MICH. L. REV. 6, 10612 (1959).
22. Charles E. Clark, The Handmaid of Justice, 23 WASH. U. L. Q. 297, 316 (1938).
23. Subrin, Equity, supra note 3, at 924625; see also, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, Information Lost and Found, 100 CAL. L. REV. 635, 647 (2012); Diane P. Wood, Summary Judgment and the Law of Unintended Consequences, 36 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 231, 231 (2011);
Richard L. Marcus, Retooling American Discovery for the Twenty-First Century: Toward a
New World Order?, 7 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 153, 158661 (1999).
24. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500601 (1947).
25. Craig B. Shaffer & Ryan T. Shaffer, Looking Past the Debate: Proposed Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 178, 187 (2013).
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5wide-ranging discovery would help ensure a just determination in all matters and remedy the imbalance of power between the wealthy and the poor-26
by accomplishing the expeditious 5location and disclosure of all the unpriv<
ileged evidentiary data that might prove useful in resolving a given dispute.-27 The rules’ drafters did recogniBe multiple dangers> from the prob<
lems likely to be posed by unwieldy documentary evidence to the possibility
that some would use discovery to 5blackmail others and to force settlement
more related to the costs of discovery than to the merits of the case.-28 Nonetheless, these men again and again elected to reject their own proposals for
restricting the rules’ 5panoply of FdiscoveryE devices.-29 Instead, unlike a
much older code,30 their compendium afforded litigators 5every type of discovery that was known in the United States and probably England up to that
time.-31 :n original conception and practical effect> discovery’s principal in<
struments totaled four: 5depositions Fpursuant to Rules 27 through 32E> inter<
rogatories to parties [under Rule 33], production and inspection of documents
Fper Rule 34E> and re'uests for admissions Fin accordance with Rule 32E.-32
,pon their geneses> this foursome became the 5keystone of the new Federal

26. John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 556 (2010).
27. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1298699 (1978).
28. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of
the 1938 Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REV. 691, 720, 730 (1998) [hereinafter Subrin,
Fishing].
29. See, e.g., Subrin, Fishing, supra note 28, at 719, 720630; Subrin, Equity, supra
note 3, at 975682; Edson E. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DISCOVERY
BEFORE TRIAL> iii. ACallaghan ( Co.> 1032@ A5Hostility to ‘fishing expeditions’ before trial is
a traditional and powerful taboo.-@. This cry was a familiar one. Laverett v. Cont’l Briar Pipe
Co., 25 F. Supp. 80, 82 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
30. David Dudley Field II created the famed code from which the rules seemed to so
sharply depart. See, e.g., Stephen N. Subrin, David Dudley Field and the Field Code: A Historical Analysis of an Earlier Procedural Vision, 6 L. & HIST. REV. 311, 327638 (1988); Paul
M. Hebert, Institute on Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1 LA. L. REV. 413, 414 (1939).
31. Subrin, Fishing, supra note 28, at 718619.
32. Alexander Holtzoff, Instruments of Discovery Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MICH. L. REV. 205, 206 (1942); cf. Will Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case Coding Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60, 83 (2013) (quoting
additional authorities asserting that the 5‘lioniBed’ Founding Fathers Fof the RulesE created a
‘Big Bang’ by completely remaking ‘the civil 4ustice system in !merica’- and did so 5based
upon ‘little empirical evidence’-@.
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practice>- indispensable to 5the delineation of issues and the revelation of
facts>-33 then hemmed in by Rules 1, 26, and 37.34
!ssertively exploited> this arsenal’s reach would later be expanded to
promote these original goals and then be constricted in response to old concerns’ materialization. In 1946, the Court made discovery subject to Rule
22’s new closing sentence: 5:t is not ground for ob4ection that the testimony
will be inadmissible at the trial if the testimony sought appears reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.-35 Originally, only
on a motion by the requesting party showing good cause and upon notice to
all other parties, Rule 34 empowered a court to order any party to produce
and permit the inspection and copying of any designated documents, books,
accounts, objects, or tangible things that constituted or contained material
evidence if not privileged.36 :n 1042> Rule 34 was retailored so as to 5corre<
late the scope of inquiry permitted under Rule 34 with that provided in Rule
22Ab@>- and the advisory committee took the opportunity to voice its displeasure at those few decisions that had 5re'uireFdE great and impracticable spec<
ificity in the description of documents, papers, books, etc., sought to be inspected>- in apparent contravention of two early Court opinions.37 In 1970,
Rule 34 endured further revisal when its 5good cause- re'uirement38 was de-

33. James A. Pike, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure and the Rules
of Evidence, 34 ILL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1939); accord, e.g., James A. Pike & John W. Willis, Federal
Discovery in Operation, 7 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 298 (1940); James A. Pike & John W. Willis,
The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure: I, 38 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1179 (1938).
34. FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 26, 37; 83 CONG. REC. 8480-81 (1938). Later amendments
shifted the contents of these original provisions. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note
to 1970 amendment.
35. Roth v. Bird, 239 F.2d 257, 259 (5th Cir. 1956) (quoting the 1946 version of Rule
22@. !s originally envisioned> 5FtEhe purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts>
the names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party in the preparation or
presentation of his case.- FED. R. CIV. P. 22 advisory committee’s note to 1042 amendment.
36. Holtzoff, supra note 32, at 219.
37. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1042 amendment Aciting Brown
v. United States, 276 U.S. 134, 143 (1928), and Consol. Rendering Co. v. Vermont, 207 U.S.
541, 543644 (1908)).
38. The old standard has not been wholly extirpated. Today, to obtain discovery as to
the 5sub4ect matter- of an action rather than 4ust a 5claim- or 5defense>- 5good cause- must
be shown. Baron Servs. v. Media Weather Innovations L.L.C., 717 F.3d 907, 913 n.9 (Fed.
Cir. 2013@ A5But ‘good cause’ is re'uired to be shown under Rule 22Ab@A1@ only if seeking
broad discovery of ‘matterFsE relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.’- Aalteration
and emphasis in original)); In re Subpoena to Witzel, 531 F.3d 113, 118 (1st Cir. 2008) (discussing Rule 22Ab@A1@’s 2000 amendment@.
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leted, and its invocation was now permitted without the need for first obtaining judicial authorization.39 Restrictive emendations to the rules’ entirety fol<
lowed in 1980, 1983, 1992, 2000, and 2015 in reaction to a variety of
abuses,40 real41 or perceived.42

1.

Law’s 'verarching 'bligations( &ules 1, 1,, 0,, and 0)

Other sources indirectly govern the interpretation of Rules 33 and 34 by
endorsing a particular standard, vague but discernible, of appropriate behavior for lawyers and parties alike.43 Interlaced, these precepts serve to make
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1070 amendment$ see also Paul
W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform: How Small
Changes Can Make a Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495, 509 (2013)
(discussing changes).
40. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors
of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 542649 (2001); see also, e.g., Carl Tobias, The 2000 Federal
Civil Rules Revisions, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 173> 114 A2001@ A5The rule revisors’ apparent
purposes in devising the change [to Rule 26 in 2000] are to restrict discovery and fishing
expeditions by limiting parties to discovery that involves matters which they raise in the pleadings.-@.
41. James S. Kaklik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 624625 (1998); see also Thomas E.
Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993
Federal Rule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 527 (1998).
42. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse:
The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683, 683 (1998) [hereinafter SequelE A5F.Etudies reaffirm our
common sense notions about discovery -- that complex, high-stakes litigation, handled by big
firms with corporate clients, are the cases most likely to involve the problematic discovery
that skews the discovery debate.-@; Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive
Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46
STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1432 (1994) [hereinafter MythE Afaulting 5surveys, materials, anecdotes,
and war stories supporting the initiatives for discovery reform [for] ignor[ing] existing empirical evidence indicating that discovery was not a problem in the majority of federal civil
case-@; cf. Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1130> 1130 A2014@ A5Contrary to the popular narrative> the problem
with excessive discovery is—and has always been—more pervasive with respect to a particular slice of mega cases, approximately five to fifteen percent of the civil caseload. In the majority of cases there is very little or no discovery and, in the other cases, the amount of discovery is> by any reasonable measure> proportionate to the stakes.- Afootnote omitted@@$ 9ohn H.
Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 553
A2012@ A5!lthough cases of abuse are thought to be infre'uent> when they occur> they trans<
form discovery from a truth-serving to a truth-impairing device.- Afootnote omitted@@.
43. Cf. Louisana Crawfish Producers !ss’n - W. v. Mallard Basin, Inc., Nos. 6:101085, 6:11-0461, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163230, at *10, 2015 WL 8074260, at *2 (W.D. La.
Hec. 4> 2013@ A5Rule 34 must be applied in connection with Rule 22Ab@- and in light of its
5policy of broad and liberal discovery.-@$ Barnhardt v. Meridian Mun. Separate Sch. Dist., No.
4:65-cv-1300 HTW-LRA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42460, at *9, 2012 WL 1067105, at *3
A..H. Miss. Mar. 21> 2012@ A5Rule 34 must be applied in connection with Rule 22Ab@.-@.
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discovery sub4ect to 5FanE overriding limitation of good faith>-44 distinguishable from 5the manner in which litigation is F‘fre'uently’E conducted.-45
While the rules allow for the adjudication of discovery disputes through two
types of motions—to compel per Rule 37(a)46 or for a protective order under
Rule 26(c),47 neither of which automatically stays discovery upon its filing48—a certain hope animates these provisions: that only most intractable of
disputes, with both parties able to mount a plausible defense, will lead to the
expenditure of judicial resources.49 With informal resolution so obviously
preferred,50 the edicts explored below demarcate the contours of the cooperative ethic regarded as essential to pretrial practice and oft-invoked in boilerplate’s regulation under Title + and its local analogues.51
44. Asea, Inc. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 669 F.2d 1242, 1246 (9th Cir. 1981); cf. Campbell :ndus. v. M;+ Gemini> 210 F.2d 24> 27 A0th Cir. 1010@ A5FHEistrict court is vested with
broad discretion to make discovery and evidentiary rulings conducive to the conduct of a fair
and orderly trial.-@$ 9effrey W. Stempel, Ulysses Tied to the Generic Whipping Post: The Continuing 'dyssey of =iscovery “&eform”, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107> 101 A2001@ A5His<
torically, trial judges in the United States have been vested with great discretion over almost
all aspects of litigation6in particular> discovery.-@.
45. Schwarzer, supra note 4, at 705; see also Amir Shachmurove, =isruptions’ 5unc8
tion: A Defense of (Some) Form Objections under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12
SETON HALL CIR. REV. 161, 208611 (2016) [hereinafter Shachmurove, Disruptions].
46. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a); SEC v. Goldstone, 301 F.R.D. 593, 644 (D.N.M. 2014)
(citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); Father M. v. Various Tort Claimants (In re Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Portland), 661 F.3d 417, 422 n.3 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)).
48. See Enron Corp. Sav. Plan v. Hewitt Assocs., L.L.C., 258 F.R.D. 149, 154 (S.D.
Tex. 2009) (discussing when a stay of discovery may be appropriate).
49. See, e.g.> Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty.> 327 ,... 101> 201 A1000@ A5FRule 37Aa@
was] designed to protect courts and opposing parties from delaying or harassing tactics during
the discovery process.-@$ In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1481 (4th Cir. 1988)
A.prouse> 9.> dissenting@ A5FTEhe very purpose of Rule 26(c) is to foster wide-ranging, successful discovery that will often forestall a public trial.-@$ 8evin 9. Lynch> When Staying Discovery
Stays Justice: Analyzing Motions to Stay Discovery When a Motion to Dismiss is Pending, 47
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71> 72 A2012@ A5The current discovery system is also designed to pro<
ceed without the direct involvement of 4udges unless a dispute arises.-@$ Honald E. Campbell>
Raise Your Right Hand and Swear to Be Civil: Defining Civility as an Obligation of Professional Responsibility, 47 GONZ. L. REV. 99, 124626 (2011) (proposing codes of civility for
pre-trial proceedings).
50. See Witt v. GC .ervs. Ltd. P’ship> 307 F.R.D. 554, 555 (D. Colo. 2014) A5Civil
discovery in the federal courts should> presumptively> be ‘a self-managed process.’-@$ Selectica, Inc. v. Novatus, Inc., No. 6:13-cv-1708-Orl-36TBS, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66335, at *5,
2014 WL 1930426, at *2 (M.D. Fla. May 14, 2014) A5Hiscovery is intended to be extrajudicial
and self-executing. :t should re'uire at most> infre'uent court involvement.-@$ Sanyo Laser
Prods. v. !rista Records> :nc.> 214 F.R.H. 402> 400 A..H. :nd. 2003@ A5In the event the parties
cannot informally resolve a discovery dispute, Rule 37 provides a vehicle for the aggrieved
party to re'uest an order from the Court compelling discovery.-@.
51. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. ConvaTec Inc., 268 F.R.D. 226, 242643 (M.D.N.C.
2010@ Aciting to both the 5spirit of the rules- and the language of a local one).
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Fittingly, the rules’ interpretive lodestar appears in their first para<
graph.52 In its present form> Rule 1 establishes a single principle: 5FThe rulesE
should be construed, administered, and employed by the courts and the parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
and proceeding.-53 It then thrusts the responsibility for its realization on three
discrete entities: the court, the parties, and the attorneys.54 That is to say, just
as a court has 5FanE affirmative duty . . . to exercise the authority conferred
by [the] rules to ensure that civil litigation is resolved not only fairly, but also
without undue cost or delay. . . . [Attorneys, a]s officers of the court [, have]
shareFd inE this responsibility- since 1013$55 parties have been so bound since
December 1, 2015.56 Any dilatory tactic which endangers a matter’s efficient
adjudication, including evasive discovery responses, almost surely breaches
this paragraph.57
More obliquely, Rule 16 reinforces the iniquity of such prorogation. Per
its first sentence> a 4udge is expected to 5establishFE early and continuing con<
trol so that the case will not be protracted because of lack of management>5discourage wasteful pretrial activities>- promote 5thorough preparations>-

52. The .cotch Whiskey !ss’n v. ,... Histilled Prods. Co.> 032 F2d 1317> 1310 AFed.
Cir. 1001@ A5Rule 1 sets the policy for construing all of the F discoveryE rules.-@.
53. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
54. :n fact> the .edona Conference has seen fit to codify Rule 1’s mandate in the socalled 5Cooperation Proclamation>- meant to launch 5a coordinated effort to promote cooper<
ation by all parties to the discovery process to achieve the goal of a ‘4ust> speedy> and inexpensive determination of every action.’- The Sedona Conference, supra note 6, at 331; see
also Ralph C. Losey, Mancia v. Mayflower Begins a Pilgrimage to the New World of Cooperation, 10 SEDONA CONF. J. 377> 310 A2000@ A5FTEhe Federal Rules are a mandate that counsel
act cooperatively in resolving discovery issues.-@.
55. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendment$ !tlas Res., Inc.
v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 297 F.R.D. 482, 485 (D.N.M. 2011) (citing note); Gipson v. Sw. Bell
Tel. Co., No. 08-2017-EFM-DJW, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103822, at *4 (D. Kan. Dec. 23,
2001@ A5This Court’s goal> in accordance with Rule 1F>E . . . is to administer the [Rules] in a
‘4ust> speedy and inexpensive’ manner. To assist the Court in accomplishing this goal> the
parties are encouraged to resolve discovery and other pretrial issues without the Court’s in<
volvement.-@$ Havid 9. Waxse> Cooperation—What Is It and Why Do It?, 18 RICH. J.L. &
TECH. 1> 13 A2012@ A5There are now numerous opinions making the same point about cooper<
ation, yet it appears that cooperation is not being used enough as a method of obtaining the
‘4ust> speedy> and inexpensive determination of the action.’-@.
56. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee note to 2015 amendment; Hyatt v. Rock,
No. 9:15-CV-0089 (DNH/DJS), 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 159831, at *7, 2016 WL 6820378, at
*2 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 2016).
57. See, e.g., Covington v. Sailormen Inc., 274 F.R.D. 692, 693 (N.D. Fla. 2011)
A5[B]oilerplate, shotgun-style objections are not consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedures’ goal of securing ‘the 4ust> speedy> and inexpensive determination of every ac<
tion.’-@.
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and act so as 5to facilitatFeE settlement.-58 Not amended for forty-five years,59
Rule 12Ab@ embodies its drafters’ intent to avoid delay and excessive cost in
litigation.60 :n fact> its reference to 5wasteful pretrial activities- was directed
at 5the problem of procrastination and delay by attorneys in a context in
which scheduling is especially important—discovery>- and its allusion to
5lack of management- was intended to police 5various motions that other<
wise might be used as stalling techni'ues.-61 Arguably, any evasive response
to an apposite interrogatory or request for production runs afoul of Rule 16.62
!nnouncing discovery’s negligible relevancy standard—5FpEarties may
obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any
party’s claim or defense- and> as of Hecember 1> 2013> 5proportional to the
needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the
action> the amount in controversy> the parties’ relative access to relevant in<
formation> the parties’ resources> the importance of the discovery in resolving
the issues, and whether the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit>- and> 5FiEnformation within this scope of discovery
need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable-63—Rule 26 prescribes
58. FED. R. CIV. P. 12Aa@$ /hio 7at’l Life !ssurance Corp. v. Langkau> 333 F. !pp’x
244> 233 A11th Cir. 2000@. .ome argue for more active involvement by 4udges in a case’s
management. See generally Steven Baicker-McKee, Reconceptualizing Managerial Judges,
65 AM. U. L. REV. 353 (2015).
59. FED. R. CIV. P. 12 advisory committee’s note to 1013 amendment.
60. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12 advisory committee’s note to 2002 amendment A5!n order
that includes the parties’ agreement may be helpful in avoiding delay and excessive cost in
discovery.-@.
61. FED. R. CIV. P. 12 advisory committee’s note to 1013 amendment$ see also Marcum v. Zimmer, 163 F.R.D. 250, 253 (S.D. W. Va. 1995) (discussing the significance of scheduling orders issued pursuant to Rule 16).
62. See, e.g., Russell v. Daiichi-Sankyo, Inc., No. 11-34-BLG-CSO, 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 49161, at *364, 2012 WL 1161435, at *1 (D. Mont. Apr. 6, 2012) (first quoting Covington, 274 F.R.D at 693; then Lurensky v. Wellinghoff, 258 F.R.D. 27, 30 (D.D.C. 2009)).
Unsurprisingly> 5courts have shown no reticence in openly and vocally expressing their dis<
pleasure with parties who fail to communicate and cooperate with one another on e-discovery
issues.- Brian C. +ick ( 7eil C. Magnuson> The Promise of a Cooperative and Proportional
Discovery Process in North Carolina: House Bill 380 and the New State Electronic Discovery
Rules, 34 CAMPBELL L. REV. 233, 253654 (2012).
63. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also, e.g.> ,... Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n
v. Parnon Energy, Inc., 593 F. !pp’x 32> 32 A2d Cir. 2014@ A'uoting Oppenheimer Fund v.
Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978)) A5Relevance to the subject matter under Rule 26 is construed broadly to encompass any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other
matter that could bear on> any issue that is or may be in the case.- Ainternal 'uotation marks
omitted)); Lewis v. ACB Bus. Servs., Inc.> 133 F.3d 310> 402 A2th Cir. 1001@ A5The scope of
discovery under the FrulesE is traditionally 'uite broad.-@$ Teichgraeber v. Mem‘l ,nion Corp.
of Emporia State Univ.> 032 F. .upp. 1223> 1223 AH. 8an. 1002@ A5Hiscovery relevance is
minimal relevance, which means it is possible and reasonably calculated that the request will
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.- Acitation omitted) (internal quotation marks
omitted@@. 7otably> although Rule 22Ab@’s relevance standard was ostensibly heightened in
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a party’s proper comportment during discovery in two distinct subsections.
First, Rule 26(b)(5), relevant if the protesting party asserts a privilege or
withholds a document as attorney work-product, compels this selfsame party
to A1@ 5expressly make thFis kind ofE claim- and A2@ 5describe the nature of
the documents, communications, or tangible things not produced or disclosed
. . . in a manner that, without revealing information itself privileged or protected> will enable other parties to assess the claim.-64 The required log must,
therefore, be sufficiently detailed so as to allow court and party to determine
whether the essentials of the asserted privilege or protection have been satisfied.65 For example> while 5a [party asserting] the attorney-client privilege
must make at least a minimal showing that the communication involved legal
matters>- that showing need not be 5onerous and may be satisfied by as little
as a statement in the privilege log explaining the nature of the legal issue for
which advice was sought.-66 In another panel’s words> minimally sufficient
logs are not re'uired to be 5precise to the point of pedantry- or to contain
5infinitely detailed information.-67 The disclosures made pursuant to Rule
2000 by the replacement of the phrase 5the sub4ect matter of the action- with 5claim or defense
of any party>- FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment> this alteration
has apparently had little practical effect, Beisner, supra note 26, at 578679, though it was
somewhat feared, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in a Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation
on the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 18622 (2001). Rule 26(b)(1)
still allows a court to order discovery as to 5any matter relevant to the subject matter involved
in the action- upon a showing of 5good cause.- FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); cf. In re Cooper Tire
& Rubber Co., 568 F.3d 1180, 188690 (10th Cir. 2009). In addition, despite the addition of
the proportional language to Rule 26(b)(1) in 2015, that requirement had been lodged in Rule
26(b)(2)(C) since 1983. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, REPORT TO COMM. ON RULES OF
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE 7 (May 2, 2014); United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint Educ.,
Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 237640 (S.D. Cal. 2015) (applying these factors to limit discovery prior
to this amendment).
64. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5)(A); In re .anta Fe :nt’l Corp.> 272 F.3d 703> 710 A3th Cir.
2001) (citing rule).
65. E.g., Avgoustis v. Shinseki, 639 F.3d 1340, 1345646 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (finding
that the disclosure of specific subject matter in a privilege log would not itself implicate attorney-client privilege); United States v. Constr. Prods. Research, 73 F.3d 464, 473674 (2d Cir.
1996) (finding privilege logs inefficiently detailed when they merely stated 5Fax: Whistle<
blower !rticle- or 5.ummary of Enclosures- and characteriBed the documents as 5attorneyclient communicationFsE- without explanation@.
66. In re Search Warrant Executed at Law Offices of Stephen Garea, Suite 422, City
Centre One, 100 Federal Plaza East, Youngstown, Ohio, No. 97-4112, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS
3861, at *6, 1999 WL 13749900, at *162 (6th Cir. Mar. 5, 1999), cited in Cooey v. Strickland,
269 F.R.D. 643, 649 (S.D. Ohio 2010). One court has summarized the recurrent essentials,
stating that the privilege log should 5identify each document and the individuals who were
parties to the communications, providing sufficient detail to permit a judgment as to whether
the document is at least potentially protected from disclosure.- Bowne of 7.G.C.> :nc. v. !m<
Base Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
67. In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 274 F.3d 563, 576 (1st Cir. 2001). True, this case
discussed Rule 45(d)(2) and not Rule 26(b)(5)(A). Id. But 5the substantive requirements of
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22Aa@> 5FuEnless the court orders otherwiseF>E must be made at least 30 days
before trial.-68
.econd> per Rule 22Ag@A1@> to 5every discovery re'uest> response> or ob<
4ection>- an attorney must sign> signifying his or her adherence to a singular
behavioral code.69 By so doing> the signature’s owner certifies 5that to the
best of the person’s knowledge> information> and belief formed after a rea<
sonable in'uiry>- that re'uest> response> or ob4ection is 5consistent with theFE
rules and warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law> or for established new law>5not interposed for any improper purpose> such as to harass> cause unneces<
sary delay> or needlessly increase the cost of litigation>- and 5neither unrea<
sonable nor unduly burdensome or expensive . . . .-70 As the advisory committee’s official comment explains> Rule 22Ag@A1@ 5imposes an affirmative
duty to engage in pretrial discovery in a responsible manner that is consistent
with the spirit and purposes of Rules 22 through 37>- serving as 5a deterrent
to both excessive discovery and evasion.-71 Caveats, however, are in order.
Though it thereby encodes an ob4ective standard 5similar to the one imposed
by Rule 11>- but distinct from the certification re'uirement mandated by
Rules 30 and 33, Rule 26(g) does not compel an attorney 5to certify the truth<
fulness of the client’s factual responses to a discovery re'uest- or 5to disclose
privileged communications or work product in order to show that a discovery
re'uest> response> or ob4ection is substantially 4ustified.-72 Only a reasonable
investigation, as adjudged by weighing a case’s particular circumstances> is

the two rules are the same.- Neelon v. Krueger, No. 12-cv-11198-IT, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
29146, at *7 n.3, 2015 WL 1037992, at *2 n.3 (D. Mass. Mar. 10, 2015).
68. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(B); see also Smith v. Pfizer, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 278, 282
(M.D. Tenn. 2010) (listing the pretrial disclosures required by Rule 26(a)(3)(B)).
69. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(i)6(iii); see also Younes v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 312 F.R.D.
202> 704 AH.7.9. 2013@ A5Rule 26(g) by its terms applies to ob4ections to discovery.-@.
70. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(B)(i)6Aiii@. 5FWEith respect to a disclosure>- the attorney
must certify it to be 5complete and correct as of the time it is made- only. FED. R. CIV. P.
26(g)(1)(A); see also Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (explaining that Rule 26(g)(1)(A) does not require an attorney, in large-data cases, to certify that
its 5discovery response is ‘complete>’ but rather incorporates the Rule 22Ab@A2@AC@ proportion<
ality principle-@.
71. FED. R. CIV. P. 22Ag@ advisory committee’s note to 1013 amendment$ see also,
e.g., Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 476 (N.D. Tex. 2014) (quoting note).
72. FED. R. CIV. P. 22Ag@ advisory committee’s note to 1013 amendment$ !pex /il
Co. v. Belcher Co. of N.Y., 855 F.2d 1009, 1017 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting note).
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impelled.73 Judiciously understood, Rules 26(b)(5) and (g) can be construed
as banning outright evasion in the course of discovery.74
One final provision buttresses these paragraphs’ themes. :n accordance
with Rule 20> unless 5FaE court orders otherwise>- the parties may by mutual
stipulation modify the 5procedures governing or limiting discovery.-75 Rule
20Ab@ ad4oins a clear limitation to this franchise: 5F!E stipulation extending
the time for any form of discovery must have court approval if it would interfere with the time set for completing discovery, for hearing a motion, or
for trial>-76 impliedly requiring that any such agreement be committed to
writing.77 7onetheless> Rule 20Ab@ was 5revised to give greater opportunity
for litigants to agree upon modifications to the procedures governing discovery or to limitations upon discovery.-78 As such, approbation of a particular
manner—5FcEounsel are encouraged to agree on less expensive and time-consuming methods to obtain information, as through voluntary exchange of
documents . . . .-79—is Rule 20’s unmistakable purpose.80

73. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1)(i)-(iii); see also Jones v. Tauber & Balser, P.C., 503 B.R.
162, 202603 A7.H. Ga. 2013@ Aconcluding that the failure to conduct 5a reasonable investiga<
tion- under Rule 26(g)(1) justified the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37).
74. See Symposium, E-=iscovery( Where We’ve Been, Where We Are, Where We’re
Going, 12 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 20 (2014) (explicating Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs.
Co., 253 F.R.D. 354 (D. Md. 2008), in which Rule 26(g) was construed as certifying the re'uest’s compliance with the proportionality touchstones presently encoded in Rule
26(b)(2)(C)).
75. FED. R. CIV. P. 29(b); Owen v. Angst (In re Angst), 428 B.R. 776, 781 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohio 2010).
76. FED. R. CIV. P. 29(b); see also Banks v. City of Phila., 309 F.R.D. 287, 292 93
AE.H. Pa. 2013@ A5Rule 29(b) requires that informal agreements extending discovery be approved by the court>- rendering 5informal discovery agreements . . . unenforceable-@.
77. See Marfolk Coal Co. v. Smith, No. 5:10-0069, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4085, at
*15 n.8, 2011 WL 111880, at *4 n.8 (S.D. W. Va. Jan. 13, 2011); Henry S. Noyes, If You
(Re)Build It, They Will Come: Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s
Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 579, 609610 (2007).
78. FED. R. CIV. P. 20 advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendment$ see also David
H. Taylor & Sara M. Cliffe, Civil Procedure by Contract: A Convoluted Confluence of Private
Contract and Public Procedure in Need of Congressional Control, 35 U. RICH. L. REV. 1085,
1108610 (2002) (dissecting Rule 29).
79. FED. R. CIV. P. 20 advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendment.
80. Daniel B. Winslow & Alexandra Bedell-Healy, Economical Litigation Agreements( The “Civil Litigation Prenup” 2eed, Basis, and 6nforceability, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL.
L.J. 123> 131 A2010@ A5The provisions allowing agreements were adopted to further the pur<
pose of the FRCP to ensure speedy> 4ust> and inexpensive proceedings.-@.
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69trinsic %ource’s Mandate( The Model &ules of Professional
Conduct

Albeit lacking in statutory force, the Model Rules of Professional Conduct too play a starring role in boilerplate’s regulation. Model Rule 3.4 declares: 5F! lawyer shall not>E in pretrial procedure> make a frivolous discov<
ery request or fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally
proper discovery re'uest by an opposing party.-81 Indeed, as commentary
adverts> 5FfEair competition in the adversary system is secured by prohibi<
tions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing
witnesses> obstructive tactics in discovery procedure> and the like.-82 Yet, for
all the force of these proclamations> 5the Code essentially licenses pure par<
tisanship except in the most extreme cases>- effectively offering 5little or no
guidance for an attorney who is concerned to balance her competing obligations in discovery practice>-83 and it stands forth, like other model codes, as
essentially hortatory.84 Under the Model Rules, 5frivolous- conduct during
discovery is thus punishable,85 but that term’s precise definition remains elusive, stymieing their utility.

3.

Rule 33

!lthough 5FtEhe flexibility and potency of oral depositions is in large
part lacking in written interrogatories>- this old tool 5fulfillFsE important

81. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(d) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007); Jayne H.
Lee, Inc. v. Flagstaff Indus. Corp., 173 F.R.D. 651, 654 n.9 (D. Md. 1997) (citing rule). In this
article> any reference to 5Model Rule- or 5Model Rules- is to one or more of the Model Rules
of Professional Conduct.
82. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 3.4(d); In re Nicole Energy Servs., Inc., 385
B.R. 201, 222 n.18 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) (quoting comment).
83. W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REV. 895, 919
(1996).
84. Cf., e.g.> ,nited .tates v. !pel> 134 .. Ct. 1144> 1131 A2014@ A5F/Epinions Fin
,nited .tates’ !ttorney’s Manual> among other executive branch documentsE are not intended
to be binding.-@$ ,nited .tates v. 9ones> 7o. 10-CR-60, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8724, at *116
12, *12 n.36, 2011 WL 320917, at *4 & n.36 (M.D. La. Jan. 28, 2011) (collecting cases standing for the 5well-established- principle that 5Hepartment of 9ustice guidelines and policies do
not create enforceable rights for criminal defendants-@.
85. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS: FRIVOLOUS
ADVOCACY § 110(3) (2000).
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functions.-86 Capped at 5no more than 25[,] . . . including all discrete subparts- and unless a court allows otherwise>87 written interrogatories posed
pursuant to Rule 33 may relate to any matter that may be inquired under Rule
22Ab@A1@’s minimal relevance standard.88 Additional interrogatories may be
sought, but only if the propounding party can satisfy the proportionality criteria set forth in Rule 26(b)(1) and (2).89 Unlike an objection to a request for
an admission> 5FaEn interrogatory is not ob4ectionable merely because it asks
for an opinion or contention that relates to fact or the application of law to
fact.-90 ! court may nonetheless order that such interrogatories 5need not be
answered until designated discovery is complete, or until a pretrial conference or some other time.-91 In such cases, upon the moving party lies the
burden of showing that 5securing early answers to its contention 'uestions
will materially advance the goals of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.-92
Under Rule 33, interrogatories 5must be answered- either 5by the party
to whom they are directed- or 5if that party is a public or private corporation>
a partnership, an association, or a governmental agency, by any officer or
agent> who must furnish the information available to the party.-93 An answer
is valid if the question was itself 5separately and fully- answered> 5to the
extent it is not ob4ected to> . . . in writing under oath-94 and if the ground for

86. Holtzoff, supra note 32, at 214; see also Edson R. Sunderland, Scope and Method
of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863, 875676 (1933) (summarizing the comparative
weaknesses of interrogatories as to oral depositions).
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 33Aa@A1@$ .uperior Commc’ns v. Earhugger> :nc.> 237 F.R.H. 213>
217611 AC.H. Cal. 2000@ A'uoting Rule 33Aa@A1@@. !dmittedly> the term 5discrete subpartshas no certain meaning> but 5courts generally agree that ‘interrogatory subparts are to be
counted as one interrogatory . . . if they are logically or factually subsumed within and necessarily related to the primary 'uestion.’- Trevino v. !CB !m.> :nc.> 232 F.R.H. 212> 214 A7.H.
Cal. 2006) (alteration in original) (citing Safeco of Am. v. Rawston, 181 F.R.D. 441, 445 (C.D.
Cal. 1998)).
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(2); Nimkoff v. Dollhausen, 262 F.R.D. 191, 195 (E.D.N.Y.
2009) (quoting Rule 33(a)(2)).
89. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(1). Like the transfer of the proportionality language moved
from Rule 26(b)(2)(C) into Rule 26(b)(1), this change made explicit what had already been
implicit. See FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment A5Rule 33 is
amended in parallel with Rules 30 and 31 to reflect the recognition of proportionality in Rule
22Ab@A1@.-@.
90. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1)(A), with FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(2).
91. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(a)(2); In re Domestic Drywall Antitrust Litig., 300 F.R.D. 228,
229 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (quoting Rule 33(a)(2)).
92. Fischer & Porter Co. v. Tolson, 143 F.R.D. 93, 96 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (quoting In re
Convergent Techs. Sec. Litig., 108 F.R.D. 328, 339 (N.D. Cal. 1985)).
93. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(1)(A)6(B); Abrams v. Ciba Specialty Chems. Corp., 265
F.R.D. 585, 587 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (quoting Rule 33(b)(1)).
94. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(3); Pederson v. Preston, 250 F.R.D. 61, 64 (D.D.C. 2008)
(citing Rule 33(b)(3)).
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ob4ecting was stated 5with specificity.-95 As this provision has been widely
construed> answers must be 5true> explicit, responsive, complete, and candid,-96 for this paragraph was 5added to make clear that ob4ections must be
specifically justified, and that unstated or untimely grounds for objection ordinarily are waived- and ought to be 5read in light of Rule 22Ag@.-97 At present> therefore> 5incomplete or evasive- answers are forbidden> the proper
punishment limned in Rule 37(a).98 Any ground for objection not timely
stated is 5waived unless the court> for good cause> excuses the failure.-99
Malleable> the term 5good cause- ostensibly encompasses legitimate reliance
on the traditional objections,100 assuming their grounds are specifically stated
and assiduously defended.101

4.

Rule 34

Rule 34 allows a party to demand another to 5produce and permit the
requesting party or its representative to inspect> copy> test> or sample- a num<
ber of 5documents- and 5any designated tangible things- or 5permit entry
onto designated land or other property possessed or controlled by the responding party.-102 For the request to be binding and effective> it 5must de<
scribe with reasonable particularity each item or category of items to be inspected- and 5specify a reasonable time> place> and manner for the inspection
and for performing the related acts.-103 :t may also 5specify the form or forms
95. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4); United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius Baer &
Co., Ltd., 276 F.R.D. 396, 399 (D.D.C. 2011) (quoting Rule 33(b)(4)).
96. Walls v. Paulson, 250 F.R.D. 48, 50 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Equal Rights Ctr. v.
Post Props., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2007)); accord Hansel v. Shell Oil Corp., 169
F.R.D. 303, 305 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
97. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendment$ .aria v. Mass.
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 228 F.R.D. 536, 539 n.1 (S.D. W. Va. 2005) (citing note).
98. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 1070 amendment.
99. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4); McKissick v. Three Heer !ss’n L.P.> 223 F.R.H. 33> 37
(D. Conn. 2010) (quoting Rule 33(b)(4)).
100. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Rawstrom, 183 F.R.D. 668, 671 n.2 (C.D. Cal. 1998)
A5There might be circumstances in which stating all ob4ections in the initial response to an
interrogatory would vitiate some of the other objections interposed or so impair the rights of
the responding party that good cause would exist.-@$ cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 33 advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendment Aimplying that Rules 22Ab@A3@ and 33Ab@A4@ should to be construed concurrently).
101. When so supported, these objections are not truly boilerplate. It is the existence
of such support that removes the brand of boilerplate from an objection. Context, as in much
of law, matters greatly.
102. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a)(1)6(2); United States v. 2121 Celeste Rd. SW, 307 F.R.D.
572, 582 (D.N.M. 2015) (quoting Rule 34(a)).
103. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(A)6(B); U.S. Bancorp Equip. Fin., Inc. v. Babylon
Transit, Inc., 270 F.R.D. 136, 140 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (quoting Rule 34(b)(1)).
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in which electronically stored information is to be produced.-104 The test for
the kind of reasonable particularity mandated by Rule 34(b)(1)(A) is
5whether the re'uest places the party upon ‘reasonable notice of what is
called for and what is not.’-105 Inspired by electronically stored information’s
modern proliferation, paragraphs (D) and (E) center on the production of
these inimitable documents.106
For every item or category, a response can take one of two forms, either
5statFingE that inspection and related activities will be permitted as re'uestedor 5statFingE with specificity the grounds for ob4ecting to the re'uest> includ<
ing the reasons.-107 In language intended to be redolent of Rule 33(b)(4), as
of December 1, 2015, Rule 34 requires both that an objection 5state whether
any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of that ob4ectionand that an ob4ection 5to part of a re'uest . . . specify the part and permit
inspection of the rest.-108 In 1993, the advisory committee elucidated the duty
imposed by the former sentence: 5F:Ef a re'uest for production is ob4ectiona<
ble only in part, production should be afforded with respect to the unobjectionable portions.-109 Seemingly, to object properly under Rule 34, a respondent must unambiguously 5identify the particular portion which is not
being responded to on the basis of the FstatedE ob4ection>-110 Rule 34(b) regarded as providing for procedures 5essentially the same as that in Rule

104. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(1)(C); In re Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. Plastic Coolant Tubes
Prods. Liab. Litig., 279 F.R.D. 447, 449 (S.D. Ohio 2012) (quoting Rule 34(b)(1)(c)).
105. Kidwiler v. Progressive Paloverde Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 193, 202 (N.D. W. Va.
2000); see also, e.g., Haeger v. Graham, 267 F.R.D. 486, 493 (N.D. W. Va. 2010) (quoting
Kidwiler, 192 F.R.D. at 202); Lopez v. Chertoff, No. CV 07-1566-LEW, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 50419, at *5, 2009 WL 1575214, at *2 (E.D. Cal. June 2, 2009) (same); Bruggeman
ex rel. Bruggeman v. Blagojevich, 219 F.R.D. 430, 436 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (quoting Parsons v.
Jefferson-Pilot Corp., 141 F.R.H. 401> 412 AM.H.7.C. 1002@@ A5The test for reasonable partic<
ularity is whether the re'uest places a party upon ‘reasonable notice of what is called for and
what is not.’-@.
106. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(D)6(E). The advisory committee divulged as much:
5FTEhe growth in electronically stored information and in the variety of systems for creating
and sorting such information has been dramatic.- FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s
note to 2000 amendment.
107. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B); Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 483 (N.D.
Tex. 2014) (quoting pre-2015 version of Rule 34(b)(2)(B)).
108. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C); Patrick v. PHH Mortg. Corp., 298 F.R.D. 333, 336
(N.D. W. Va. 2014) (quoting Rules 33(b)(4) and 34(b)(2)(C)).
109. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendment.
110. Aheger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 906 F. Supp. 2d 938, 976 (D. Ariz.
2012).
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33-$111 in point of fact> Rule 34’s latest incarnation appears to ratify this formerly conjectured congruence.112 Accordingly, although it has never included an automatic waiver provision like Rule 33(b)(4),113 courts have repeatedly imported the latter’s language into Rule 34,114 a penchant roundly
praised by scholars and practitioners.115

5.

Rule 36

With antecedents in equity and state procedures,116 Rule 36 allows a
party to serve on another 5a written re'uest to admit . . . the truth of any
matters within the scope of Rule 26(b)(1) relating to (A) facts, the application
of law to fact, or opinions about either; and (B) the genuineness of any described documents.-117 .o phrased> Rule 32 cannot be used to compel 5an
admission of a conclusion of law.-118 5:f a matter is not admitted>- Rule
111. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1070 amendment$ Mainstreet
Collection> :nc. v. 8irkland’s> :nc.> 270 F.R.D. 238, 240 (E.D.N.C. 2010) (quoting the advisory committee note).
112. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment Astating that
Rule 34Ab@A2@AB@> as amended> 5adopts the language of Rule 33Ab@A4@- in order to 5eliminatFeE
any doubt that less specific ob4ections might be suitable under Rule 34-@$ Ries v. Ardinger (In
re Adkins Supply, Inc.), 555 B.R. 579, 587 n.8 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2016) (quoting comment).
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4).
114. Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., Inc., 285 F.R.H. 330> 320 AH. Md. 2012@ A5!ll
objections to document production requests must be stated with particularity and specificity;
ob4ections may not be ‘boilerplate.’-@$ !utotech Techs. L.P. v. !utomationdirect.com> :nc.>
236 F.R.D. 396, 398 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (stating that, although Rule 34(b) does not include
an automatic waiver provision> 5courts are uniform in their interpretation of the rules as per<
mitting a finding of waiver where objections are not timely made and the objector cannot show
good cause for the delay-@$ Wagner v. .t. Paul Fire ( Marine :ns. Co.> 231 F.R.H. 411> 423
(N.D. W. Va. 2006) Afinding it 5well settled- that 5the failure to timely ob4ect under Rule 34results in a waiver of that objection); Hall v. Sullivan, 231 F.R.D. 468, 473674 (D. Md. 2005)
Aciting case law showing that 5other courts addressing this issue long have ruled that a failure
to raise an objection in an answer to a Rule 34 document production request may constitute
waiver-@$ Rivera v. 8mart Corp.> 100 F.R.H. 201> 300 AH.P.R. 2000@ A5FTEhe ob4ecting party
must be specific enough in its objections to support its privilege, but not too specific as to
divulge privileged information.-@$ Pulsecard> :nc. v. Hiscovery Card .ervs.> :nc.> 121 F.R.H.
295, 303 (D. Kan. 1996) A5Although Fed. R. Civ. P. 34, governing production of documents
and things, provides no similar language with respect to specificity and waiver of objections,
no reason exists to distinguish between interrogatories and requests for production.-@.
115. See generally Daniel C. Girard & Todd I. Espinosa, Limiting Evasive Discovery:
A Proposal for Three Cost-Saving Amendments to the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 473
(2010).
116. FED. R. CIV. P. 32 advisory committee’s note to 1037 adoption.
117. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(1); Huon Le v. Krepps (In re Krepps), 476 B.R. 646, 649
n.4 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2012) (citing Rule 36(a)(1)); Buzz Off Insect Shield, LLC v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 606 F. Supp. 2d 571, 593 (M.D.N.C. 2009) (same).
118. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 60 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1057 (S.D. Cal. 1999); see
also, e.g., Tobkin v. Fla. Bar (In re Tobkin@> 371 F. !pp’x 022> 024 A11th Cir. 2014@ Afinding
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32Aa@A4@ continues> 5the answer must specifically deny it or state in detail
why the answering party cannot truthfully admit or deny it.-119 On the nature
of an objection, the Rule is clear: 5The grounds for ob4ecting . . . must be
stated.-120 ! party> however> may not ob4ect 5solely on the ground that the
request presents a genuine issue for trial.-121 5!FnyE denial must fairly re<
spond to the substance of the matter>- and the answer must specify the ob4ec<
tionable party 5when good faith re'uires that . . . FitE 'ualify an answer or
deny only a part of a matter.-122 A 5lack of knowledge or information as a
reason for failing to admit or deny- suffices if the ob4ecting party 5has made
reasonable inquiry and that the information it knows or can readily obtain is
insufficient to enable it to admit or deny.-123 Rule 32 5serves two vital purposes> both of which are designed to reduce trial time- first> 5to facilitate
proof with respect to issues that cannot be eliminated from the case>- and
second> 5to narrow the issues by eliminating those that can be.-124 A proper
request for admission must be 5simple> direct> and concise so FitE may be
admitted or denied with little or no explanation or 'ualification.-125

reliance on an admission misplaced for this reason); Newby v. Enron Corp. (In re Enron Corp.
Secs., Derivative ( ER:.! Litig.@> 722 F. .upp. 2d 042> 030 A..H. Tex. 2010@ A5Rule 32
cannot be used to compel an admission of a conclusion of law.-@.
119. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(4); McMahan v. Adept Process Servs., 279 F.R.D. 356, 363
n.8 (E.D. Va. 2011) (quoting Rule 36(a)(4)).
120. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(5); Lynn v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., Inc., 285 F.R.D. 350,
363 (D. Md. 2012) (applying Rule 36(a)(5)).
121. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(5); Cutino v. Untch, 303 F.R.D. 413, 414 (S.D. Fla. 2014)
(quoting Rule 36(a)(5)).
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(4); Tequila Centinela, S.A. de C.V. v. Bacardi & Co., 247
F.R.D. 198, 202 (D.D.C. 2008) (quoting Rule 36(a)(4)).
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 36(a)(4); Yoder & Frey Auctioneers, Inc. v. EquipmentFacts,
L.L.C., 774 F.3d 1065, 1076 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Rule 36(a)(4)).
124. FED. R. CIV. P. 32 advisory committee’s note to 1070 amendment$ see also, e.g.,
Adventis, Inc. v. Consol. Prop. Holdings, Inc.> 124 F. !pp’x 120> 172 A4th Cir. 2003@ A5The
purpose of . . . [Rule 36] admissions is to narrow the array of issues before the court, and thus
expedite both the discovery process and the resolution of the litigation.-@$ Carney v. :R. AIn
re Carney@> 231 F.3d 413> 410 A3th Cir. 2001@ A5FRule 32’sE breadth allows litigants to winnow
down issues prior to trial and thus focus their energy and resources on disputed matter.-@.
125. Sommerfield v. City of Chi., 251 F.R.D. 353, 355 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (citing United
Coal Co. v. Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 967668 (3d Cir. 1988)); accord, e.g., Hill v.
Lappin, No. 3:10-CV-1743, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78396, at *14, 2012 WL 2049570, at *4
AM.H. Pa. 9une 2> 2012@ A5Rule 32 should not be used unless the statement of fact sought to
be admitted is phrased so that it can be admitted or denied without explanation.-) (quoting
United Coal Co. v. Powell Constr. Co., 839 F.2d 958, 967668 (3d Cir. 1988))).

2017]

6.

POLICING BOILERPLATE

225

Rule 37

5ProvidFingE generally for sanctions against parties or persons un4usti<
fiably resisting discovery>-126 Rule 37 authorizes punishment for various misdeeds. Pursuant to Rule 37Aa@A3@AB@> 5FaE party seeking discovery may move
for an order compelling an answer> designation> production> or inspection.-127
9ustification for such a motion arises whenever 5a deponent fails to answer a
'uestion asked under Rule 30>- 5a corporation fails to make a designation
under Rule 30Ab@A2@ or 31Aa@A4@>- if 5a party fails to answer an interrogatory
submitted under Rule 33,- or if 5a party fails to respond that inspection will
be permitted—or fails to permit inspection—as re'uested under Rule 34.-128
Crucially> the moving party must prove the other’s answers run afoul of these
encoded standards.129 If either the motion is granted or disclosure is ordered,
the court 5must . . . re'uire the party or deponent whose conduct necessitated
the motion, the party or attorney advising that conduct, or both to pay the
movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in making the motion> including at<
torney’s fees.-130 But such payment must not be ordered if 5the movant filed
the motion before attempting in good faith to obtain the disclosure or discovery without court action-$ 5the opposing party’s nondisclosure> response> or
objection was substantially 4ustified-$ or 5other circumstances make an
award of expenses un4ust.-131 The latter two exceptions, but not the first, apply when the motion is denied.132 For both subsections’ purposes> 5FsEubstan<

126. FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 1070 amendment$ Hawkins v.
Fulton Cty.> 02 F.R.H. 412> 410 A7.H. Ga. 1012@ A'uoting the advisory committee’s note@$ see
also Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763 (1980) (discussing possible sanctions
for failure to comply with discovery orders).
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 37Aa@A3@AB@$ Hill v. Emory ,niv.> 342 F. !pp’x 300> 302 A11th
Cir. 2009) (quoting Rule 37(a)(3)AB@@. .ubsection A!@ of Rule 27Aa@A3@ applies 5FiEf a party
fails to make a disclosure re'uired by Rule 22Aa@.- FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A).
128. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(B)(i)6Aiv@$ .cruggs v. :nt’l Paper Co.> 271 F.R.H. 201>
701 (S.D. Ga. 2012) (quoting Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(iv)); Huthnance v. Dist. of Columbia, 268
F.R.D. 120, 121 (D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Rule 37(a)(3)(B)(i)6(iv)).
129. E.g., Equal Rights Ctr. v. Post Props., 246 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2007); Daiflon
Inc. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 534 F.2d 221, 227 (10th Cir. 1976).
130. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A); Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Elston Self Serv. Wholesale
Groceries, Inc., 259 F.R.D. 323, 326 (N.D. Ill. 2009) (quoting Rule 37(a)(5)(A)).
131. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i)6(iii); Drouin v. Symetra Life Ins. Co., 242 F.R.D.
167, 168 (D. Mass. 2007) (quoting Rules 37(a)(5)(A)(i)6(iii)).
132. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(B); Carolina First Bank v. Stambaugh, 275 F.R.D. 463,
465 (W.D.N.C. 2011) (quoting Rule 37(a)(5)(B)).
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tially justified means that reasonable people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.-133 For all its potential bite, Rule 37(a) has
rarely been aggressively employed to regulate discovery abuse.134
Populated with the discretionary 5may>-135 Rule 37(c) is directed at failures to disclose, supplement, or admit.136 :f a party 5fails to provide infor<
mation or identify a witness as re'uired by Rule 22Aa@ or Ae@>- a court may
prohibit the use of that witness or information 5on a motion> at a hearing> or
at trial, unless the failure was substantially justified or is harmless.-137 Rather
than or as a supplement to this specified remedy> 5on motion and after giving
an opportunity to be heard>- a court 5may order payment of the reasonable
expenses . . . caused by the failure> inform the 4ury of the party’s failure[,]
and may impose other appropriate sanctions- specified in Rule
37(b)(2)(A).138 A failure to admit as required by Rule 36 may also lead, upon
the re'uesting party’s movement> to responsibility for the propounding
133. Maddow v. Procter & Gamble Co., 107 F.3d 846, 853 (11th Cir. 1997) (citing
Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988)); see also, e.g., Parsi v. Daioleslam, 778 F.3d
116, 127 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting Pierce> 417 ,... at 323@ A5A party is substantially justified
in opposing discovery or disobeying an order if there is a genuine dispute, or if reasonable
people could differ as to the appropriateness of the contested action.- Ainternal 'uotation marks
omitted@@$ Council for Tribal Emp’t Rights v. ,nited .tates> 110 Fed. Cl. 244> 230 AFed. Cl.
2013@ Aciting case law defining 5substantially 4ustified-@$ Ray v. Univ. of Tulsa (In re Ray),
283 B.R. 70, 81 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 2002) (quoting Pierce, 487 U.S. at 564665).
134. See Lindsey D. Blanchard, &ule /+(a)’s Loser-Pays “Mandate”( More Bark than
Bite, 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 109, 122626 (2011); see also, e.g., Grimm & Yellin, supra note 39,
at 302 Anoting that 5there does appear to be a reluctance to impose sanctions for discovery
violations throughout the courts-@$ Beckerman> supra note 4> at 334 A5FHEespite their theoret<
ical availability, serious sanctions for violations of the discovery rules are awarded rarely under Rule 37 . . . .-@.
135. BRYAN A. GARNER & ANTONIN SCALIA, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 112615 (2012). However, the advisory committee described this Rule as both
5automatic- and 5self-executing.- FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 1003
amendment; Yeti by Molly, Ltd. v. Deckers Outdoor Corp., 259 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir.
2001@ Aciting the advisory committee note@. 5To the extent that the Advisory Committee Note
calls Rule 37Ac@’s exclusion of evidence ‘automatic’ . . . that characterization cannot be
squared with the plain language of Rule 37(c)(1) itself.- Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469
F.3d 284, 298 (2d Cir. 2006).
136. FED. R. CIV. P. 37Ac@$ !mtrak v. Catalina Enters.> 147 F. !pp’x 371> 313 A4th Cir.
2003@ A5Rule 37Ac@A1@ expressly provides a district court with discretion to penalize a party
who fails—‘without substantial 4ustification’—to comply with procedural rules and court orders.-@. Rule 37 was amended in 2000 to include a party’s failure to supplement discovery as
required by Rule 26(e). FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c) advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment.
137. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1); Cruz v. Bristol Myers Squibb Co. PR, 777 F. Supp. 2d
321, 326 (D.P.R. 2011), aff’d, 200 F.3d 323 A1st Cir. 2012@ A5Failure to make appropriate
discovery disclosures as required by Rule 26 results in the failing party’s inability ‘to use that
information or witness to supply evidence on a motion, at a hearing, or at a trial, unless the
failure was substantially 4ustified or is harmless.’-@.
138. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(A)6(C); Asher v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 278 F.R.D. 608,
611 (D. Colo. 2011) (citing Rule 37(c)(1)(A)6(C)).
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party’s 5reasonable expenses> including attorney’s fees.-139 In fact, a court
must so mandate unless 5the re'uest was held ob4ectionable under Rule
36(a)[,] the admission sought was of no substantial importance[,] the party
failing to admit had a reasonable ground to believe that it might prevail on
the matterF>E or there was other good reason for the failure to admit.-140 5Bad
faith>- that hobgoblin so favored in vast swathes of modern and ancient 4u<
risprudence,141 has no place in the assessment of sanctions under Rule 37.142
Rule 37(d) addresses failures to attend a deposition, serve answers to
interrogatories, or respond to a request for inspection.143 Rule 37(d)(1) authoriBes a court to order sanctions 5on motion- if 5a party or a party’s officer>

139. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2); Kelly v. McGraw-Hill Cos., Inc., 279 F.R.D. 470, 472
A7.H. :ll. 2012@ Aexplaining the shifting of fees and expenses for a party’s failure to admit
what is requested under Rule 36). Before 2000, this provision constituted (c)(1). Sun River
Energy, Inc. v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1226 n.5 (5th Cir. 2015) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37
advisory committee’s note to 2000 amendment@.
140. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(2)(A)6AH@$ Benson Tower Condo. /wners !ss’n v. +ictau<
lic Co., 105 F. Supp. 3d 1184, 1193694 (D. Or. 2015) (acknowledging the exceptions found
in Rule 37(c)(2)(A)6(D) and explaining the purpose of Rule 37(c)(2)).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Gilbert, 198 F.3d 1293, 1298699 (11th Cir. 1999) (explaining bad faith within the context of the Hyde Amendment); Steele v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co.> 711 F.2d 441> 442 A7th Cir. 1012@ A5The common law of :llinois makes it a civil wrong
for a liability insurer to refuse> in bad faith> to settle litigation against the insured . . . .-@. The
devil may be more in the doctrine’s application than its existence. See Cox v. Cox (In re Cox),
247 B.R. 556, 564 (Bankr. H. Mass. 2000@ A5‘The meaning of good faith is simple honesty of
purpose.’ The meaning of bad faith is presumably the opposite.- A'uoting 8each v. Boya4ian
(In re Keach), 243 B.R. 851, 868 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2000))).
142. See, e.g., Design Strategy, Inc. v. Havis> 420 F.3d 214> 202 A2d Cir. 2002@ A5.ince
Rule 37(c)(1) by its terms does not require a showing of bad faith, we now hold that such a
re'uirement should not be read into the Rule.-@$ .. .tates Rack ( Fixture> :nc. v. .herwinWilliams Co., 318 F.3d 502> 302 A4th Cir. 2003@ A5Rule 37Ac@A1@ does not re'uire a finding of
bad faith or callous disregard of the discovery rules. While Rule 37(c)(1) requires the nondisclosure to be ‘without substantial 4ustification’ and harmful> neither of these re'uirements
suggests that the non-disclosing party must act in bad faith or otherwise culpably.-@$ Goun v.
Track> :nc.> 421 A2th Cir. 2003@ A5Rule 37 has no bad faith re'uirement.-@$ He+aney v. Cont’l
!m. :ns. Co.> 010 F.2d 1134> 1122 A11th Cir. 1003@ A5FTEhe 1070 amendments were specifically enacted to eliminate the possibility that a bad faith requirement would be read into the
rule, and they contain no suggestion that bad faith should remain a prerequisite when an attorney, as opposed to a client, is subjected to sanctions.- Acitation omitted@@. Even so> 5bad faithhas maintained its place as a prominent factor. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287
F.3d 936, 953654 (10th Cir. 2002) (incorporating bad faith into the set of factors to consider
when determining a Rule 26(g) violation); DiPirro v. United States, 43 F. Supp. 2d 327, 340
AW.H.7.G. 1000@ A5Precluding expert testimony under . . . [Rule 37(c)(1)] is a drastic remedy
and should only be applied in cases where the party’s conduct represents flagrant bad faith
and callous disregard for the re'uirements of Rule 22Aa@A2@AB@.- Acitation omitted@@.
143. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d); Keepers, Inc. v. City of Milford, 807 F.3d 24, 32 (2d Cir.
2015) (quoting Reilly v. Natwest Mkts. Grp., Inc., 181 F.3d 253, 268 (2d Cir. 1000@@ A5:f the
organizational deponent fails to comply by mak[ing] available such number of persons as will
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director, or managing agent . . . fails, after being served with proper notice,
to appear for that person’s depositionF>E or a party> after being properly served
with interrogatories under Rule 33 or a request for inspection under Rule 34,
fails to serve its answers> ob4ections> or written response.-144 That 5the discovery sought was ob4ectionable- is not an acceptable excuse 5unless the
party failing to act has a pending motion for a protective order under Rule
22Ac@.-145 As under Rule 37(c), Rule 37(d)(3) allows for the levying of the
sanctions enumerated in Rule 37(b@A2@A!@ in addition to or in lieu of 5the
reasonable expenses> including attorney’s fees> caused by the failure> unless
the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award
of expenses un4ust.-146 While Rule 37Aa@A4@ classifies an 5evasive responseas a failure to respond> it does so only 5for purposes of . . . subdivision Aa@>which governs motions for an order compelling discovery.147 No similar
statement is made in Rule 37(d)(1)(A)(ii), the lone paragraph authorizing
sanctions for 5failFingE to serve . . . answers> ob4ections> or written re<
sponseFsE- to another’s re'uest for production under Rule 34.148

7.

Other Powers149
i.

Statutory

Per statute, any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in a
federal court 5who so multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably
be able to give complete, knowledgeable and binding answers on its behalf, a court may impose sanctions under Rule 37[,] . . . including the preclusion of evidence.- Ainternal 'uotation
marks omitted)).
144. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(i)6(ii); Baker v. St. Paul Travelers Ins. Co., 670 F.3d
119, 124 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing rule).
145. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(2); Societe Civile Succession Guino v. Renoir> 303 F. !pp’x
334, 338 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Rule 37(d)(2) and the exception).
146. FED. R. CIV. P. 37Ad@A3@$ Cont’l Cas. Co. v. .t. Paul .urplus Lines :ns. Co.> 223
F.R.D. 510, 531 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (discussing sanctions within Rule 37(d)).
147. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4); Emerman v. Fin. Commodity Invs., L.L.C., No.
1:13cv2546, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148223, at *21, 2015 WL 6742077, at *7 (N.D. Ohio
Nov. 2, 2015) (citing Rule 37(a)(4)).
148. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(ii); see also Wang v. Bear Stearns Cos. (In re Bear
Stearns Cos. Sec., Deriv. & ERISA Litig.), 308 F.R.D. 113, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing rule
and distinguishing it from paragraph (d)(1)(A)(iii)).
149. Other inapposite sanctions provisions do exist. For example, though it constitutes
5the apex of sanctions law>- Houglas 9. Pepe> Persuading Courts to Impose Sanctions on Your
Adversary, 36 LITIG. 1, 1 (Winter 2010), Rule 11 has nothing to do with discovery, FED. R.
CIV. P. 11(d); see Hilburn v. Bayonne Parking Auth., 322 F. !pp’x 82, 85 (3d Cir. 2014)
(citing Rule 11(d)). Rule 41 allows only for dismissal, FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b); see Chandler v.
Daly, No. 06-2742-STA-tmp, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54857, at *869, 2008 WL 2783178, at
*3 (W.D. Tenn. July 17, 2008) (dismissing for discovery abuse pursuant to Rules 37 and
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and vexatious may be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess
costs> expenses> and attorneys’ fees incurred because of such conduct.-150
Broken into its discrete elements, so as to impose sanctions pursuant to §
1927, a court must find that an attorney (1) multiplied proceedings, (2) in an
unreasonable and vexatious manner, that (3) increased the cost of the proceedings.151 Like 5the various sanctioning provisions in the . . . [r]ules>- §
1927 does punish 5bad-faith conduct in litigation>-152 and its remedy’s 5principal purpose- is 5the deterrence of intentional and unnecessary delay in the
proceedings.-153 Castigated as one 5paradigm of discovery abuse>-154 boilerplate objections can be described as so intended, their very use prolonging a
particular litigation.155 Consequently, in spite of % 1027’s infrequent utilization in the boilerplate cases, evasive answers to interrogatories, as well as
any other course of conduct inimical to a matter’s smooth determination, can
fall within its clutches.156
Yet, several features of § 1927 blunt its usefulness in the judicial efforts
to curtail boilerplate. First, in unambiguously written text, it authorizes but
one punishment—the imposition of 5excess costs, expenses> and attorneys’
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct-157—and must be invoked
5to compensate the victims of dilatory practices- and not as 5a means of pun<
ishment.-158 Second, sanctions under § 1927 are only available against an
individual attorney and neither that adversary’s law firm159 nor the party that
he or she represents.160 Third, the standard under § 1927—5unreasonably and
41(b)), and Rule 56(h) applies only to bad faith affidavits submitted in support of a motion for
summary judgment, FED. R. CIV. P. 56(h)).
150. 21 ,...C. % 1027 A2012@. :n this !rticle> any references to 5% 1027- or 5.ection
1027- are to this statute unless otherwise noted.
151. In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 101 (3d Cir. 2008).
152. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42 (1981).
153. Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll. of Pa., 103 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir.
1996) (quoting Beatrice Foods v. New Eng. Printing, 899 F.2d 1171, 1177 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
154. Freydl v. Meringolo, No. 09 CIV. 07196 BSJ, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67742, at
*7, 2011 WL 2566087, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2011).
155. See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358 (D. Md.
2008); Piotrowski v. City of Hous., No. 95-4046, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10097, at *8 n.4,
1998 WL 268827, at *3 n.4 (S.D. Tex. May 5, 1998).
156. See Bates v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 83 F.R.D. 535, 539 (D.S.C. 1979)
(holding so, but declining to invoke § 1927).
157. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012) (emphasis added).
158. Hamilton v. Boise Cascade Express, 519 F.3d 1197, 1203 (10th Cir. 2008); see
also Kiefel v. Las Vegas Hacienda, Inc., 404 F.2d 1163, 1167 (7th Cir. 1968) (observing that
the power bestowed by § 1027 should be 5exerciseFdE only in instances of a serious and studied
disregard for the orderly processes of 4ustice-@.
159. Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 396 n.6 (6th Cir. 2009);
Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722624 (7th Cir. 2005).
160. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 280 F.3d 519, 525 (5th Cir. 2002).
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vexatiously-161—is high and murky.162 As a case in point, in some circuits,
5bad faith or . . . intentional misconduct- must be conclusively shown.163 The
Sixth Circuit> meanwhile> has directed its focus to whether 5‘an attorney
knows or reasonably should know that a claim pursued is frivolous, or that
his or her litigation tactics will needlessly obstruct the litigation of nonfrivolous claims.’-164 For these reasons> % 1027> already 5relativeFlyE dis<
useFdE>-165 affords little succor to boilerplate’s opponents.166
ii.

Inherent

Historically, courts have always been empowered to discipline an attorney who has 5acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive
reasons.-167 Unquestionably, litigation abuse qualifies.168 More debatably,
161. 28 U.S.C. § 1927; see also FDIC v. Conner, 20 F.3d 1376, 1384 (5th Cir. 1994)
A5Before a sanction under § 1927 is appropriate> the offending attorney’s multiplication of the
proceedings must be both ‘unreasonable’ and ‘vexatious.’-@.
162. Cf. Red Carpet Studios Div. of Source Advantage, Ltd. v. Sater, 465 F.3d 642,
242 A2th Cir. 2002@ A5% 1027 sanctions re'uire a showing of something less than sub4ective
bad faith> but something more than negligence or incompetence.-@$ Browning v. Kramer, 931
F.2d 340, 345 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that Section 1927 only authorizes shifting fees that are
associated with 5the persistent prosecution of a meritless claim-@$ Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors
of Am., Inc., 768 F.2d 1159, 1165 (10th Cir. 1985).
163. Compare In re Schaefer Salt Recovery, Inc., 542 F.3d 90, 101 (3d Cir. 2008),
with Cruz v. Savage, 896 F.2d 626, 631632 A1st Cir. 1000@ A5[W]hile an attorney's bad faith
will always justify sanctions under [S]ection 1927, we do not require a finding of subjective
bad faith as a predicate to the imposition of sanctions.-@.
164. Hall v. Liberty Life Assurance Co., 595 F.3d 270, 275676 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting Rentz, 556 F.3d at 396).
165. Pepe, supra note 149, at 4.
166. !s with the rules> depending on a lawyer’s misdeeds> other statutes may be rele<
vant. See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012).
167. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 45646 (1992) (citation omitted); see
also, e.g., Charbono v. Sumski (In re Charbono@> 700 F.3d 10> 13 A1st Cir. 2013@ A5FTEhe
contempt power is merely one of many inherent powers that a court possesses; it is not the
only type of inherent power that can be deployed.- Aciting Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43644));
Terra v. Rabo !grifinance> :nc.> 304 F. !pp’x 211> 200691 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Scaife v.
!ssociated !ir Ctr.> :nc.> 100 F.3d 402> 411 A3th Cir. 1002@@ A5Federal courts have an inherent
power ‘to sanction a party or attorney when necessary to achieve the orderly and expeditious
disposition of their dockets.’-@$ 9ean M. Cary> Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical
Cancer in Civil Litigation, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 561, 592694 (1996) (discussing the courts’
inherent judicial power to regulate attorney misconduct). In the exercise of this license, courts
enjoy much flexibility in formulating appropriate sanctions. Johnson v. SmithKline Beecham
Corp., No. 11-5782, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28210, at *35, 2015 WL 1004308, at *13 (E.D.
Pa. Mar. 9, 2015) (relying on First Bank of Marietta v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 307
F.3d 501, 515 (6th Cir. 2002) and Fellheimer, Eichen & Braverman, P.C. v. Charter Tech.,
Inc., 57 F.3d 1215, 1228 (3d Cir. 1995), to support the notion that courts have greater flexibility in formulating inherent authority sanctions).
168. Wendel, supra note 83, at 908, 908610; Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46.
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half-hearted compliance with the rules’ discovery obligations> as the use of
boilerplate reasonably signals, does so as well.169 Along with Rule 37, this
inherent power is the predominant method for managing and deterring noncompliance with the rules’ manifold obligations.170
As regards to policing boilerplate in particular, however, a problem
arises from two limitations upon this prerogative. First, courts disfavor reliance on such authority whenever an extant provision green-lights one or more
sanctions for the misconduct at issue.171 As one court observed, the inherent
power to penalize should only be used A1@ 5where no sanction established by
the Federal Rules or a pertinent statute is ‘up to the task’ of remedying the
damage done by a litigant’s malfeasance>- and A2@ 5when the sanction is tai<
lored to address the harm identified.-172 As another adjoined, this power
should be exercised with 5restraint and discretion-173 to manage those situations 5in which the conduct of a party or an attorney is egregious and no other
basis for sanctions exists>-174 5reach[ing] individuals and conduct not directly
addressed by other mechanisms.-175 Based on this paradigm, as the standard
set in Rule 37 is considered lower,176 conduct not awful enough to trigger a
169. Beckerman, supra note 4, at 571; see also Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. New
Images of Beverly Hills, 412 F.3d 1001> 1007 A0th Cir. 2007@ A5Where a party so damages the
integrity of the discovery process that there can never be assurance of proceeding on the true
facts, a case dispositive sanction may be appropriate.- A'uoting +alley Eng’rs v. Elec. Eng’g
Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1058 (9th Cir. 1998))).
170. See, e.g., Degen v. United States, 517 U.S. 820, 826627 (1996); Chambers, 501
U.S. at 44; Tom v. S.B., Inc., 280 F.R.D. 603, 610 (D.N.M. 2012).
171. See Ferguson v. +alero Energy Corp.> 114 A3d Cir. 2011@ A5F:Enherent-authority
sanctions are generally disfavored where another provision . . . authoriBes sanctions . . . .-@.
172. Klein v. Stahl GMBH & Co., 185 F.3d 98, 108 (3d Cir. 1999) (citing Chambers,
501 U.S. at 44, and Republic of Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 43 F.3d 65, 73 (3d Cir.
1995)); see also, e.g., Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Energy Gathering, 2 F.3d 1397, 1410
(5th Cir. 1993) (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 50631@ A5When parties or their attorneys engage
in bad faith conduct, a court should ordinarily rely on the Federal Rules as the basis for sanctions.-@.
173. Chambers, 501 U.S. at 44; Mullane v. Chambers, 333 F.3d 322, 338 (1st Cir.
2003).
174. Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252, 1265 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing Gillette Foods, Inc.
v. Bayernwald-Fruchteverwertung, GmbH, 977 F.2d 809, 813 (3d Cir. 1992)).
175. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 2 F.3d at 1411 (citing Chambers, 501 U.S. at 46647); see
also Flaksa v. Little River Marine Constr. Co.> 310 F.2d 113> 111 A3th Cir. 1021@ A5The inher<
ent power of a court to manage its affairs necessarily includes the authority to impose reasonable and appropriate sanctions upon errant lawyers practicing before it.-@ Afootnote omitted).
176. Sun River Energy, Inc. v. Nelson, 800 F.3d 1219, 1227 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting
Pierce v. ,nderwood> 417 ,... 332> 323 A1011@@ A5Rule 37Ac@A1@ re'uires only the absence of
substantial justification—a less stringent standard characteriBed as ‘not justified to a high degree> but . . . 4ustified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.’- Aalteration in origi<
nal)); He+aney v. Cont’l !m. :ns. Co.> 010 F.2d 1134> 1122 A11th Cir. 1003@ A5The language
‘advising such conduct’ in Rule 37 does not incorporate either heightened procedural requirements or a bad faith test into FRule 37E.-@.
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court’s dormant authority in the midst of discovery should be punished under
Rule 37, a prescription with a lighter burden. To wit, on such situations, Rule
37—and it alone—contains the relevant adjudicative touchstones and the
sole panoply of possible penalties. Second> in proving that a lawyer’s conduct
was 5egregious- or 5in bad faith>- a 5particulariBed showing- is often re<
quired.177 To make this demonstration, evidence must usually be presented
that 5the conduct at issue is A1@ entirely without color and A2@ motivated by
improper purposes>-178 an impossibly high evidentiary bar. In the worst of
cases, a court’s inherent power will allow it to levy 5a sanction for abuse of
the 4udicial process> or> in other words> for bad faith conduct in litigation.-179
But, whatever form it may take, boilerplate cannot be readily classified as an
example of such extreme maleficence—and, consequently, as the proper target of a court’s inherent resources.

III.
A.

CASE LAW180

PRELUDE

Three tales, and a variegated problem crystalized.
Sometime in January 2015, in a coastal district, a plaintiff served eighteen special interrogatories on a defendant’s counsel. More than fifty-two
days later> with the plaintiff’s consent> defendant’s counsel tendered a thir<
teen-page response. :t began with a section entitled 5General /b4ections>which contained an objection to each interrogatory 5to the extent that it is
overbroad and subjects . . . [it] to unreasonable and undue annoyance, oppression, burden, and expense, and seeks information which is neither relevant to the subject matter of this lawsuit nor reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence>- 5seeks information . . . protected from
discovery by virtue of the attorney-client privilege, the joint defense privilege> or any other recogniBed privilege or immunity- or that is itself 5propri<
ety information, trade secret information, information to subject to any protective orders>- and far more. Having stated these ob4ections> ones incorpo<
rated into every specific interrogatory response thereafter> one defendant’s
counsel repeated the same boilerplate in nearly every response—5vague and
ambiguous>- 5overbroad>- and the like—and added a 'ualifier to six: 5.ub<
ject to and without waiving the foregoing, defendant responds as follows . . .
.177. ,nited .tates v. :nt’l Bhd. of Teamsters> 041 F.2d 1331> 1343 A2d Cir. 1001@.
178. Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Scivantage, 564 F.3d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 2009)
(citing Schlafer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 337 (2d Cir. 1999)).
179. Farmer v. Banco Popular of N. Am., 791 F.3d 1246, 1256 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273, 1279 (10th Cir. 2011)).
180. These facts are drawn from three litigated cases; dates, names, and other identifying data have been omitted or changed.
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It began earlier, in November 2014, within the borders of marshier land.
There, a governmental plaintiff requested a number of documents pursuant
to Rule 34. To the response, the plaintiff objected, for the defendant had not
produced the requested documents as they are kept in the usual course of
business or organized and labeled them to correspond to the categories actually set forth in the plaintiff’s re'uest. While the magistrate 4udge would dis<
agree with the plaintiff as to this issue> he would find the defendant’s privi<
lege log to be wholly inadequate to support this shield’s invocation under
Rule 22Ab@A3@A!@. The descriptions of the withheld documents’ character and
subject matter struck him as absent or vague, leaving the opposing party unable to assess the validity of the privilege. (Indeed, too many examples could
be found for the final order to tally all with precision.@ The defendant’s fail<
ings convinced the magistrate judge to find that any privilege had been
waived and that all documents within the original re'uest’s broad scope must
be produced. The district court judge disagreed with this harsh remedy,
though he did not contest the log’s inade'uacy. Having won this reprieve> the
defendant proceeded to submit a new privileged log to a certain agency that
purported to identify all documents withheld as privileged in detail. Although
the defendants had affirmatively waived privilege across a significant number of subjects by asserting the advice of counsel affirmative defense, the
plaintiff observed, the privilege logs failed to correctly identify the subject
matters of items withheld as required by the rules. Two documents, inadvertently disclosed by a third-party vendor, revealed this discrepancy, though
neither court nor party wandered through the thousands of documents at issue. This time the magistrate 4udge’s finding of waiver was affirmed.
Years before, in a district more pluvial> a doctor re'uested 5copies of
any and all . . . materials> regardless of their source> in . . . Fdefendant’sE
possession on or before- a certain date. The defendant> naturally> 5ob4ectFed]
to this discovery request as overbroad, burdensome, and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.- But its response
continued: 5Without waiving these ob4ections . . . FdefendantE answers as fol<
lows: . . . [It] has no documents . . . responsive to this discovery re'uest.B.

ABSOLUTE BOILERPLATE

For decades, absolute boilerplate has provoked federal courts’ ire.181 In
a relatively unbroken chain of decisions,182 this boilerplate has been deplored
181. Matthew L. Jarvey, Note, Boilerplate Discovery Objections: How They Are Used,
Why They Are Wrong, and What We Can Do About Them, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 913, 916 (2013)
A5Federal courts have long disfavored boilerplate ob4ections.-@ Aciting .t. Paul Reinsurance
Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 512 (N.D. Iowa 2000)).
182. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358659 (D. Md. 2008)
(detailing these decisions).
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as abusive and improper, incompatible with discovery’s 5cooperative> antiobstructive norms>-183 and as 5borderFingE on being frivolous.-184 To reach
this conclusion that absolute boilerplate amounts to unacceptable 5shot<
gun-185 and 5Rambo-186 style opposition, examples of a lawyerly penchant
for 5FhEardball discovery>-187 courts and scholars have relied on two strands
of thought.188
First, courts have broadly construed and conjoined the language of
Rules 33 and 34, a tactic notably endorsed by the advisory committee in its
most current annotation to Rule 34.189 More precisely, in confronting the administrative variant of absolute boilerplate, multiple jurists have linked the

183. Beckerman, supra note 4, at 527; see also Mills v. E. Gulf Coal Preparation Co.,
230 F.R.H. 111> 130 A..H. W. +a. 2000@ A5FRulesE contemplate that in con4unction with dis<
closure, civil discovery is a process of elucidation and clarification of facts and circumstances
. . . . The civil discovery process is to be engaged in cooperatively.-@$ Wagner v. .t. Paul Fire
( Marine :ns. Co.> 231 F.R.H. 411> 422 A7.H. W. +a. 2002@ A5Parties must respond truthfully>
fully and completely to discovery or explain truthfully, fully and completely why they cannot
respond.- Aciting Hansel v. .hell /il Corp.> 120 F.R.H. 303> 303 AE.H. Pa. 1002@@).
184. Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 1997); see
also, e.g., Kaufman v. United States, No. 1:12-0237, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88875, at *13,
2013 WL 3237864, at *5 A..H. W. +a. 9une 23> 2013@ A5FBEoilerplate ob4ections regurgitating
words and phrases from Rule 22 are completely unacceptable Fresponses to Rule 34 re'uestsE.(citing Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc., v. Elk Run Coal Co., 246 F.R.D. 522, 528629
A..H. W. +a. 2007@@@$ .teed v. EverHome Mortg. Co.> 301 F. !pp’x 324> 371 A11th Cir. 2000@
Aobserving that a party would have been entitled to file a motion to compel based on another’s
boilerplate objections to certain discovery requests).
185. Covington v. Sailormen, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 692, 693 (N.D. Fla. 2011); Russell v.
Daiichi-Sankyo, Inc., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49161, at *3, 2012 WL 1161435, at *1 (D. Mont.
!pr. 2> 2012@ A5The recitation of ‘boilerplate> shotgun-style ob4ections’ are not consistent with
the re'uirements of discovery rules.-@.
186. McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Apffel, P.C. v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1486 (5th
Cir. 1990); see also Hall v. Louisiana, No. 12-657-BAJ-RLB, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77179,
at *566, 2014 WL 2560715, at *2 AM.H. La. 9une 2> 2014@ A5This prohibition against general
ob4ections to discovery re'uests has been long established.- Aciting Quarles, 894 F.2d at 18456
46)); Wurlitzer Co. (Holly Springs Div.) v. E.E.O.C., 50 F.R.D. 421, 424 (N.D. Miss. 1970)
A5[I]n conventional lawsuits in federal court, objections to interrogatories had to be specific,
and general objections that the information sought was irrelevant, immaterial, oppressive, conclusory or already in possession of the requesting party were insufficient.-@.
187. Network Computing Servs. Corp. v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 223 F.R.D. 392, 395 (D.S.C.
2004).
188. Kelly v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., No. 3:10-cv-01265, 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 45180, at *4, 2011 WL 1584764, at *162 (S.D. W. Va. Apr. 26, 2011) (outlining these
twin strands).
189. See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment A5Rule
34(b)(2)(B) is amended to require that objections to Rule 34 requests be stated with specificity.
This provision adopts the language of Rule 33(b)(4), eliminating any doubt that less specific
objections might be suitable under Rule 34.-@.
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specificity requirements in Rules 33(b)(4)190 and Rule 34(b)(2)(C)191 and
thereupon asserted that the party resisting discovery must 5specificallyshow how either an interrogatory or a re'uest for production is 5not relevantor 5overly broad> burdensome> or oppressive.-192 With Rule 34 thusly amalgamated with Rule 33, courts have maintained that a party that responds with
such boilerplate necessarily fails to substantiate how an exact demand is arguably vague, ambiguous, unintelligible, or privileged.193 Having been insufficiently specific to allow either a court or a party 5to ascertain the claimed
190. FED. R. CIV. P. 33Ab@A4@ A5The grounds for ob4ecting to an interrogatory must be
stated with specificity.- Aemphasis added@@$ Mulero-!breu v. P.R. Police Hep’t> 273 F.3d 11>
93 (1st Cir. 2012) (explaining requirement).
191. FED. R. CIV. P. 34Ab@A2@AC@ A5!n ob4ection to part of a re'uest must specify the
part and permit inspection of the rest.- Aemphasis added@@.
192. St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508, 513 (N.D.
Iowa 2000) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Mills v. East Gulf Preparation Co., 259 F.R.D.
111> 132 A..H. W. +a. 2000@ A5/b4ections to Rule 34 re'uests must be stated specifically> and
boilerplate objections regurgitating words and phrases from Rule 26 are completely unacceptable.- Aciting Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc. v. Elk Run Coal Co., 246 F.R.D. 522,
528629 (S.D. W. Va. 2007))); Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc.> 242 F.R.H. at 321 A5There
is abundant case law to the effect that boilerplate objections to Rule 34 document requests are
inappropriate.-@$ Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 184 F.R.D. 181, 190 (D.D.C. 1998)
A5!lthough Rule 34 governing production of documents does not contain identical language
Fas Rule 33E> ‘no reason exists to distinguish between interrogatories and requests for production’ as to the re'uirement for specificity and the risk of waiver.- A'uoting Pulsecard> :nc. v.
Discover Card Servs., 168 F.R.D. 295, 303 (D. Kan. 1996))); Redland Soccer Club, Inc. v.
,... Hep’t of the !rmy, 55 F.3d 827, 832 A3d Cir. 1003@ A5FTEhe party resisting discovery
must show specifically how each interrogatory is not relevant or how each question is overly
broad> burdensome or oppressive.- A'uoting 9osephs v. Harris Corp.> 277 F.2d 013> 002 A3d
Cir. 1982))); McLeod, Alexander, Powel & Paffel, P.C v. Quarles, 894 F.2d 1482, 1485 (5th
Cir. 1000@ A5!n interrogatory was ‘overly broad> burdensome> oppressive and irrelevant’ was
‘not ade'uate to voice a successful ob4ection to an interrogatory.’ FThe courtE seeFsE no reason
to distinguish the standards governing responses to interrogatories from those that govern responses to production re'uests.- Ainternal 'uotations omitted@ A'uoting Josephs, 677 F.2d at
992)).
193. See e.g., Paulsen v. Case Corp., 168 F.R.D. 285, 289 (C.D. Cal. 1996); see also,
e.g., Pegoraro v. Marrero et al, 281 F.R.D. 122, 128620 A..H.7.G. 2011@ A5‘FBEoilerplate ob<
jections that include unsubstantiated claims of undue burden, overbreadth and lack of relevancy>’ while producing ‘no documents and answerFing] no interrogatories . . . are a paradigm
of discovery abuse.’- Aalterations in original@ A'uoting 9acoby v. Hartford Life ( !ccident :ns.
Co.> 234 F.R.H. 477> 471 A..H.7.G. 2000@@@$ Compagnie Francaise d’!ssurance pour le Com<
merce Exterieur v. Phillips Petrol. Co.> 103 F.R.H. 12> 42 A..H.7.G. 1014@ A5Hefendant cannot
evade its discovery responsibilities by simply inton[ing] this familiar litany that the interrogatories are burdensome> oppressive or overly broad.- Aalteration in original@ Acitation omit<
ted)); Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp. et al, 85 F.R.D. 292, 296607 AE.H. Pa. 1010@ A5To
voice a successful objection to an interrogatory, . . . must show specifically how, despite the
broad and liberal construction afforded the federal discovery rules, each interrogatory is not
relevant or how each question is overly broad, burdensome or oppressive . . . by submitting
affidavits or offering evidence revealing the nature of the burden.- Ainternal citations omit<
ted)).
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objectionable character of the [dEiscovery FrEe'uest>-194 the response neither
supports nor explains the bases of its objections, as required by Rules 33 and
34,195 unless the veracity of its absolute boilerplate is obvious on its face.196
.o as to penaliBe respondent’s failure to articulate particular deficiencies>197
courts have proceeded to invoke Rule 33’s waiver provision,198 one still absent from the text of Rule 34 after December 1, 2015, upon encountering
absolute boilerplate in a Rule 34 response.199 This reasoning has been applied
to absolute administrative and substantive boilerplate without distinction,
Rule 34 remolded to help ensure this outcome—5FfEor each item or category>
the response must either state that inspection and related activities will be
permitted as requested or state with specificity the grounds for objecting to
the re'uest> including the reasons-200—as of the winter of 2015.
In striking at substantive boilerplate, courts have further rested on the
language of Rule 26(b)(5). Per this section, a log populated with sufficient
194. Burns v. :magine Films Entm’t :nc.> 124 F.R.D. 589, 593 (W.D.N.Y. 1996).
195. Paulsen, 168 F.R.D. at 289; see also, e.g., Nissan N.A. v. Johnson Elec. N.A.,
No. 09-CV-11783, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16006, at *4, 2011 WL 669352, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Feb. 17, 2011); Adelman v. Boy Scouts of Am., 276 F.R.D. 681, 688 (S.D. Fla. 2011); Hy-Ko
Prods. Co. v. Hillman Grp., Inc., No. 5:09MC32, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94713, at *4, 2009
WL 3258603, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 8, 2009); Guzman v. Irmadan, Inc., 249 F.R.D. 399, 401
A..H. Fla. 2001@$ Mitchell v. 7at’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 208 F.R.D. 455, 458 n.4 (D.D.C.
2002); Nagele v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 193 F.R.D. 94, 109 (W.D.N.Y. 2000); Walker v.
Lakewood Condo. /wners !ss’n> 112 F.R.H. 314> 312687 (C.D. Cal. 1999); Panola Land
Buyers !ss’n v. Shuman, 762 F.2d 1550, 1559 (11th Cir. 1985); Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd.
v. 7at’l Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 58 (D.D.C. 1984).
196. E.g., Etienne v. Wolverine Tube, Inc., 185 F.R.D. 653, 656 (D. Kan. 1999); Hilt
v. SFC Inc., 170 F.R.D. 182, 188 (D. Kan. 1997).
197. Thermoset Corp. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., No. 14-60268-CIVCOHN/SELTZER, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161343, at *4, 2014 WL 6473232, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Nov. 18, 2014) (collecting cases striking absolute boilerplate for this reason).
198. FED. R. CIV. P. 33Ab@A4@ A5!ny ground not stated in a timely ob4ection is waived
unless the court> for good cause> excuses the failure.-@$ see also, e.g., Shahzad v. Cty. of Nassau, No. 13-CV-2268 (SJF) (SIL), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 136575, at *768, 2014 WL
4803022> at ?3 AE.H.7.G. .ept. 22> 2014@ Aciting Rule 33Ab@A4@@$ 7a’im v. .ophie’s !rms Fine
Residences, L.L.C., No. 13cv2515-JAH (BLM), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100700, at *11 n.3,
2014 WL 3537807, at *4 n.3 (S.D. Cal. July 2, 2014) (same).
199. Cargill Inc. v. Ron Burge Trucking Inc., 284 F.R.D. 421, 424 (D. Minn. 2012)
A5!lthough Rule 34 does not contain an automatic waiver provision for untimely ob4ections
as does Rule 33Ab@A4@> ‘courts have reasoned that Rule 33Ab@A4@ type waiver should be implied
into all rules involving the use of the various discovery mechanisms.’- A'uoting Horace Mann
Ins. Co. v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 238 F.R.D. 536, 538 (D. Conn. 2006))); see also, e.g.,
Horace Mann Ins. Co., 238 F.R.D. at 538 (citing Byrd v. Reno, No. 96-2375 (CKK)(JMF),
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11855, at *16617 (D.D.C. Feb. 12, 1998); Pham v. Hartford Fire Ins.
Co., 193 F.R.D. 659, 661 (D. Colo. 2000); Deal v. Lutheran Hosp. & Homes, 127 F.R.D. 166,
168 (D. Alaska 1989)).
200. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B); Louisiana Crawfish Producers !ss’n6W. v. Mallard
Basin Inc., Nos. 6:10-1085, 6:11-0461, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 163230, at *9610 (W.D. La.
Dec. 4, 2015) (quoting Rule 34(b)(2)(B) as amended).
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detail to identify the privilege’s applicability must be provided by the party
asserting a privilege or work-product protection.201 To be adequate, of
course, the log itself must indicate that the several components of the relevant
privilege have been satisfied, possessing such limited but clear utility.202 By
definition, absolute substantive boilerplate cannot satisfy this flexible standard, as such generalized objections of the attorney-client privilege, for example> invariably 5fails to identify the lawyers . . . involved in the conversations>
the people present during the conversation, and a description of the nature of
the communication sufficient to enable [others] to assess the applicability of
the claimed privilege.-203 Unlike administrative and absolute boilerplate, absolute and substantive boilerplate therefore blunders twice: first, it is too non-

201. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(5); Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612,
623 (7th Cir. 2009) (noting that defendant had not waived any right to rely on the attorneyclient privilege or the work-product doctrine because they had provided a detailed privilege
log regarding those documents within their possession and withheld).
202. See King v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., 645 F.3d 713, 721 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming
a district court decision not to review individual emails for privilege purposes when the privilege log listed the authors and recipients of the e-mails, a brief description of each withheld
communication, the amount of each document withheld, and the type of privilege asserted);
Avgoustis v. Shinseki, 639 F.3d 1340, 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (quoting Rule 25(b)(5)(A)(ii))
A5:t would be strange if this re'uirement to disclose general sub4ect matter in a privilege log
invalidated the attorney-client privilege when the purpose of the rule is to determine whether
the document is privileged ‘without revealing information itself privileged or protected.’-@.
5Limited utility- is> of course> 5very different from no utility.- !l Haramain :slamic Found.,
:nc. v. ,... Hep’t of the Treasury> 212 F.3d 023> 013 n.10 A0th Cir. 2012@.
203. Pham, 193 F.R.D. at 662; accord, e.g.> Bess v. Cate> 422 F. !pp’x 320> 372 A0th
Cir. 2011) (finding that well-established law supported a magistrate 4udge’s order to sanction
parties who lodged blanket objections and thereby failed to provide sufficient information to
enable others to evaluate the applicability of the claimed privilege or protection); Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1147648 (9th
Cir. 2005) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 22Ab@A3@ advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendments@$
MMAR Grp. Inc. v. Dow Jones & Co., 187 F.R.D. 282, 290 n.6 (S.D. Tex. 1999) (concluding
that a party’s five general ob4ections> including the attorney-client, work-product, and investigative privileges> were pure boilerplate that impermissibly hampered its opponent’s ability
to prosecute its own case); Athridge v. Aetna Cas. & Surety Co., 184 F.R.D. 181, 194 (D.D.C.
1998) (finding that assertions of the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine were
too general to satisfy Rules 33 and 34); Miller v. Pancucci, 141 F.R.D. 292, 302 (C.D. Cal.
1002@ A'uoting :nt’l Paper Co. v. Fireboard Corp.> 23 F.R.H. 11> 04 AH. Hel. 1074@@ A5/bjections> in such boilerplate terms as those stated by FdEefendants> are improper and therefore ‘no
claim of privilege at all.’-@.
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specific,204 and second, it is often unaccompanied by a marginally satisfactory privilege log.205 So convinced, more than a handful of courts have characterized such boilerplate as 5unexplained and unsupported.-206 The responding party having thereby failed to painstakingly explicate its objections, as
the rules demand,207 such boilerplate is 5treatFedE as if . . . Fa viable ob4ection
wasE never made.-208
Whatever their textual mooring, the foregoing courts have simultaneously stressed these ob4ections’ inconsistency with discovery’s core policies>
204. See, e.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. v. West, 748 F.2d 540, 542 (10th Cir.
1014@ A5! party seeking to assert the privilege must make a clear showing that it applies.-@$
Davis v. Fendler, 230 F.2d 1134> 1120 A0th Cir. 1011@ A5!ppellant’s blanket claim of privilege
is simply not sufficient Ffor purposes of Rule 33E.-@$ Kan.-Neb. Nat. Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil
Co., 109 F.R.D. 12, 23624 AH. 7eb. 1013@ A5! general ob4ection of work product is insuffi<
cient under this definition where it does not designate which documents allegedly enjoyed that
privilege.-@.
205. Morris, supra note 6, at 149; see also Jarvey, supra note 181, at 914616.
206. Duran v. Cisco Sys., 258 F.R.D. 375, 379680 (C.D. Cal. 2009); see also, e.g.,
Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 358659 (D. Md. 2008) (collecting
decisions showing that generaliBed boilerplate 5are improper unless based on particulariBed
facts-@$ !. Farber ( Partners> :nc. v. Garber> 234 F.R.H. 112> 100691, 194 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
A5FGEeneral or boilerplate ob4ections such as overly burdensome and harassing are improper—
especially when a party fails to submit any evidentiary declarations supporting such objections.- Acitation omitted@ Acollecting cases@@. :ndeed> one court observed:
[T]he very act of making such boilerplate objections is prima
facie evidence of a Rule 26(g) violation, because if the lawyer
had paused, made a reasonable inquiry, and discovered facts
that demonstrated the burdensomeness or excessive cost of the
discovery request, he or she should have disclosed them in the
objection, as both Rule 33 and 34 responses must state objections with particularity, on pain of waiver.
Mancia, 253 F.R.D. at 359 (citations omitted).
207. See El-Shaddai v. Wheeler, No. CIV S-06-1898 FCD EFB P, 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 12131, at *4, 2009 WL 301824, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2009) (citing DirectTV, Inc.
v. Trone, 209 F.R.D. 455, 458 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (in regards to administrative boilerplate); see
also Anderson v. Hansen, No. 1:09-cv-01924-LJO-MJS (PC), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 131010,
at *9, 2012 WL 4049979, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2012) (citing El-Shaddai and others in
overruling 5in their entirety- administrative boilerplate adduced in response to a plaintiff’s
second interrogatory).
208. Ritacca v. Abbott Labs., 203 F.R.D. 332, 335 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 2001); see also, e.g.,
Bible v. Rio Props., Inc., 246 F.R.D. 614, 619620 AC.H. Cal. 2007@ Aoverruling a defendant’s
general or boilerplate objections, namely overly broad, vague and ambiguous, and proprietorial); Momah v. Albert Einstein Med. Ctr., 164 F.R.D. 412, 417 (E.D. Pa. 1002@ A5Mere reci<
tation of the familiar litany that an interrogatory or a document production re'uest is ‘overly
broad> burdensome> oppressive and irrelevant’ will not suffice.- Aciting 9osephs v. Harris
Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982), and Roesberg v. Johns-Manville Corp., 85 F.R.D.
292, 295 (E.D. Pa. 1980))); In re Shopping Carts Antitrust Litig., 95 F.R.D. 299, 305
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (acknowledging that a blanket claim of privilege is improper).

2017]

POLICING BOILERPLATE

239

as canonized in Rules 1 and 26 and the Model Rules.209 Because 5the spirit
of the rules is violated when advocates attempt to use discovery tools as tactical weapons rather than to expose the facts and illuminate the issues>-210
either 5boilerplate ob4ections or blanket refusals inserted into a response to a
Rule 34 request for production of documents are insufficient to assert a privilege.-211 For precisely the same cause—5boilerplate> shotgun-style objections are not consistent with the . . . [r]ulesF’E . . . goal of securing ‘the 4ust>
speedy> and inexpensive determination of every action>’-212 so that 5the spirit
of the rules- cannot but be 5violated when advocates attempt to use . . . FsuchE
evasive responses-213—the mere repetition of absolute boilerplate has often
effectuated an automatic waiver of any legitimate objection,214 5tantamount
209. See supra Part II.B.
210. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1013 amendment$ cf. Zoumana
Bakayoko v. Panera Bread, No. 1:14CV993, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124174, at *364, 2015
WL 3311021> at ?1 AM.H.7.C. .ept. 17> 2013@ Aconcluding that 5FiEn applying the foregoing
principles, district judges and magistrate judges in the Fourth Circuit (including members of
this Court) have repeatedly ruled that the party or person resisting discovery, not the party
moving to compel discovery> bears the burden of persuasion-@.
211. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d
1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005); see also, e.g., Gluc v. Prudential Life Ins. Co. of Am., 309 F.R.D.
406, 415 (W.D. Ky. 2015) (citing Burlington N., 408 F.3d at 1149; In re Heparin Products
Liab. Litig., 273 F.R.D. 399, 410611 (N.D. Ohio 2011); and Duran v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 258
F.R.D. 375, 379680 (C.D. Cal. 2009)); Valvoline Instant Oil Change Franchising v. RFG Oil,
Inc., No. 12-cv-2079-GPC (KSC), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88235, at *16 n.1, 2014 WL
2919518, at *6 n.1 (S.D. Cal. June 27, 2014)). For more on the significance of this jurisprudence, see infra Part IV.B.1.a.
212. Covington v. Sailormen, Inc., 274 F.R.D. 692, 693 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (citing FED.
R. CIV. P. 1); see also, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500601 A1047@ A5F,nder the
rules, t]he way is now clear, consistent with recognized privileges, for the parties to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial.-@; Asarco, L.L.C. v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1006 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1471 (3d ed. 1998)); Klonoski v. Mahlab, 156 F.3d
255, 267 (1st Cir. 1998) (quoting Hickman, 329 U.S. at 500601). Moved by similar concerns,
one court once wrote: 5F:Et is appalling that attorneys> like defense counsel in this case> rou<
tinely twist the discovery rules into some of ‘the most powerful weapons in the arsenal of
those who abuse the adversary system for the sole benefit of their clients.’- Malautea v. Suzuki
Motor Co.> 017 F.2d 1332> 1342 ( n.0 A11th Cir. 1003@ A'uoting Tommy Prud’homme> The
Need for Responsibility Within the Adversary System, 26 GONZ. L. REV. 443, 460 (1990691)).
213. FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1013 amendment$ see also Huggins v. Fed. Express Corp., 250 F.R.D. 404, 405 (E.D. Mo. 2008) (reminding the parties of
this 5well-established principle-@.
214. Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. ConvaTec Inc., 268 F.R.D. 226, 241, 247 (M.D.N.C.
2010) (first summarizing much case law—5magistrate judges in at least five district courts in
the Fourth Circuit have declared boilerplate objections to discovery requests, including for
documents> invalid-—and then finding an effective waiver); see also, e.g., Frontier-Kemper
Constructors, Inc. v. Elk Run Coal Co., 246 F.R.D. 522, 528 (S.D. W. Va. 2007) (detailing
authority for the proposition that valid objections are waived when a party first relies on mere
boilerplate in responding to document requests); Sabol v. Brooks, 469 F. Supp. 2d 324, 329
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to not making any ob4ection at all.-215 Thusly portrayed, these responses desecrate a broader vision by warping a free-flowing exchange, as once purportedly existed and is still fervently envisaged> into a 5hell- populated by 5dis<
putatious> uncivil> and vituperative lawyers.-216 In using them, counsel betray
themselves> courts> and clients by 5treating the discovery process as a forum
for game[s]manship, spiteful rhetoric, and the proliferation of unnecessary
paper.-217 Beginning on December 1, 2015, this popular line of reasoning
will derive greater strength from an amended Rule 1.218
AH. Md. 2002@ A5FThe non-party served with a subpoena containing document requests] did
not particularize its objections . . . , and instead used the boilerplate objections that this Court
repeatedly has warned against> thereby waiving its ob4ections.-@.
215. Walker v. Lakewood Condo. /wners !ss’n> 112 F.R.H. 314> 317 AC.H. Cal.
1999) (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1121 (3d Cir. 1986); and Josephs
v. Harris Corp., 677 F.2d 985, 992 (3d Cir. 1982)).
216. In re Chicago Invs., LLC, 470 B.R. 32, 84 n.352 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2012) (quoting
Dahl v. City of Huntington Beach, 84 F.3d 363, 364 (9th Cir. 1996)). This purpose animates
the various states’ discovery statutes as well. See, e.g.> First 7at’l Bank v. 7ewport Hosp. (
Clinic, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 742> 743 A!rk. 1014@ A5The !rkansas Rules of Civil Procedure> pat<
terned after the federal rules, are to be given a broad and liberal interpretation in the implementation of discovery procedures.-@. California’s system> for one> was intended
(1) to give greater assistance to the parties in ascertaining the
truth and in checking and preventing perjury; (2) to provide an
effective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent and
sham claims and defenses; (3) to make available, in a simple,
convenient and inexpensive way, facts which otherwise could
not be proved except with great difficulty; (4) to educate the
parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and
defenses, thereby encouraging settlements; (5) to expedite litigation; (6) to safeguard against surprise; (7) to prevent delay;
(8) to simplify and narrow the issues; and, (9) to expedite and
facilitate both preparation and trial.
Davies v. Superior Court, 682 P.2d 349, 354 (Cal. 1984) (internal quotation marks omitted);
see also Greyhound Corp. v. Superior Court, 364 P.2d 266, 275 (Cal. 1961).
217. Carl Zeiss +ision :nt’l GMBH v. .ignet !rmorlite :nc.> 7o. 07-cv-0894-DMS
(POR), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145164, at *51, 2010 WL 743792, at *18 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21,
2010).
218. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment A5Rule 1 is
amended to emphasize that just as the court should construe and administer these rules to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action, so the parties share the
responsibility to employ the rules in the same way.-@$ 7avico> :nc. v. Garmin :nt’l :nc.> 7o.
14-cv-303-CVE-TLW, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 160036, at *15, 2015 WL 7721218, at *5 (N.D.
/kla. 7ov. 30> 2013@ A5The new language of Rule 1 does not impose a new duty> rather, as
the comments state> it merely emphasiBes a duty that already exists.-@. The !dvisory Commit<
tee on Civil Rules explained the reasoning behind its tinkering with an 5iconic- rule in these
terms: 5Cooperation among the parties was a theme heavily and frequently emphasized.ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63> at 12. .till> the committee left only a 5hint.ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 16.
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Overall, a certain inclination can be discerned within this mass—absolute boilerplate reckoned most offensive to discovery’s very essence.219
C.

CONDITIONAL BOILERPLATE

As with its kin, conditional boilerplate has been derided as inconsistent
with 5the spirit or letter of the discovery rules>-220 and its manifest impropriety has been repeatedly maintained.221 Even so, for all this fervor, conditional
boilerplate in response to a Rule 34 request for production, one scholar observed> did 5comply technically with the letter of the discovery rulesthrough at least November 30, 2015.222 Perhaps due to this recognition, a
slightly modified analytical approach to conditional boilerplate has been formulated.
One path of attack has fastened on Rule 34’s unadorned language. Hav<
ing read Rule 34Ab@ in con4unction with Rule 22’s relevance and privilege
requirements,223 one court insisted: 5F!E party served with a document re<
quest has four options: (1) respond to the document request by agreeing to
produce documents as requested . . . (2) respond to the document request by
objecting . . . (3) move for a protective order [. . .]; or (4) ignore the re'uest.-224 Construing Rule 34 more narrowly, other courts have counted three
options:
Rule 34(b)(2) permits only three responses to a request for production of documents: [(1)] produce
the documents as re'uested> FA2@E ‘state an ob4ection
to the re'uest’ as a whole> FA3@E or state an ‘ob4ec<

219. ResendeB v. .mith’s Food ( Hrug Ctrs.> :nc.> 7o. 2:13-cv-00061-JAD-PAL,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34038, at *566, 2015 WL 1186684, at *2 (D. Nev. Mar. 16, 2015)
(citing Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142,
1149 (9th Cir. 2005); St. Paul Reinsurance Co. v. Commercial Fin. Corp., 198 F.R.D. 508,
513 (N.D. Iowa 2000); and Walker v. Lakewood Condo. /wners !ss’n> 112 F.R.H. 314> 317
(C.D. Cal. 1999)).
220. Wash. .tate Physicians :ns. Exch. ( !ss’n v. Fisons Corp.> 131 P.2d 1034> 1013
AWash. 1003@ Ainterpreting 5essentially identical- state e'uivalents@.
221. Beckerman, supra note 4, at 554.
222. Beckerman, supra note 4, at 553.
223. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), (5).
224. Badalamenti v. Hunham’s :nc.> 102 F.2d 1330> 1322 AFed. Cir. 1000@$ see also,
e.g., Enron Corp. Sav. Plan v. Hewitt Assocs., L.L.C., 258 F.R.D. 149, 155 (S.D. Tex. 2009)
(citing Badalamenti, 896 F.2d at 1362); Johnson-Hines v. Freeman, No. CV 2005-5173 (SJ)
(MDG), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59145, at *2, 2006 WL 2443553, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 22,
2006) (same).
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tion to part of FtheE re'uest’ provided that the response specifies the part objected to and responds
to the non-objectionable portion.225
Regardless> 5FoEb4ecting but answering subject to the objection is not one of
the allowed choices under the . . . FrEules.-226 This construal is the 5natural
corollary- of Rule 34Ab@A2@AC@>227 which re'uires that 5FaEn ob4ection to part
of a request must specify the part and permit inspection of the rest-228 and
was intended to 5make clear that> if a re'uest for production is ob4ectionable
only in part, production should be afforded with respect to the unobjectionable portions.-229 For this subparagraph to be satisfied, any valid objection
5must identify the particular portion which is not being responded to on the
basis of the ob4ection>- and 5FtEhe plain language of Rule 34 re'uires a partial
response be identified as such.-230 But, in intent and assembly, conditional
ob4ections fail 5to specify exactly what part of [a] document request[] is [ob4ectionableE>-231 therefore violating the respondent’s obligation under Rule
225. .print Commc’ns Co. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns> L.L.C.> 7os. 11-2684-JWL,
11-2685-JWL, 11-2686-JWL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16938, at *10, 2014 WL 545544, at *3
(D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2014) (emphasis in original) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B)); accord
Fay Ave. Props., L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., No. 11-2389-GPC(WVG), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89614, at *5, 2014 WL 2965316, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2014).
226. Tardif v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, No. 2:09-cv-537-FtM-29SPC,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47132, at *364, 2011 WL 1627165, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2011)
(citing Mann v. Island Resorts Dev., Inc., No. 3:08cv297/RS/EMT, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
130436, at *9611, 2009 WL 6409113, *263 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2009)); see also e.g., C.T. v.
Liberal Sch. Dist., Nos. 06-2093-JWL, 06-2360-JWL, 06-2359-JWL, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10348, at *18, 2008 WL 394217, at *5 (D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2008) (describing conditional boilerplate as 5neither an ob4ection> nor an ade'uate identification of the responsive documents.-@$
Meese v. Eaton Mfg. Co.> 33 F.R.H. 122> 122 A7.H. /hio 1024@ A5Whenever an answer ac<
companies an objection, the objection is deemed waived and the answer, if responsive,
stands.-@$ R. 9ason Richards> Answering =iscovery “%ubject to” 'bjections: Lessons from
5lorida’s =istrict Courts, 35 S. ILL. U. L.J. 127, 133 (2010).
227. Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 906 F. Supp. 2d 938, 976 (D. Ariz. 2012).
228. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(c)(2)(C).
229. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendment.
230. Haeger, 906 F. Supp. 2d at 977; see also Lurensky v. Wellinghoff, 258 F.R.D.
27> 30 AH.H.C. 2000@ A5Rule 34 plainly states that objections to requests for production must
be made on an individual basis.-@.
231. Pro Fit Mgmt., Inc. v. Lady of Am. Franchise Corp., No. 08-CV-2662 JAR/DJW,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19151, at *28, 2011 WL 939226, at *9 (D. Kan. Feb. 25, 2011); see
also GMAC Real Estate, L.L.C. v. Joseph Carl Sec., Inc., No. CV 10-192-PHX-JAT, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14732, at *4, 2010 WL 432311> at ?1 AH. !riB. Feb. 3> 2010@ A5/b4ections
must be in writing and identify the particular portions of the request subject to the objection;
all other portions should be made available for inspection.-@$ 9ohnson v. 8raft Foods 7.!.>
Inc., 238 F.R.D. 648, 660 (D. Kan. 2006) (ordering defendants to respond to a request after
extirpating a phrase that they had attacked as 5vague and ambiguous>- for 5FdEefendants have
a duty under the federal rules to respond to the extent that discovery requests are not objectionable-@.
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34Ab@A2@ to 5clearly state that responsive documents do not exist> have al<
ready been produced, or exist but are being withheld [based on an objectionE.-232 Under this straightforward analysis, conditional boilerplate is
viewed as so imprecise and equivocal in definitively delineating the precise
nature of a relevant objection that waiver must be presumed,233 since a proper
objection for purposes of Rule 34 must be 5specific> non-boilerplate, and
supported by particularized facts where necessary to demonstrate . . . [its basisE.-234 In short, to this choir> the rules’ unvarnished verse allots 5no author<
ity . . . for reserving ob4ections- by means of conditional boilerplate.235 Ergo,
232. Rodriguez v. Simmons, No. 2:09-cv-02195 KJN, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39836,
at *24625, 2011 WL 1322003, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2011) (emphasis in original).
233. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Md. 2008)
(collecting cases); see also Sonnino v. Univ. of Kan. Hosp. Auth., 221 F.R.D. 661, 666667,
222 n.13 AH. 8an. 2004@ Areminding the parties that the court has 5disapproved FofE the prac<
tice of asserting a general ob4ection ‘to the extent’ it may apply to particular requests for discovery-@.
234. See Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 573 (D. Md. 2010) (stating the
standard as to Rule 33); Mancia> 233 F.R.H. at 330 Aholding that 5both Rule 33 and 34 re<
sponses must state objections with particularity, on pain of waiver-@$ Hall v. .ullivan> 231
F.R.H. 421> 473 AH. Md. 2003@ Aopining that 5FiEf one looks at the commentary to Rule 34>
however, it is clear that the procedures under Rule 34 were intended to be governed by the
same procedures applied under Rule 33-@. This result is not uncommon when parties attempt
to conceal data in other contexts. See Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the
Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND.
L. REV. 921, 923625 (2009) (focusing on cooperation agreements between prosecutors and
defendants).
235. Jones v. Forrest City Grocery, Inc., No. 4:06CV00944-WRW, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19482, at *3, 2007 WL 841676, at *1 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 16, 2007); accord, e.g., SherwinWilliams Co. v. JB Collision Servs., Nos. 13-CV-1946-LAB (WVG), 13-CV-1947-LAB
(WVG), 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93368, at *667, 2014 WL 3388871, at *263 (S.D. Cal. July
9, 2014) A5Providing conditional responses to discovery re'uests is improper.-@$ Fay Ave.
Props., L.L.C. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., No. 11-2389-GPC (WVG), 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89614, at *465, 2014 WL 2965316, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 1, 2014) (stating that a party
responding to a discovery re'uest 5cannot . . . combine its ob4ections into a partial response
without any indication that the response was actually a partial response-@$ Leisure Hospitality>
Inc. v. Hunt Props., Inc., No. 09-CV-272-GKF-PJC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93680, at *9610,
2010 WL 3522444, at *3 (N.D. Okla. Sept. 8, 2010) A5Rule 34 makes no provision for FaE
response- that 5attemptFsE to both ob4ect and produce> but produce only ‘sub4ect to and without
waiving’ its ob4ections.- Aemphasis in original@@$ Medmarc Cas. :ns. Co. v. +entura> 7o. 0723300-CIV-UNGARO/SIMONTON, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100114, at *11, 2008 WL
3101100> at ?4 A..H. Fla. Hec. 1> 2001@ A! conditional ob4ection 5preserves nothing and serves
only to waste the time and resources of both the Parties and the Court-$ 5FfEurther> such prac<
tice leaves the requesting Party uncertain as to whether the question has actually been fully
answered or whether only a portion of the 'uestion has been answered.- Aciting A.B.A. SEC.
ON LITIG., CIVIL DISCOVERY STANDARDS 18 (2004))); see also, e.g., VNA Plus, Inc. v. Apria
Healthcare Grp., Inc., No. 98-2138-KHV, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8908, at *15, 1999 WL
386949, at *5 (D. Kan. June 8, 1999) (as to interrogatories under Rule 33); Moses v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 104 F.R.D. 55, 58 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (same); Casson Constr. Co., Inc.
v. Artmco Steel Corp., 91 F.R.D. 376, 378679 (D. Kan. 1980) (same).
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such boilerplate has led courts both to deem any objection waived and to
leave any answer, if responsive, to stand on its own merits.236 Before December 1, 2015, few could reasonably believe differently;237 today, any such opposition is only more likely to fail.238
Moving beyond Rule 34’s text> these opinions accentuate policy rationales implicit in the rules as a whole.239 Conditional boilerplate invariably
5leaves the opposing party in the dark as to whether something unidentified
has been withheld.-240 !s a result> their employment 5serves only to waste
the time and resources of both parties and the court.-241 Now, opposing counsel must do the impossible: 5reasonably determine beyond speculation what
objection, if any, [the responding parties] intend to assert against any specific
Fdiscovery re'uestE.-242 Now, if unsatisfied, he or she must meet and confer

236. Tardif v. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, No. 2:09-cv-537-FtM29SPC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47132, at *364, 2011 WL 1627165, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29,
2011) (citing Pepperwood of 7aples Condo. !ss’n v. 7ationwide Mut. Fire :ns. Co.> 7o. 2:10cv-753-FtM-36SPC, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106624, at *13, 2011 WL 4382104, at *5 (M.D.
Fla. Sept. 20, 2011), and Mann v. Island Resorts Dev., Inc., No. 3:08cv297/RS/EMT, at *11,
2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130436, 2009 WL 6409113, at *3 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 27, 2009)); see also
Estridge v. Target Corp., No. 11-61490-CIV-WILLIAMS/SELTZER, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21593, at *364, 2012 WL 527051, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 16, 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Tardiff, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47132, at *364, 2011 WL 1627165, at *2);
Leisure Hospitality, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93680, at *9610, 2010 WL 3522444, at *3) (noting that 5Rule 34 makes no provision- for a party 5producFingE only ‘sub4ect to and without
waiving’ its ob4ections-@.
237. See Mullins v. Encore Senior Living II, L.L.C., No. 3:07cv325/WS/EMT, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84867, at *2 n.1, 2007 WL 4098851, at *1 n.1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 16, 2007)
(so maintaining as to absolute and conditional boilerplate and collecting many of the sources
collected in this section).
238. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 29.
239. See, e.g., Tiedman v. Am. Pigment Corp., 253 F.2d 803, 808 (4th Cir. 1958)
A5FHEiscovery is founded on the policy that the search for truth should be aided.-@$ 1!
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2204 (2d ed. 1994).
240. Myers v. Goldco, Inc., No. 4:08cv8-RH/WCS, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37089, at
*3, 2008 WL 1995131, at *1 (N.D. Fla. May 6, 2008) (so concluding as to interrogatories);
see also, e.g.> Consumer Elecs. !ss’n v. Compras & Buys Magazine, Inc., No. 08-21085-CIV,
2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80465, at *7, 2008 WL 4327253, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 18, 2008)
Adeploring conditional boilerplate for 5leav[ing] the requesting Party uncertain as to whether
the question has actually been fully answered or whether only a portion of the question has
been answered-@; Girard & Espinosa, supra note 115> at 413 A5The upshot [of such objections]
is that the propounding party is unable to assess the extent to which the responding party has
complied with a discovery re'uest.-@; Richards, supra note 226, at 128 (canvassing Florida
federal cases so holding).
241. Curtis v. Time Warner Entm’t-!dvance;7ewhouse P’ship> 7o. 3:12-cv-2370JFA, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68115, at *7, 2013 WL 2099496, at *3 (D.S.C. May 14, 2013).
242. Thermoset Corp. v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am., No. 14-60268-CIVCOHN/SELTZER, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161343, at *6, 2014 WL 6473232, at *263 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 18, 2014) (alterations in original) (quoting Cotracom Commodity Trading Co. v.
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with the other’s attorney> and only then file a motion to compel in order to
ascertain whether a production request was fully answered.243 Now, upon
such a motion’s tendering> a busy court must spend its time and resources
attempting to establish the propriety of a particular objection or compel a
more faithful and accurate response.244 Frustration follows> as 5FaE 4udge
should not have to wade through a sea of boilerplate objections only to discover that the ob4ections did not represent the party’s actual position> but
were merely used to make the discovery process more difficult.-245 Of
course, the propounding lawyer may choose to avoid endless postponement
by not objecting, but he or she invites disaster if surprised with new information not provided at a later proceeding.246 To any lawyer remotely attuned
to this haBard to his or her case’s success Aand livelihood@, the only reasonable response is a motion to compel, propagating the delays endemic to such
practice247 and antithetical to Rule 1’s three virtues.248 In this telling, conditional boilerplate is denounced as 5unfair to the re'uesting party- and as 5pre<
vent[ing] courts from properly evaluating the ob4ections’ underlying mer<
its>-249 5calculated to mislead . . . .-250
Seaboard Corp., No. CIV. A. 97-2391-GTV, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6726, at *465, 1998 WL
231135, at *1 (D. Kan. May 6, 1998)).
243. Marti v. Baires, No. 1:08-cv-00653-AWI-SKO PC, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
77962, at *569, 2012 WL 2029720, at *263 (E.D. Cal. June 5, 2012) (outlining the cumbersome process of adjudicating a motion to compel); Menis E. Ketchum, Impeding Discovery:
Eliminating Worthless Interrogatory Instructions and Objections, W. VA. LAW., Apr.6June
2012, at 19.
244. See Rogers v. Brauer Law Offices., P.L.C., No. CV-10-1693-PHX-LOA, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93905, at *16, 2011 WL 3665346, at *5 (D. Ariz. Aug. 22, 2011) (bemoaning the fact that 5FrEather than the parties focusing on dispositive motions> if any> that might
reduce or eliminate the issues in dispute, the Court is required to impose one of two disfavored
choices: order an expedited briefing schedule on the untimely discovery motion or extend the
dispositive motion deadline-@$ Mezu v. Morgan State Univ., 269 F.R.D. 565, 573 (D. Md.
2010) (holding that defendant waived any legitimate objection due to its use of absolute boilerplate but adding: 5Rather than burden the Court with this dispute> what counsel should have
done is meet face to face and discuss each disputed interrogatory and challenged response.
Interrogatories that contained excessive subparts should have been redrafted . . . .-@.
245. Chevron Midstream Pipelines L.L.C. v. Settoon Towing L.L.C., Nos. 13-2809,
13-3197, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6931, at *32, 2015 WL 269051, at *3 (E.D. La. Jan. 21,
2015).
246. See Ketchum, supra note 243, at 18619.
247. Beckerman, supra note 4, at 550652; DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum
Corp., 303 P.3d 1187, 1196 (Colo. 2013).
248. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; cf. Trask v. Olin Corp., 298 F.R.D. 244, 269 (W.D. Pa. 2014)
Afinding 5good cause- to reopen discovery under Rule 12 and in light of the 5import- of Rule
1 when 5diligent discovery was hampered by both misleading statements from . . . counsel
and the practical difficulties obtaining the information outside of discovery-@.
249. Jarvey, supra note 181, at 918.
250. Kosher Sports, Inc. v. Queens Ballpark Co., No. 10-CV-2618 (JBW), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 86651, at *20, 2011 WL 3471508, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2011).
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A critical inference rests on these probabilities and assumptions. Once
Rule 34 is 5read to allow parties to combine ob4ections with a partial response
that does not specify whether other potentially responsive material is being
withheld> ‘discovery would break down in practically every case.’-251 Dealing with only 5hypothetical or contingent possibilities>- conditional boiler<
plate cannot but 5delay discovery- as courts and litigants pore over vague
language and demand compliance with the rules’ longstanding mandates.252
Because 5FsEerving discovery responses and ob4ections on time is critically
important to maintaining a steady pace of discovery>-253 such artificial dilatoriness offends the rules’ very structure> most assuredly Rule 1. Further<
more> by so 5hinderFingE the ad4udication process> and making the task of the
deciding tribunal not easier> but more difficult>- the use of conditional boil<
erplate appears to infringe upon a lawyer’s 5duty of loyalty to the procedures
and institutions the adversary system is intended to serve.-254 Bereft of 5any
rational basis-255 and irreconcilable with the directives encoded in Rules 26
and 34,256 conditional boilerplate impedes attainment of the rules’ august purpose: 5the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action, and
proceeding.-257

251. .print Commc’ns Co. v. Comcast Cable Commc’ns> L.L.C.> 7os. 11-2684-JWL,
11-2685-JWL, 11-2686-JWL, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16938, at *10, 2014 WL 545544, at *3
(D. Kan. Feb. 11, 2014) (quoting Haeger v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 906 F. Supp. 2d
938, 977 (D. Ariz. 2012)).
252. .tarlight :nt’l> :nc. v. Herlihy> 111 F.R.H. 404> 407 AH. 8an. 1001@ A'uoting Co<
tracom Commodity Trading Co., v. Seaboard Corp., No. Civ. A. 97-2391-GTV, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6726, at *4, 1998 WL 231135, at *1 (D. Kan. May 6, 1998)).
253. Frontier-Kemper Constructors, Inc. v. Elk Run Coal Co., 246 F.R.D. 522, 526
(S.D. W. Va. 2007). If so, the rules themselves may be to blame. See generally Patrick E.
Higginbotham, Judge Robert A. Ainsworth, Jr. Memorial Lecture, Loyola University School
Of Law: So Why Do We Call Them Trial Courts?, 55 S.M.U. L. REV. 1405 (2002).
254. Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 362 (D. Md. 2008)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
255. Tardif v. People for Ethical Treatment of Animals, No. 2:09-cv-537-FtM-29SPC,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 47132, at *4, 2011 WL 1627165, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2011); see
also hibu Inc. v. Peck, No. 16-cv-1055-JTM-TJJ, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121770, at *9, 2016
WL 4702422, at *4 (D. Kan. Sept. 8, 2016) (as to Rule 33 responses).
256. Hall v. Sullivan, 231 F.R.D. 468, 472674 (D. Md. 2005) (finding conditional boilerplate to violate these rules’ interlocking framework@.
257. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also, e.g.> .ec. 7at’l Bank of .ioux City v. !bbott Labs.>
299 F.R.D. 595, 596697 (N.D. Iowa 2014) (so concluding); Covington v. Sailormen Inc., 274
F.R.D. 692, 693 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (same); Tomlinson v. Combined Underwriters Life Ins. Co.,
No. 08-CV-259-TCK-FHM, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82192, at *263, 2008 WL 4601578, at *1
(N.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2008) (same).
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COHERENCY’S IMPOSSIBILITY: THE RULES’ IRRESOLVABLE
AMBIGUITIES

PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION

In the years immediately after the rules’ enactment> a freewheeling in<
terpretive schematic reigned.258 For decades, however, in fealty to the more
restrictive approach that emerged upon e'uity’s eclipse> five tenets have
guided the judicial construction of Rules 26 through 37 specifically and federal procedural rules more generally.259 Though not all are similarly applicable to Rule 34> these principles still circumscribe any interpreter’s given
route.
First, as with statutes, and subject to the same exceptions,260 a rule’s
terms are 5giveFnE . . . their plain meaning.-261 :f the words’ import is both
unambiguous and clear, any further inquiry into its obvious purpose and its
drafters’ intent is foreclosed.262 A rule plainly read is one whose words have
been accorded their ordinary meaning,263 and the import of even the plainest
language hinges on context.264 Similarly> ambiguity exists if 5several plausi<
ble interpretations of the same . . . text> specific and different in substanceyet equally plain in denotation, can be cohered with the relevant provision’s
context and structure and must be dispelled with the same interpretive contrivances.265 The stridency of this methodology acquires a shoring impetus
258. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 686687 (2009); cf. Bowles v. Russell,
432 F.3d 668, 673673 A2th Cir. 2003@ Are4ecting 5a contrary and more liberal interpretationof Federal Rule of !ppellate Procedure 4 epitomiBed in 5a line of .upreme Court cases em<
ploying an e'uitable interpretation of appeals time limits-@. The instinct remains strong. See,
e.g., EEOC v. Go Daddy Software> :nc.> 311 F.3d 031> 021 A0th Cir. 2000@ Apreferring a 5lib<
eral interpretation- of Rule 30Aa@> as the rule would otherwise be 5a harsh one-@$ Uniroyal
Chem. Co. v. Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc., No. 02-2253, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4545, at *5,
2005 WL 677806, at *2 (D. Conn. Mar. 23, 2005) A5FTEhe court finds the better and more
equitable interpretation of Rule 15(a) is the moderate approach . . . .-@.
259. Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 13, at 528634 (summarizing the relevant tenets); Shachmurove, Disruptions, supra note 45, at 194697 (same).
260. Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 13, at 530633 (detailing the exceptions).
261. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989); accord Elliott v. Archdiocese of N.Y., 682 F.3d 213, 225 (3d Cir. 2012).
262. Bus. Guides v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters.> 401 ,... 333> 340641 (1991) (citing Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at 123), superseded by FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993 amendment);
Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 157 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Berckeley Inv. Grp., Ltd. v. Colkitt,
259 F.3d 135, 142 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001)); Shachmurove, Disruptions, supra note 45, at 194697
(summarizing the relevant case law); Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 13, at 528630 (same).
263. See Lara-Ruiz v. I.N.S., 241 F.3d 934, 940 (7th Cir. 2001).
264. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 515 (1993).
265. Stern v. Am. Home Mortg. Servicing, Inc. (In re Asher), 488 B.R. 58, 64 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 2013).
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from the rules’ peculiarity> for> unlike statutes> they must be read most nar<
rowly so as to avoid conflict with a more substantive stricture in keeping with
the Rules Enabling Act.266
.econd> 5discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treat<
ment to effect their purpose of adequately informing the litigants in civil trials.-267 !s all concur> Rule 22 enshrines 5the fundamental principle that the
public has a right to every man’s evidence-268 via its 5low threshold of relevance.-269 Impelled by this entrenched concept> 5FcEourts commonly look un<
favorably at significant restrictions placed upon the discovery process.-270
Traditionally, therefore, an objecting party has borne the heavy burden of
demonstrating a particular re'uest’s impropriety.271
Third, magistrate and district court judges retain broad discretion over
pretrial discovery.272 By virtue of this deference, a district court’s 5discretion
will not be disturbed ordinarily unless there are unusual circumstances showing a clear abuse.-273 This relative autonomy is the product of a pervasive
recognition that trial 4udges habitually possess more 5intimate knowledge of

266. 21 ,...C. % 2072Ab@ A2012@ A5FREules Fof practice and procedureE shall not
abridge> enlarge or modify any substantive right.-@. :n effect> the Rules Enabling !ct compels
a stringent application of the plain meaning approach, thereby minimizing the possibility of a
conflict between rule and statute. See Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 13, at 531633.
267. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 177 (1979) (first citing Schlagenhauf v. Holder,
379 U.S. 104, 114615 (1964); and then citing Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501, 507
(1947)); see also, e.g., Carrera v. First Am. Home Buyers Prot. Co., No. 13cv1585-BAS (JLB),
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 101064, at *364, 2014 WL 3695403, at *1 (S.D. Cal. July 23, 2014)
(citing Herbert, 441 U.S. at 177); Blangsted v. Snowmass-Wildcat Fire Prot. Dist., 642 F.
Supp. 2d 1250, 1261 n.7 (D. Colo. 2009) (same).
268. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980); see also, e.g., Simpson v. Univ.
of Colo., 220 F.R.D. 354, 356 (D. Colo. 2004) (citing Trammel, 445 U.S. at 50).
269. Breon v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 232 F.R.D. 49, 53 (D. Conn. 2005).
270. Kodish v. Oakbrook Terrace Fire Prot. Dist., 235 F.R.D. 447, 450 (N.D. Ill.
2006); accord Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 349 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (N.D. Ill. 2004).
271. See Kodish, 235 F.R.D. at 450.
272. See, e.g.> Hanos v. ,nion Carbide Corp.> 341 F. !pp’x 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2013)
A5F!E district court has broad discretion over discovery matters . . . .-@$ Conti v. !m. !xle (
Mfg.> :nc.> 322 F. !pp’x 000> 003 A2th Cir. 2000@ A5‘The scope of discovery is> of course>
within the broad discretion of the trial court . . . .’- A'uoting Lewis v. !CB Bus. .ervs.> :nc.>
135 F.3d 389, 402 (6th Cir. 1998))); Little v. City of Seattle, 863 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988)
A5The district court has wide discretion in controlling discovery.-@$ Cook v. 8artridg Pak Co.>
840 F.2d 202> 204 A1th Cir. 1011@ Aciting /’7eal v. Riceland Foods> 214 F.2d 377> 311 A1th
Cir. 1012@@ A5! district court must be free to use and control pretrial procedure in furtherance
of the orderly administration of justice . . . . A district court is afforded wide discretion in its
handling of discovery mattersF.E-@. !t present> magistrate 4udges mostly manage the discovery
process in federal court. See Ruth Dapper, A Judge by Any Other Name? Mistitling of the
United States Magistrate Judge, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 265 (2015).
273. Moore v. CITGO Ref. & Chems. Co., 735 F.3d 309, 315 (5th Cir. 2013).
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the facts>- a particular case’s fettle> and their own 5administrative prob<
lems.-274 Indeed, this principle holds with such force that, in most cases, not
even Rule 22’s permisssiveness will prompt reversal of a decision to deny
discovery 5except upon the clearest showing- of 5actual and substantive pre4<
udice.-275
Fourth> every rule 5should be viewed> not as FanE isolated fragmentFE>
but as [a part of] an integrated whole, and thus one rule cannot be read to
circumvent another.-276 A pivotal interpretive constraint springs from this
tenet: the effective meaning and the practical application of Rule 34 in any
case should not be divined and determined solely within its four corners.277
Instead, the policies embodied in and parameters demarcated by others,
maybe most significantly Rules 1 and 26, must always be perpended.278
Finally, even Rule 26 is bounded by limitations that 5come into exist<
ence when . . . [a party’sE inquiry touches upon the irrelevant or encroaches
upon the recogniBed domains of privilege.-279 As such, when a clash looms,
274. Syracuse Broad. Corp. v. Newhouse, 271 F.2d 910, 915 (2d Cir. 1959).
275. Goehring v. Brophy, 94 F.3d 1294, 1305 (9th Cir. 1996), cited in Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002); see also, e.g., Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v.
S.S. Geert Howaldt, 341 F.2d 437> 430 A3th Cir. 1023@ A5Trial courts have the right to exercise
appropriate control of the discovery process when necessary and may deny, limit, or qualify
it.-@.
276. Garza v. Webb Cty., 296 F.R.D. 511, 512 (S.D. Tex. 2014); see also, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 822 F.2d 335, 342 (3d Cir. 1987) (quoting Cipollone v. Liggett Grp.,
Inc., 113 F.R.D. 86, 92693 (D.N.J. 1986)); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 1 F.R.D.
37> 31 A..H.7.G. 1031@ Aconstruing Rules 34 and 43> which 5relate to the same sub4ect Fmat<
ter,] . . . in pari materia.-@$ cf. Makaeff v. Trump Univ., LLC, 715 F.3d 254, 274 (9th Cir.
2000@ A8oBinski> 9.> concurring@ A5The Federal Rules aren’t 4ust a series of disconnected pro<
cedural devices.-@$ Baicker-McKee, supra note 58, at 333 Acontending that the rules 5were
conceived as one unified set of rules flexible enough to govern cases of all sizes and variations
in complexity- and collecting sources so saying); Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of
Transsubstantive Procedure: An 6ssay on Adjusting the “'ne %ize 5its All” Assumption, 87
DENV. U. L. REV. 377, 383 (2010) (commenting that their drafters 5assumed that the rules
would apply uniformly to all cases-@.
277. See, e.g., Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 21 (1985); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 177 (1979); Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. PPG Indus., 177 F.R.D. 443, 444 (D. Minn.
1997) (relying in part on Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947)).
278. Shachmurove, Disruptions, supra note 45, at 194697; see also, e.g.,
Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 13, at 528634; David Marcus, Institutions and an Interpretive Methodology for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 927, 967669
(2011) (discussing the relevant so-called 5policy canons-@.
279. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947); see also SEC v. Rajaratnam, 622
F.3d 130> 111 A2d Cir. 2010@ A5The right of access to discovery materials is fre'uently 'uali<
fied in the interest of protecting legitimate interests.-@$ Herbst v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac.
R. Co.> 10 F.R.H. 14> 17 A..H. :owa 1030@ Adeclaring that a party’s rights under Rules 33 and
34 5must be exercised only under definitely restricted circumstances> as permitted by Rule
26(b), and subject always to such limitations as the court may direct for the protection of the
parties under Rule 30Ab@-@.
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a careful balance must be struck between discovery’s relevance standard—
the rules 5should not be narrowly applied so as ‘to deprive a party of the
discovery that is reasonably necessary to afford a fair opportunity to develop
and prepare the case’-280—and the rationales behind both the relevant privileges, these safeguards 5designed to protect weighty and legitimate compet<
ing interests-281 yet 5not lightly created nor expansively construed>-282 and
Rule 22Ab@’s operative discoverability standard, implanted in subparagraphs
(b)(1) and (b)(2)(C)283 and impliedly incorporating the prerequisites for a
protective order lodged in Rule 26(c)(1).284 Hence, a jumble of four policies

280. Jones v. Forrest City Grocery, Inc., No. 4:06CV00944-WRW, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19482, at *2 & n.3, 2007 WL 841676, at *1 & n.3 (E.D. Ark. Mar. 16, 2007) (quoting
Trevion v. Celanese Corp., 701 F.2d 397, 405 (5th Cir. 1983)); cf, e.g., Thalheim v. Eberheim,
124 F.R.H. 34> 33 AH. Conn. 1011@ A5! party’s loss of the ‘right to contest a matter on the
merits is not to be treated lightly’- even when it has failed to comply with a rule’s clear com<
mand A'uoting /’Bryant v. !llstate :ns. Co.> 107 F.R.H 43> 41 AH. Conn. 1013@@@.
281. For example> 5FtEhe rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications
between client and attorney>- the Court once wrote> 5is founded upon the necessity, in the
interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and
skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely and readily availed of when free
from the consequences or the apprehension of disclosure.- Hunt v. Blackburn> 121 ,... 424>
470 (1888); see also United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 169 (2011) (citing
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)).
282. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974); see also, e.g., Pierce Cty. v.
Guillen, 337 ,... 120> 143 A2003@ A5FWEhen possible> privileges should be construed nar<
rowly.-@.
283. Rule 26(b)(1) contains a minimal relevance standard, Teichgraeber v. Mem’l ,n<
ion Corp. of Emporia State Univ., 932 F. Supp. 1263, 1265 (D. Kan. 1996), and attorneys
invariably emphasize this fact in argument. See United States ex rel. Carter v. Bridgepoint
Educ., Inc., 305 F.R.D. 225, 234635 (S.D. Cal. 2015). As of December 1, 2015, however, it
also contains a proportionality qualifier, and even before that date, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) allowed
a court to limit the discoverability of all relevant evidence for a variety of factors. FED. R. CIV.
P. 26(b)(2)(C); B&S Equip. Co. v. Truckla Servs., No. 09-3862c/w10-0832,10-1168,10-459,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72436, at *11613, 2011 WL 2637289, at *3 (E.D. La. July 6, 2011)
Alisting factors@. :n effect> to obtain discovery in the face of another’s opposition> a party must
first show relevance and thereafter prove discoverability. The 2015 amendments to Rule 26
have made this implication explicit. FED. R. CIV. P. 22Ab@A1@ advisory committee’s note to
2013 amendment A5:nformation is discoverable under revised Rule 22Ab@A1@ if it is relevant to
any party’s claim or defense and is proportional to the needs of the case . . . .-@. For more on
this addition, see Elizabeth D. Laporte & Jonathan M. Redgrave, A Practical Guide to Achieving Proportionality Under New Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 19,
39643, 47672 (2015).
284. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c)(1); see, e.g., Uppal v. Rosalind Franklin Univ. of Med. &
Sci., 124 F. Supp. 3d 811, 814 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (contending that with the authority conferred
by Rule 22Ab@A1@ and Rule 22Ac@ 54udges should not hesitate to exercise appropriate control
over the discovery process-@$ Eastman v. !llstate :ns. Co.> 7o. 3:14-CV-00703-WQH-WVG,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92144, at *15616, 2015 WL 4393287, at *5 (S.D. Cal. July 15, 2015)
(explicating the connection between these provisions).
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always tangle (and must be mulled) when a court considers imposing sanctions for a party’s use of boilerplate: a re'uest’s bare relevance under Rule
26(b)(1), with every litigant having a capacious right to another’s proof;285
the re'uested material’s discoverability> evaluated in light of the proportion<
ality factors now set forth in Rule 26(b)(1) and the related concerns indexed
in Rule 26(b)(2)(C); the respondent’s right to be secure from 5annoyance>
embarrassment> oppression> or undue burden or expense>- as recogniBed in
Rule 22Ac@A1@$ and a certain privilege’s apparent function. Even if the resulting tension may, in fact, be irreconcilable,286 the conflict must be acknowledged and resolved.
B.

PRECEHE7T’. /VERSIGHTS

Once they are rigorously applied, the preceding principles disclose a
troubling verity. Simply put, no definite resolution about the proper sanction
for all boilerplate response to Rule 34 requests can be comfortably reached
based on the rules’ plain text. Conse'uently> by having found all boilerplate
to be forbidden and to effectuate a waiver, too many courts have wandered
too far for the sake of Rule 1’s ineffable> if laudable> aims.287 True, the most
recent amendments tried to strengthen this majority position; in certain ways,
as shown above and below, many haunting ambiguities will no longer vex.
7onetheless> much remains too ambiguous for comfort once those 5well-established principles of construction- are 5clearly and predictably- applied to
the regnant texts.288 Almost paradoxically, the policing of boilerplate has
285. Still used, this quip—5right to every man’s evidence-—dates to 1950. See Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323,
331 A1030@@ A5Testimonial exclusionary rules and privileges contravene the fundamental prin<
ciple that ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence.’-@.
286. See In re Grand Jury Matter, 673 F.2d 688, 698 (3d Cir. 1982) (Adams, J., dissenting).
287. Cf., e.g., Baker Botts L.L.P. v. ASARCO L.L.C., 135 S. Ct. 2158, 2169 (2015)
A5Whether or not the Government’s theory is desirable as a matter of policy, Congress has not
granted us roving authority . . . . Our job is to follow the text even if doing so will supposedly
undercut a basic ob4ective of the statute.- Acitations omitted@ Ainternal 'uotation marks omit<
ted@@$ Lamie v. ,... Tr.> 340 ,... 322> 331 A2004@ A5/ur unwillingness to soften the import
of Congress’ chosen words even if we believe the words lead to a harsh outcome is longstand<
ing.-@$ Cent. Tr. Co. v. /fficial Creditors’ Comm. of Geiger Enters.> :nc.> 454 U.S. 354, 360
A1012@ Aper curiam@ A5While the Court of !ppeals may have reached a practical result> it was
a result inconsistent with the unambiguous language used by Congress.-@$ Bd. of Trs. of :BT
Local 863 Pension Fund v. C&S Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 3d 707, 720 (D.N.J.
2014@ A59ust because the application of . . . bright line rules sometimes leads to harsh outcomes
does not mean that courts may deviate from them whenever doing so seems fair.-@.
288. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 648 (2012);
see also Peterson v. Somers Dublin Ltd., 729 F.3d 741, 749 (7th Cir. 2013) (citing RadLAX
Gateway Hotel, 566 U.S. at 648-40@ A5.tatutes often are written more broadly than their gen<
esis suggests.-@.
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been so indiscriminate as to obscure frailties that only another round of revisions can fully uproot.289
Significantly, each of the four types of boilerplate plaguing modern discovery—(1) administrative and absolute, (2) administrative and conditional,
(3) substantive and absolute, and (4) substantive and conditional290—has
been subjected to a distinctly flawed analysis within an often crepuscular judicial discourse. Some preteritions infect judicial dissections of all four; a
few crop up only when absolute boilerplate is at issue; and fewer still can be
detected when conditional boilerplate has been expended. Sitting at the intercourse of two strains bedeviled by specialized weaknesses—those peculiar
to the courts’ treatment of substantive boilerplate and those pervasive in their
handling of conditional boilerplate—the juridical scrutiny of substantive and
conditional boilerplate manifests the most defects. Too often unnoticed, this
4urisprudence’s errors number six.291

1.

Problems Common to All Forms of Boilerplate
i.

&ule /.’s Phantom Waiver

The first problem to dog the dominant approach is posed by the text of
Rule 34. Prior to Hecember 1> 2013> an ob4ection had to include its 5reasons>while 5FaEn ob4ection to part of a re'uest- had to 5specify the part and permit
inspection of the rest.-292 Ever since, Rule 34(b)(2)(B) also requires that an
ob4ection’s grounds be 5stateFdE with specificity>- and a new first sentence—
5FaEn ob4ection must state whether any responsive materials are being with<
held on the basis of that ob4ection-—has been affixed to Rule 34(b)(2)(C).293
The former 5adoptFedE the language of Rule 33Ab@A4@> eliminating any doubt
that less specific ob4ections might be suitable under Rule 34.-294 The latter
directly targeted conditional boilerplate, the advisory committee expressing
its hope that this addition would 5end the confusion that fre'uently arises
when a producing party states several objections and still produces infor-

289. Cf. Ruling and Order at 465, SEC v. Commonwealth Advisors, Inc., No. 3:12-cv00700-JWD-.CR AM.H. La. 7ov. 14> 2014@ Areversing in part a magistrate 4udge’s grant of a
motion to compel).
290. See supra Part II.A.
291. For a summary, see infra Part IV.B.4.
292. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B)6(C); Doe v. Mastolini, 307 F.R.D. 305, 311 n.5 (D.
Conn. 2015) (citing rule).
293. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B)6(C).
294. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment Aalteration in
original).
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mation, leaving the requesting party uncertain whether any relevant and responsive information has been withheld on the basis of the ob4ections.-295
This decided similarity between this iteration of Rule 34(b)(2)(B) and (A)
and the language of Rule 33(b)(4) is obvious,296 and the mandatory character
of the shared 5must- cannot be linguistically disputed.297 Accordingly, especially considering the most recent academic commentary available298 and in
line with the most authoritative treatise on federal procedure,299 Rule 34
would seem to support ordering all valid ob4ections’ waivers upon a party’s
use of any boilerplate,300 the anticipated tonic for a widespread malpractice.301

295. Id.; Saliga v. Chemtura Corp., No. 3:12cv832 (RNC), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
167801, at *1 n.3, 2013 WL 6247219, at *1 n.3 (D. Conn. Nov. 26, 2013) (citing note); see
also Philip J. Favro, A Comprehensive Look at the Newly Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, UTAH B. J., Sept.-/ct. 2013> at 31> 40 A5This recommended
change is supposed to do away with the assertion of general ob4ections.-@.
296. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4), with FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(B).
297. See, e.g.> Hyatt v. ,...P.T./.> 707 F.3d 1374> 1310 AFed. Cir. 2013@ A5The ‘shall’
makes this language mandatory> not discretionary.-@.
298. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 167 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in judgment) (describing the explanatory notes prepared by the advisory
committees> 5a body of experts>- as 5assuredly persuasive scholarly commentaries6ordinarily
the most persuasive6concerning the meaning of the FrEules-@. 7evertheless> a committee’s
notes 5bear no special authoritativeness as the work of the draftsmen.- Id.; see also 7at’l Min<
ing !ss’n v. 8empthorne> 312 F.3d 702> 700 n.3 AH.C. Cir. 2001@ A5FWhile] [a]cademic commentary supports our reading . . . we cannot outsource the task of statutory interpretation to
the professoriate.-@.
299. 7 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE-CIVIL § 34.13(2)(c)
A3d ed. 2014@ A5!lthough Rule 34 does not contain an automatic waiver provision for untimely
objections as found in Rule 33(b)(4) for interrogatories, the courts have reasoned that a waiver
should be implied into all rules involving the use of the various discovery mechanisms.-@.
300. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 165666. Statements from
various commentators bear this out. Thus, for example, Jennie Lee Anderson for the American
!ssociation for 9ustice’s Class !ction Litigation Group saw the new Rule 34 as 5desirabledue to its effective prohibition of conditional boilerplate> which leads to 5FcEountless hours of
meeting and conferring.- ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 165. J. Burton
LeBlanc for the same entity concurred> damning conditional boilerplate as 5makFingE it diffi<
cult to assess what has not been produced and which objections go to whatever has not been
produced.- ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 165. He then believed that
5FtEhe proposed change will discourage parties from evading discovery on procedural grounds
and enable the requesting party to assess whether further discovery will produce evidence to
support its claims.- ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 165. Louis A. Jacobs
of the /hio .tate ,niversity’s MoritB College of Law agreed> as did .tuart F. Helery of the
Department of Justice. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at166.
301. Charter Practices :nt’l v. Robb> 7o. 3:12cv1721 AR7C@> 2013 ,... Hist. LE*:.
34112, at *6 n.2, 2015 WL 1268295, at *2 n.2 (D. Conn. Mar. 19, 2015); Favro, supra note
295, at 40 A5This recommended change is supposed to do away with the assertion of general
ob4ections.-@.
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7onetheless> Rule 34’s actual text, the very words that must control,302
still poses a decisive hurdle: while Rule 33(b)(4) includes an express waiver
clause, the same amendments that sought to make Rules 33 and 34 more alike
did not lead to the inclusion of any parallel clause in Rule 34. This absence
cannot be ascribed to mere ignorance> as per the advisory committee’s own
notes> its latest drafters were well ac'uainted of the two provisions’ language
and consciously strove to harmonize these disparate rules.303 For instance,
after endorsing the 5amendFmentE- of Rule 34Ab@A2@A!@ 5to fit with new Rule
22Ad@A2@>- it said so explicitly as to Rule 34Ab@A2@AB@: in 4ustifying the addi<
tion of one clause to this subparagraph—5the response must . . . state with
specificity the grounds for objecting to the re'uest> including the reasons-—
the advisory committee wrote: 5This provision adopts the language of Rule
33(b)(4), eliminating any doubt that less specific objections might be suitable
under Rule 34.-304 Having so expressly transposed Rule 33Ab@A4@’s first sentence into Rule 34(b)(2)(B), however, the advisory committee did not import
Rule 33’s waiver remedy.305
By most accounts, then, Rule 34(b)(2) boasts a rare—and pregnant—
lucidity. Whereas waiver upon boilerplate’s use follows from Rule 33Ab@A4@’s
second sentence> no such textual anchor can support this sanction’s pinning
onto the more silent Rule 34.306 Equally significantly, though its cognizance
of this absence cannot be debated, after copying clauses and phrases from
Rule 33, the advisory committee opted to appropriate no remedial slice. In
light of this bare history, as evidenced by the most patent texts, Rule
34(b)(2)(C)’s incongruity with Rule 33Ab@A4) triggers an old canon’s appli<
cation: 5F!E drafter is presumed to act purposely in the inclusion or exclusion

302. See supra Part IV.A; see also, e.g., United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S.
235, 241642 ( n.3 A1010@ Amaking use of both 5the natural reading of . . . [a] phrase- and 5the
grammatical structure of . . . FaE statute-@$ Lockhart v. Napolitano, 573 F.3d 251, 255656 (6th
Cir. 2000@ Aconsidering a grammatical analysis as a component of 5a natural reading of the
full text-@$ .outh Hakota v. Hood> 301 F.3d 311> 310690 (5th Cir. 2004) (focusing on a
phrase’s 5natural reading- and a statute’s 5grammatical structure-@.
303. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment.
304. Id.
305. FED. R. CIV. P. 33(b)(4). Even at a time when Rule 34 less perfectly mirrored Rule
33, the advisory committee had still insisted on their harmony in simple commentary, a tactic
followed with Rule 37 in 1993. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c) (listing sanctions for violations
of orders and discovery obligations and identifying them as discretionary), with FED. R. CIV.
P. 37 advisory committee’s note to 1993 amendment (describing these same optional punishments as 5automatic- and 5self-executing-@$ see also supra note 135.
306. Cf. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408
F.3d 1142> 1147 A0th Cir. 2003@ A5While . . . Rule F34Ab@E imposes a bright-line rule defining
timeliness, it does not contain an explicit prohibition against boilerplate objections or assertions of privilege.-@.
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of disparate language.-307 True, the rules may be a knitted and cohesive edifice,308 but a specific rule’s explicit script> holistically analyBed> always con<
trols.309 :n accordance with the law’s dominant interpretive framework> when
conscious knowledge of another rule’s divergent version can be inferred> and
when the newest sentence in a second rule was partly molded to mirror another’s first> introducing the latter’s remnant into the former is verboten.310
However advisable as policy,311 the submersion of Rule 33’s orphaned
waiver clause into Rule 34’s newly sharpened specificity re'uirement cannot
be characterized as anything except such an impermissible, albeit understandable> sleight of hand by boilerplate’s foes.312 With Rule 34 still unimproved by a clause resembling Rule 33Ab@A4@’s second sentence, no apparent

307. Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 13, at 524 (collecting sources).
308. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 505 (1947); see also, e.g., Mortg. Info. Servs.
v. Kitchens Inc., 210 F.R.D. 562, 566667 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (collecting sources so saying, including Hickman, 329 U.S. at 505); Drexel Heritage Furnishings, Inc. v. Furniture USA, Inc.,
200 F.R.H. 233> 231 AM.H.7.C. 2001@ A5Courts have long viewed the discovery rules as an
integrated mechanism to be read in pari materia.-@.
309. See Pioneer Invs. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. L.P., 507 U.S. 380, 388
(1993); Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, 503 U.S. 638, 643644 (1992); Bus. Guides v. Chromatic
Commc’ns Enters.> 401 ,... 333> 340641 (1991), superseded by FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993
amendment). Naturally, therefore, the rules are often, if not always, treated as statutes. Jesse
N. Panoff, Rescuing Expedited Discovery from the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
" &eturning It to 5ed. &. Civ. P. 0,(d)(1)( #sing a =octrine’s 5orgotten History to Achieve
Legitimacy, 42 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 393, 415 (2012).
310. See, e.g., BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004) (citing
Connecticut 7at’l Bank v. Germain> 303 ,... 240> 233634 A1002@@ A5The preeminent canon
of statutory interpretation re'uires us to ‘presume that FtheE legislature says in a statute what
it means and means in a statute what it says there.’- Aalteration in original@@$ see also Alper v.
,nited .tates> 100 F.R.H. 211> 213 AH. Mass. 2000@ Astating that 5while the language of Rule
45 . . . may . . . not be crystal clear, it is apparent . . . that discovery of documents from a party,
as distinct from a non-party> is not accomplished pursuant to Rule 43- Aalterations in original@
(quoting Hasbro, Inc. v. Serafino, 168 F.R.D. 99, 100 (D. Mass. 1996))); 9A CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2452 (2d ed. 1995 &
Supp. 2001) (same); cf. Hasbro Inc., 168 F.R.D. at 100 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 34(c)) (concluding that Rule 45 cannot be used to subpoena parties and non-parties as Rule 34 explicitly
5directs that ‘a person not a party to the action may be compelled to produce documents and
things or to submit to an inspection as provided in Rule 43’-@. ,nsurprisingly> this position is
contested. See, e.g., Badman v. Stark, 139 F.R.D. 601, 603 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (taking the opposite view).
311. See supra Part III. But see infra Part IV.B.1.iii.
312. See supra Part III; Hobley v. Chicago Police Commander Burge, No. 03 C 3678,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20585, at *9 n.2, 2003 WL 22682362, at *3 n.2 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 12,
2003@ Aopining that 5FwEhile Rule 34 does not contain an express provision for waiver of ob<
jections not timely made, failure to respond to a document request subjects the party to sanctions under Rule 37Ad@- and observing that 5courts have interpreted Rule 34 as containing an
implicit waiver provision to parallel the express provision of Rule 33Ab@A4@-@.
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judicial consensus313 can thwart this inference’s inevitability> its application
compelled by both a fundamental principle (the plain meaning doctrine) and
a contextual canon (presumption of consistent usage). For these reasons, the
reading of 5the automatic-waiver provision of Rule 33(b)(4) . . . into Rule
34- continues to be 5an odd conclusion to drawF:E :f the drafters of the . . .
[r]ules saw fit to include an automatic-waiver provision in Rule 33 and to
omit such a provision from Rule 34, that implies that there is no automatic
waiver of an untimely ob4ection under Rule 34.-314
Two more textual facts appear to bolster this ratiocination. First, while
this canon normally relies on a presumption of full awareness even in the
absence of any actual proof of such sentience> the advisory committee’s most
recent notes provide ample and patent evidence of the drafters’ conscious
cognizance of a distinct yet related text, i.e. Rule 33(b)(4), in the shared subpart, i.e. Title V, of the exact same body of law, i.e. the rules in total, during
their remodeling of Rule 34(b)(2)(C).315 In point of fact, a number of comments that the advisory committee included with its most germane report expressly linked the two rules,316 further denuding any and all potency from a
presumption of authorial ignorance. Second, the utter absence of any reference in Rule 34 to Rule 33, a telling contrast with the explicit incorporation
of Rule 45 in Rule 34(c) and of Rules 26 and 29 in Rule 34(b)(2)(A),317 lends
greater force to this disinclination on the same canon’s basis.318 To wit, when
reference or incorporation was desired, the drafters inscribed such clear language into the germane rule, and only reliance on willful inconsistency could
313. See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Ron Burge Trucking, Inc., 284 F.R.D. 421, 424 (D. Minn.
2012@ Acollecting cases so saying@$ First 7at’l Bank v. Civic Partners .ioux City> LLC AIn re
Civic Partners Sioux City, LLC), Bankr. No. 11-00829, Adv. Proc. No. 11-9046, 2011 Bankr.
LEXIS 4620, at *768, 2011 WL 6013847, at *3 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Dec. 2, 2011) (same);
Caudle v. Dist. of Columbia, 263 F.R.D. 29, 32 (D.D.C. 2009) (same).
314. Ashford v. City of Milwaukee, 304 F.R.D. 547, 549 (E.D. Wis. 2015); see also,
e.g., Brenford Envtl. Sys., L.P. v. Pipeliners of P.R., Inc., 269 F.R.D. 143, 146 (D.P.R. 2010)
A5:t is clear that failure to comply with Rule 34Ab@ does not automatically result in waiver of
an ob4ection.-@$ Cunningham v. Connecticut Mut. Life :ns.> 143 F. .upp. 1403> 1400 A..D.
Cal. 1004@ A5Failure to specifically identify documents on a privilege log does not automati<
cally waive the privilege for omitted documents.-@$ cf. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.H. v. Portland Nat.
Gas> 211 F.R.H. 321> 323 AH.7.H. 2003@ A5While it is possible to read Rule 33(b)(4) to incorporate Rule 26(b)(5) . . . a more harmonious reading of the rules as a whole leaves the enforcement of Rule 26(b)(5) to the nuanced sanctioning regime governed by [Rule 37] rather than
the nearly automatic waiver process required by Rule 33Ab@A4@.-@.
315. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment$ see also FED.
R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 1070 amendment.
316. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 165.
317. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(5), 34(c); cf. Mortg. Info. Servs. v. Kitchens Inc., 210 F.R.D.
562, 566 (W.D.N.C. 2002) (noting that most courts have concluded that a Rule 45 subpoena
must be served by the close of discovery based on 5the text of Rule 22> which expressly in<
corporates Rule 43 subpoenas into its definition of discovery-@.
318. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512614 (1981).
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justify ignoring these examples, each of which counsels against the conflation of Rules 33 and 34.319 In effect, by interpretive explication, many have
affixed a sentence absent from Rule 33 onto Rule 34, a result accordant with
the rules’ overarching theory yet> fatally> not Rule 34’s categorical final
text.320 It is, however displeasing it may be, the latter alone that here controls,321 a presumption which throws into doubt waiver’s convection.
ii.

&ule /+’s 4ravid %ilences

Allowing a party to file a motion to compel a discovery response upon
another’s failure to comply with Rules 30> 31> 33> and 34>322 so long as it has
first 5in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with the person or party
failing to make disclosure or discovery in an effort to obtain it without court
action>-323 Rule 37 treats 5an evasive or incomplete disclosure> answer> or
response . . . as a failure to disclose> answer> or respond.-324 For such improper feats, Rule 37 lists seven possible sanctions,325 a court free to impose

319. See GARNER & SCALIA, supra note 135, at 167669 (discussing the whole-text
canon). Notably, this canon can lend itself to abuse while its corollary—the presumption of
consistent usage—5assumes a perfection of drafting that> as an empirical matter> is not
achieved.- GARNER & SCALIA, supra note 135, at 168, 170.
320. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989). Only true
ambiguity would allow such wandering. See Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S.
369, 377680 (2004) (looking to statutory purpose to interpret an ambiguous statute); Reves v.
Ernst ( Goung> 404 ,... 32> 73 A1000@ A5Given this ambiguity> the FprovisionE must be inter<
preted in accordance with its purpose.-@.
321. Bus. Guides> :nc. v. Chromatic Commc’ns Enters.> 498 U.S. 533, 540641 (1991)
A5!s with a statute> our inquiry is complete if we find the text of the Rule to be clear and
unambiguous.-@> superseded by FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended 1993).
322. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(B); Petrucelli v. Bohringer & Ratzinger, 46 F.3d 1298,
1310 A3d Cir. 1003@ A5In order to succeed on a motion to compel discovery, a party must first
prove that it sought discovery from its opponent.-@. Rule 37(a)(3)(A) authorizes sanctions for
a party’s failure to provide the mandatory disclosures presently re'uired by Rule 22. FED. R.
CIV. P. 37(a)(3)(A); Alexander v. Ohio State Univ. Coll. of Soc. Work, 420 F. !pp’x. 411>
486 (6th Cir. 2011).
323. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(1); see also Robinson v. Potter, 453 F.3d 990, 995 (8th Cir.
2002@ A5Before the court can rule on a motion> the parties must demonstrate they acted in good
faith to resolve the issue among themselves.-@.
324. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4); see, e.g., United States v. All Assets Held at Bank Julius
Baer & Co., 276 F.R.D. 396, 399 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Rule 37(a)(1)); Med. Assur. Co. v.
Weinberger, No. 4:06 cv 117, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67516, at *13, 2011 WL 2471898, at *2
(N.D. Ind. June 20, 2011) (same).
325. FED. R. CIV. P. 37Ab@A2@A!@> Ac@A1@AC@$ +icknair v. Louisiana Hep’t of Pub. .afety
( Corr.> 333 F. !pp’x 323> 332 A3th Cir. 2014@ Alisting some of the relevant sanctions and
adding that 5FsEanctions must be both just and specifically related to the claim at issue in the
discovery order-@.
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5other appropriate-326 ones in the exercise of its reasoned discretion.327 Because absolute and conditional boilerplate 5border- on frivolity> such ob4ec<
tions can trigger Rule 37’s application>328 its intricate mechanism designed to
achieve four ends,329 both punitive330 and remedial.331 Overall, three exceptions may justify stay of a sanction’s imposition: 5the failure to disclose was
substantially 4ustified- regardless of the underlying act$ it was 5harmless- if
a failure to disclose took place$ or 5other circumstances make an award of
expenses un4ust- when reasonable attorneys’ fees amount to a party’s pro<
posed punishment or a motion to compel has been granted.332 Typically,
5FtEhe overriding consideration- is whether the sanction’s severity is 5com<
mensurate with the non-compliance>-333 as courts strive 5to restore the pre4<
udiced party to the same position it would have been in absent the wrongful
FwithholdingE of evidence by the opposing party.-334
As an initial matter, one omission from two different sources looms
large, damaging Rule 37’s value in the regulation of boilerplate. First, in its

326. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1)(C); Neiberger v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 566 F.3d
1184, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009) (citing rule). Significantly, if not unremarkably, Rule 37(c)(1)(C)
does not define 5appropriate.- Cf. Societe Internationale Pour Participations et Commerciales
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 107> 201 A1031@ A5Rule F37Ab@A2@E allows a court all the flexibility it
might need in framing an order appropriate to a particular situation.-@.
327. See, e.g., Roberts v. Shawnee Mission Ford, Inc., 352 F.3d 358, 360 (8th Cir.
2003); Daval Steel Prods. v. M/V Fakredine, 951 F.2d 1357, 1365 (2d Cir. 1991).
328. Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp., 123 F.3d 1353, 1358 (11th Cir. 1997); see
also, e.g., Steed v. EverHome Mortg. Co., 301 F. !pp’x 324> 371 A11th Cir. 2000@ Aciting
Chudasama, 123 F.3d at 1358); Update Art> :nc. v. Modiin Publ’g> Ltd.> 143 F.2d 27> 71 A2d
Cir. 1988) (quoting Cine Forty-Second St. Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 602
F.2d 1062, 1064 (2d Cir. 1979)).
329. Wachtel v. Health Net, Inc., 239 F.R.D. 81, 996100 (D.N.J. 2006); Carlucci v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 775 F.2d 1440, 1453 (11th Cir. 1985).
330. Gratton v. Great !m. Commc’ns> 171 F.3d 1373> 1374675 (11th Cir. 1999).
331. Roadway Express v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 763664 (1980); First Mariner Bank v.
Resolution L. Grp., No. MJG-12-1133, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153299, at *11, 2013 WL
5797381, at *4 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2013).
332. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(c)(1), (d)(3); Hewlett-Packard Fin. Servs. Co. v. Alt. Graphics,
Inc. (In re Alt. Graphics, Inc.), No. CC-14-1193-DTaKu, 2015 Bankr. LEXIS 3696, at *28,
2015 WL 6605542, at *10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Oct. 29, 2015). This final sanction has been called
Rule 37’s 5great operative principle.- Rickels v. City of .. Bend> 33 F.3d 713> 712 A7th Cir.
1994).
333. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, No. 03 MDL 1570 (GBD) (FM),
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 155085, at *102, 2013 WL 5788307, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2013);
Shcherbakovskiy v. Da Capo Al Fine, Ltd., 490 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2007).
334. Linde v. Arab Bank, PLC, 269 F.R.D. 186, 195 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (alteration in
original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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explicit array of sanctions, Rule 37 hints at no waiver, unlike the overt mention of this punitive measure in Rules 26(a)(3),335 32(d),336 33(b)(4),337
35(b)(4),338 and 45(d)(3)(A)(iii).339 As these examples attest, when the rules
do designate waiver as a possible price, they do so in the body of the specific
provision that lays forth the duties whose flouting can trigger such an assessment. Second, in decided contrast with its commentary on the equivalently
silent Rule 16> the advisory committee’s notes to Rule 37 make no allusion
to waiver as a viable penalty.340 Like Rule 34’s recent failure to echo Rule
33(b)(4) in full, and pursuant to the same well-known rule of thumb,341 the
presumptively knowing drafters’ non-inclusion of waiver in Rule 37’s text
and official exposition cannot be disregarded.
In fact, one more canon can be adduced so as to solidify this conclusion:
5:t is a commonplace of statutory construction that the specific governs the
general.-342 As text unabashedly reveals, Rule 37 catalogues certain remedies, waiver not among them, while Rule 34 alone maintains taciturnity as to
this peculiar remedy. Logically, because Rule 37 enumerates a number of
mulcts for violations of Rule 34 without expressly alluding to waiver, unlike
Rule 33(b)(4), its authorization for 5any other appropriate sanctions- should
not be read to license a punishment—waiver—left unnamed within its text.
Otherwise, a court would have decoded neighboring provisions in a way that
renders the specific passage 5superfluous- by allowing it to be 5swallowed-

335. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(3)(B); Welch v. Tritt, No. 15-CV-191, 2015 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 81204, at *9, 2015 WL 3887087, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 23, 2015) (quoting Rule
26(a)(3)(B)).
336. FED. R. CIV. P. 32(d); Woods v. Deangelo Marine Exhaust Inc., No. 08-81579Civ-Hurley/Hopkins, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 110293, at *13, 2010 WL 4116571, at *4 (S.D.
Fla. Sept. 27, 2010) (quoting Rule 32(d)).
337. FED. R. CIV. P. 33Ab@A4@$ Cooper v. Hall. Police !ss’n> 314 F. !pp’x 201> 200
(5th Cir. 2014) (quoting rule).
338. FED. R. CIV. P. 35(b)(4); United States v. Turner, No. 5:07-HC-2167-D, 2012 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 871, at *6, 2012 WL 27425, at *2 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 4, 2012) (quoting rule).
339. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(d)(3)(A)(iii)$ !la. Educ. !ss’n v. Bentley AIn re Hubbard), 803
F.3d 1298, 1307 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting rule).
340. FED. R. CIV. P. 12 advisory committee’s note to 1013 amendment A5:f counsel fail
to identify an issue for the court, the right to have the issue tried is waived.-@$ .mith v. Gulf
Oil Co., 995 F.2d 638, 644 (6th Cir. 1993) (finding waiver on the basis of this sentence). The
propriety of relying on these notes is open to question. See supra Part IV.A.
341. See supra Part IV.B.1.i.
342. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992). This result is
unsurprising, as this duo often works hand-in-hand. See BNSF Ry. v. United States, 775 F.3d
743, 759 (5th Cir. 2015).
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by the general one,343 a construction that should never be countenanced.344
Based on these linguistic deductions, a serious question can be raised about
whether Rule 37 can be fairly read to authorize waiver as a sanction for noncompliance with Rule 34,345 one often unaddressed.
Rule 37’s efficacy in boilerplate’s governance is undercut by its constricted language in two more ways. First, Rule 37(b) requires that a discovery order be in place, and Rule 37(d) has been understood to authorize sanctions only when a party has wholly ignored a discovery request.346 Admittedly> 5an evasive or incomplete disclosure> answer> or response must be
treated as a failure to disclose> answer> or respond- pursuant to Rule 37> but
only 5for purposes of- Rule 37(a), which governs motions to compel alone,
and by implication not for purposes of Rule 37(d)(1)(ii), which lists the sanctions possible for a party’s noncompliance with Rule 34.347 As a consequence
of this rather convoluted design, which too must be respected during any interpretive endeavor,348 5evasive or incomplete responses>- such as absolute

343. RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 640 (2012);
see also, e.g., HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 6 (1981) (per curiam) (finding that
a specific provision tends to govern a more general> 5particularly when the two are interrelated
and closely positioned, both in fact being parts of [the same statutory schemeE-@$ BNSF Ry.,
773 F.3d at 730 A5The specific-general canon applies where there is a specific statutory provision that would be subsumed by a general statutory provision.-@.
344. See RadLAX Gateway Hotel> 322 ,... 230 at 243 A5The general;specific canon .
. . has full application . . . to statutes . . . in which a general authorization and a more limited,
specific authorization exist side-by-side. There the canon avoids not contradiction but the superfluity of a specific provision that is swallowed by the general one.-@$ see also, e.g., Prime
Time :nt’l Co. v. +ilsack> 030 F. .upp. 2d 240> 231 n.1 AH.H.C. 2013@ Aciting RadLAX Gateyway Hotel, 566 U.S. 639 at 645) A5When a general provision is allowed to trump a more
specific provision, the specific provision may be greatly diminished, as that provision had a
narrower reach to begin with.-@.
345. Admittedly, as commonly construed, Rule 37 provides a nonexclusive range of
sanctions. Hathcock v. 7avistar :nt’l Transp. Corp.> 33 F.3d 32> 40 A4th Cir. 1003@. Nonetheless> its textual failure to mention waiver and other rules’ explicit incorporation of this sanction
cannot be properly glossed over with nary a mention; pursuant to modern principles, that gaping omission must somehow be addressed.
346. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b), (d); Beckerman, supra note 4, at 554. But see Collins v.
Landry’s :nc.> 7o. 2:13-cv-1674-JCM-VCF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83003, at *11612, 2014
WL 2770702, at *5 (D. Nev. June 17, 2014).
347. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(3)6(4), (d)(1). Axiomatically, headings and titles can bear
on meaning. :.7... v. 7at’l Ctr. for :mmigrants’ Rights> :nc.> 302 ,... 113> 110 A1001@.
348. Cf. Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 506 (2007) (quoting EC Term of Years
Trust v. ,nited .tates> 330 ,... 420> 434 A2007@@ A5F:En most contexts> ‘a precisely drawn>
detailed statute pre-empts more general remedies.’-@. But see King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480,
2302 A2013@ A.calia> 9.> dissenting@ A5.tatutory design and purpose matter only to the extent
they help clarify an otherwise ambiguous provision.-@.
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and conditional boilerplate, cannot be fairly treated as failures to respond or
answer under Rule 37(d).349
Second, by custom, willfulness, fault, or bad faith must often be shown
for Rule 37 to be invoked; regardless of the violation at issue, lesser sanctions
should always be considered.350 At least in part, this presumption rests on the
common view that 5a Rule 37 FsanctionE is effectively a criminal contempt
sanction>-351 and logic alone suggests that, just as preclusion of evidence generally requires a strong showing of prejudice,352 an ob4ection’s waiver should
require a similar impact.353 Meanwhile, under Rule 26(g)(1), in responding
to a request under Rules 33 and 34, a lawyer must do no more than a reasonable investigation before adducing a particular objection.354 Reading these
provisions in pari materia, as courts recommend,355 a lawyer’s compliance
with Rule 22Ag@A1@’s minimal re'uirement> even if rightful discovery is
thereby impeded, should foreclose a finding of willfulness, fault, or fraud
under Rule 37.356 In light of this jurisprudence, Rule 37 raises two final issues
when invoked to punish boilerplate’s use: so long as a response to a re'uest
for production is not self-evidently false or fanciful, Rule 26(g)(1) should
place a lawyer beyond Rule 37’s grasp> while Rule 37Ab@ and Ad@ demand
either total flouting or an order’s docketing before any authoriBed sanctions
can be sought for a party’s noncompliance with Rule 34.
:n sum> Rule 37 is no unalloyed prop for boilerplate’s enemies. Even
after December 1, 2015, not firm links but ambiguities interosculate its structure. The sole repository of the courts’ punitive authority in the rules them<
selves is, in the end, an even more tenuous point of departure than Rule 34’s
ghostly waiver clause.

349. Pringle v. Garcia, No. 2:09-CV-22-PPS-PRC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 65463, at
*11 n.1, 2013 WL 1911484, at *4 n.1 (N.D. Ind. May 8, 2013).
350. E.g., R & R Sails, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa., 673 F.3d 1240, 1247648 (9th Cir. 2012);
see also Wendt v. Host :nt’l> :nc.> 123 F.3d 102> 114 A0th Cir. 1997) (limning the test for
assessing sanctions).
351. Bradley v. Am. Household, Inc., 378 F.3d 373, 379 (4th Cir. 2004).
352. First Mariner Bank v. Resolution L. Grp., P.C., No. MJG-12-1133, 2013 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 153299, at *25 n.5, 2013 WL 5797381, at *9 n.5 (D. Md. Oct. 24, 2013).
353. These distinct doctrines rely on the same fundamental predicate—a willful violation of some evidentiary or procedural rule—to justify the same dramatic result—an automatic
relaxation of an otherwise firm rule-based boundary.
354. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(1); see supra Part II.B.1.
355. See sources cited supra note 276.
356. See, e.g., Hake v. Carroll Cty., No. WDQ-13-1312, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
112572, at *869, 2014 WL 3974173, at *3 (D. Md. Aug. 14, 2014).
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Asymmetrical Treatment

Lastly, the practical issue of proportionality, newly invigorated by the
addition of such language into the body of Rule 26(b)(1), has often been
overlooked in this developing jurisprudence. For all the commonality of boilerplate objections, boilerplate requests are also often propounded.357 Not infrequently, it is such indeterminate bids for documents that 5set the stage for
discovery problems because the recipient does not know specifically what is
being re'uested>-358 with the proponent’s re'uest 5facially encompassFingEevery aspect of their opponent’s case and 5thusFE the broadest possible range
of documents.-359 Consistent with this observation, courts have deemed a
discovery re'uest to be facially overbroad if it uses such 5omnibus termFsE>as 5relating to>- 5pertaining to>- or 5concerning.-360 These cases, recognizing
the frequent, if less noticed, tendency of lawyers to propound vagaries, are
not outliers.361 !s one court has warned> 5Fa partyE must specify in ‘sufficient
detail to permit [the other party] to locate and to identify, as readily as can
[the . . . party] the records from which the answer may be ascertained.’-362 If
not, a boilerplate request may induce a boilerplate objection,363 the latter no
more than a reasonable response to an untailored probe.
357. See, e.g., Shaffer & Shaffer, supra note 25, at 201; Girard & Espinosa, supra note
115, at 474675.
358. Howard v. Segway, Inc., No. 11-CV-688-GKF-PJC, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
31402, at *5, 2013 WL 869955, at *2 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2013).
359. Everlast World’s Boxing Head'uarters Corp. v. Ringside> :nc.> 7o. 13-2150-CMKGG, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84704, at *17, 2014 WL 2815515, at *6 (D. Kan. June 23,
2014).
360. Johnson v. Kraft Foods N.A., 238 F.R.D. 648, 658 & n.31 (D. Kan. 2006); see
also Cardenas v. Dorel Juvenile Grp., Inc., 232 F.R.D. 377, 381 (D. Kan. 2003@ A5FTEhis Court
has held on several occasions that a document request may be vague, or overly broad and
unduly burdensome on its face if it uses an omnibus term such as ‘relating to>’ ‘pertaining to>’
or ‘concerning.’-@.
361. See Beisner, supra note 26, at 551; see also Grimm & Yellin, supra note 39, at
521.
362. Hansel v. Shell Oil Corp., 169 F.R.D. 303, 307 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (quoting FED. R.
CIV. P. 33); cf. !m. Health .ys.> :nc. v. +isiting 7urse !ss’n> 7o. 03-0542, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 15447, at *20621, 1994 WL 594424, at *566 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 1994) (pointedly relying on a plaintiff’s earlier stated agreement to define specific undefined terms included in its
first document request after it arbitrarily cut off further attempts to resolve a dispute concerning its first document request).
363. See Durden v. Citicorp Tr. Bank, 763 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1310 n.13 (M.D. Fla.
2011) (as to fee application); Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 362
AH. Md. 2001@ A5A lawyer who seeks excessive discovery given what is at stake in the litigation, . . . or pursues discovery in order to make the cost for his or her adversary so great that
the case settles to avoid the transaction costs, . . . is . . . hindering the adjudication process[.]-@$
Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669,
736 (2010@ A5FLEawyers regularly violate Rule 22Ag@ by serving excessive and thoughtlessly
broad discovery re'uests . . . .-@$ cf. Eastman v. Allstate Ins. Co., No. 3:14-CV-00703-WQH-

2017]

POLICING BOILERPLATE

263

In view of these facts> a finding of waiver in response to a respondent’s
boilerplate may effectively absolve the proponent of their own responsibility
for originally vague queries. Consumed by one side’s misdeeds> such an or<
der may grant the propounding party a benefit predicated on another’s viola<
tion of a standard that they themselves have contravened in their production’s
drafting.364 Both parties have offended the rules’ ensconced spirit, yet while
the second suffers, the first prospers for crafting ambiguous, if not impermissibly so, demands.365 Revealingly, such a result runs counter to the imputations of another 4uridical strain> as reflected in Rule 32’s 4urisprudence. !s
one jurist explained in regards to the admissions covered by this rule, upon
the propounding party lies the duty to not state 5half a fact- or 5half-truthsthat effectively 5re'uire the answering party to 'ualify responses.-366 In such
cases, a clear and good faith qualification openly offends no settled rule,367
and even if the chosen answers appear evasive, a party should be allowed to
amend such an authentic rider,368 a precept as applicable to Rule 34 as to Rule
32. !nd> as 5it is not always easy to know whether a denial is ‘specific’ or an
explanation is ‘in detail>’-369 the Rule’s drafters once cautioned against 5giv<
ing a defective answer the automatic effect of an admission.-370 With these
concerns in mind, the iron rule endorsed by many scholars and courts—

WVG, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92144, at *29630, 2015 WL 4393287, at *10 (S.D. Cal. July
13> 2013@ AemphasiBing that the remarkable breadth of a plaintiff’s subpoenas demanded
5some curtailment-@.
364. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 159, 166667. In opposing
Rule 34’s new specificity provision> Havid 9. 8essler commented: 5F:Et would be better to
direct that the responding party state what it is looking for.- ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL
RULES, supra note 63> at 122. !lex Hahl added: 5The re'uesting party also has a duty to pro<
pound specific demands.- ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, 167.
365. Some hope that Rule 26(b)(1), as amended on December 1, 2015, will mitigate
this imbalance. See infra note 373. Get> so long as discovery’s scope is broad> expansively
worded requests will likely persist.
366. Herrera v. Scully, 143 F.R.D. 545, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Havenfield
Corp. v. H & R Block, Inc., 67 F.R.D. 93, 96697 (W.D. Mo. 1973)). But see Poole v. Textron,
Inc., 192 F.R.D. 494, 499 (D. Md. 2000).
367. See Xcel Energy, Inc. v. United States, 237 F.R.D. 416, 422 (D. Minn. 2006)
A5While we have no quarrel with allowing a qualification of a Response, the qualification must
both clear and advanced in good faith . . . .-@.
368. Tri-State Hosp. Supply Corp. v. United States, 226 F.R.D. 118, 138 (D.D.C.
2005).
369. FED. R. CIV. P. 32 advisory committee’s note to 1070 amendment$ Clements v.
Toombs Cty. Hosp. Auth., 334 S.E.2d 188, 190 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting language).
370. FED. R. CIV. P. 32 advisory committee’s note to 1070 amendment$ In re K-Dur
Antitrust Litig., No. 01-1652 (JAG), MDL No. 1419, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96066, at *38
n.8 (D.N.J. Jan. 2, 2007) (citing note); see also United Coal Co. v. Powell Constr. Co., 839
F.2d 958, 967668 (3d Cir. 1988).
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5FgEeneral> or boilerplate> ob4ections that do not respond specifically to re<
'uests for production are not proper-371—pays no mind to these concerns and
thereby enthrones an asymmetry in both duty and punishment inconsistent
with the rules’ overarching emphasis on all parties’ fair and 4ust treatment.
!s the advisory committee recently reminded one and all> 5the parties share
the responsibility to employ the rules in the same way- and are expected to
make 5proportional use of procedure.-372 As rejiggered on December 1,
2013> Rule 22Ab@A1@’s 'ualification of its relevance standard has given a modicum of official support to this focus on the asymmetrically retributive effects
that can be begat by a proponent’s own unclear and 'uestionable re'uests.373
Per the golden rule, when both parties have strayed, neither should be rewarded.

2.

Problems Unique to Conditional Boilerplate
i.

&ule /.’s Conditional Language

Strangely, Rule 34(b) is rather vague on the propriety of conditional
boilerplate, a fact too often neglected by the current judicial majority.374 True,
Rule 37Aa@A4@ ensures that either an 5incomplete- or an 5evasive- response
to a Rule 34 re'uest will be treated as a 5failure to disclose> answer> or re<
spond.-375 At first blush, such language can reasonably be read to sweep into
its natural ambit both conditional and absolute boilerplate.
Still, Rule 34(b)(2)(C) seems to allow for partial objection, if so labeled.
At first blush, conditional boilerplate does seem to fit its own clumsy formulation that 5FaEn ob4ection to part of a re'uest . . . specify the part and permit
inspection of the rest>-376 acknowledging the surrender of all non-privileged
materials 5except to the extent a valid ob4ection has been made.- Though the
latter clause’s addition in 2013 was intended to combat 5the confusion that
frequently arises when a producing party states several objections and still
371. Cal. Sportfishing Prot. Alliance v. Chico Scrap Metal, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-1207GEB-AC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 144173, at *12, 2014 WL 5093398, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9,
2014).
372. FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment$ Witt v. GC
.ervs. Ltd. P’ship> 307 F.R.H. 334> 332 n.1 AH. Colo. 2014@ Aciting and relying upon this
commentary).
373. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63> at 23 A5This change rein<
forces the Rule 26(g) obligation of the parties to consider these factors in making discovery
re'uests . . . .-@.
374. See supra Part III.C.
375. FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4); Cunningham v. Hamilton Cty, 527 U.S. 198, 206 (1999)
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(4)).
376. FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b)(2)(C); Heller v. City of Dallas, 303 F.R.D. 466, 475 (N.D.
Tex. 2014) (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b)(2)(C)).
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produces information, leaving the requesting party uncertain whether any relevant and responsive information has been withheld on the basis of the ob4ections>- this language was inputted so as 5to alert other parties to the fact
that documents have been withheld and thereby facilitate an informed discussion of the ob4ection.-377 Supposing even a single document has been
withheld on the basis of a boilerplate objection, conditional boilerplate technically informs the ob4ection’s recipient of some documents’ withholding. In
this most limited sense, Rule 34(b)(2)(C) would appear satisfied—or, at
worst, a good-faith defense afforded.
In addition, the appending of an arbitrary date range would seemingly
suffice to render even conditional boilerplate proper under this rule’s bare
terms. In fact, the advisory committee specifically discounted the requirement that 5a detailed description or log of all documents withheld- be pro<
vided and concluded that 5FaEn ob4ection that states the limits that have con<
trolled the search for responsive and relevant materials qualifies as a [proper]
statement that the materials have been ‘withheld.’-378 In a telling bit of evidence, in its observation on the post-November 30, 2015, form of Rule 34,
the Association of the Bar of the City of New York did not read its new specificity language as barring conditional boilerplate and advocated for a more
express and 5better method- of regulation.379

3.

Problems Unique to Substantive Boilerplate
i.

Limits of Waiver Doctrine

By rule and custom, an assertion of privilege can be a valid objection to
a discovery request.380 These familiar shields can, of course, be waived deliberately or accidentally,381 as courts have found when boilerplate objections
377. FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note to 2013 amendment.
378. Id.
379. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 167. Others obviously disagreed. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 167. (statement of Sidney I. Schenkier for Federal Magistrate Judges Association). Most important here, the mere existence of
doubt immeasurably strengthens a lawyer’s own defense to Rule 37 on the basis of good faith.
380. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court
for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d 1142, 1148649 (9th Cir. 2005).
381. See Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1160 (9th Cir. 1981) (concluding that a
failure to ob4ect to interrogatories within the time fixed by Rule 33 constitutes a waiver 5even
of an ob4ection that the information sought is privileged-@$ FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendment A5To withhold materials without . . . notice [of a claim of
privilege or work product protection] is contrary to the rule, subjects the party to sanctions
under Rule 37(b)(2), and may be viewed as a waiver of the privilege or protection.-@$ cf. Law
v. Medco Research> :nc.> 113 F.3d 711> 717 A7th Cir. 1007@ A5Failure to contest a point is not
necessarily a waiver> but it is a risky tactic> and sometimes fatal.-@. Huring a federal proceed<
ing, inadvertent disclosure is governed by Federal Rule of Evidence 502. FED. R. EVID. 502.
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have been tendered.382 Axiomatically, as a consequence of the esteemed status of the common law’s various privileges>383 waiver is considered to be 5a
harsh sanction>- 5reserved generally for un4ustified> inexcusable> or bad faith
conduct- and 5unnecessary where other remedies are available.-384 Usually,
only 5un4ustifiably delayed discovery>-385 or 5gross negligence and ethical
violations>-386 can warrant its possible finding. Hence> 5minor procedural vi<
olations, good faith attempts at compliance, and other such mitigating circumstances militate against finding waiver-$ conversely> 5evidence of footdragging or a cavalier attitude towards following court orders and the discovery rules supports FitsE finding.-387 Even where found, despite all privileges’
cabined scope,388 implied waivers are construed narrowly389 after an exacting

382. See supra Part III; see also, e.g., Gonzales v. City of San Jose, No. 5:13-cv-00695BLF, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165662, at *364, 2014 WL 6687138, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 25,
2014); Bourne v. Town of Madison, No. 05-cv-365-JD, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23945, at *10,
2007 WL 951552, at *3 (D.N.H. Mar. 27> 2007@$ 7at’l ,nion Fire :ns. Co. v. Midland Bancor>
Inc., 159 F.R.D. 562, 567 (D. Kan. 1994).
383. See, e.g., Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 17618 (1996); Upjohn Co. v. United
States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981); cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709613 (1974)
Aweighing the importance of one privilege against 5the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal 4ustice-@.
384. ,.F :ns. Co. v. .mith’s Food ( Hrug Ctr.> :nc.> 7o. 2:10-cv-001513-RLH-LRL,
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63926, at *8, 2011 WL 2457655, at *3 (D. Nev. June 16, 2011) (citing
Moe v. System Transp., Inc. 270 F.R.D. 613, 623 (D. Mont. 2010)); accord, e.g., Shao Ying
Sun v. Ikea US W., Inc., No. 15-cv-01146-MEJ, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 150544, at *7, 2015
WL 6734480, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Nov 4, 2015); Moe v. Sys. Transp., Inc., 270 F.R.D. 613, 623
(D. Mont. 2010).
385. EEOC v. Safeway Store, Inc., No. C-00-3155 TEH (EMC), 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 25200, at *6, 2002 WL 31947153, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2002).
386. Boag v. Litton Loan Servicing, No. C11-5838 BHS, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
146461, at *18619, 2013 WL 5569908, at *7 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 9, 2013).
387. Ritacca v. Abbott Labs., 203 F.R.D. 332, 335 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (collecting cases
standing for these propositions).
388. See, e.g.> Herbert v. Lando> 441 ,... 133> 173 A1070@ A5Evidentiary privileges in
litigation are not favored, and even those rooted in the Constitution must give way in proper
circumstances.-@$ ,nited .tates v. /loyede> 012 F.2d 133> 141 A4th Cir. 1002@ A5FTEhe Fattor<
ney-clientE privilege is to be ‘strictly confined within the narrowest possible limits consistent
with the logic of its principle.’- A'uoting In re Grand Jury Investigations, 599 F.2d 1224, 1235
(3d Cir. 1979))).
389. Teleglobe Commc’ns Corp. v. BCE> :nc. AIn re Teleglobe Communc’ns Corp.@>
493 F.3d 345, 378 (3d Cir. 2007); see also, e.g., Schofield v. U.S. Steel Corp., No. 2:04-CV520-PRC, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30471, at *869, 2005 WL 3159165, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Nov.
28, 2005) (opining that courts tend to limit a waiver to the narrowest possible subject matter);
Chevron Corp. v. Pennzoil Co., 974 F.2d 1156, 1162 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Weil v. Inv./Indicators, Research & Mgmt., Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 25 (9th Cir. 1981)). Dangers can, however, arise.
See !spex Eyewear> :nc. v. E’Lite /ptik> :nc.> 272 F. .upp. 2d 1014> 1003 AH. 7ev. 2003@
A5! narrowly circumscribed waiver> at the discovery stage> creates a danger of a defendant
utilizing favorable opinion letters while allowing unfavorable evidence to languish in their
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fact-specific analysis,390 recurrently limited to those documents intended to
attain an unfair advantage391 and rarely 5broader than needed to ensure the
fairness of the [relevantE proceedings.-392
Aside from this extraordinarily rigorous view of a waiver’s contours,
courts have tended to treat the very notion of an automatic waiver as inconsistent with varied privileges’ honored roles. In a seminal opinion, the Ninth
Circuit famously rejected a party’s attempt to defend the existence of 5a per
se waiver rule that deems a privilege waived if a privilege log is not produced
within Rule 34’s 306day time limit- and when boilerplate has been offered.393
As a substitute, it urged courts to engage in a 5holistic reasonableness analy<
sis- in which four nonexclusive factors A5Burlington Factors-@ should be
weighed:
[(1)] the degree to which the objection or assertion
of privilege enables the litigant seeking discovery
and the court to evaluate whether each of the withheld documents is privileged . . .; [(2)] timeliness of
the objection and accompanying information about
the withheld documents (where service within 30
days, as a default guideline, is sufficient); [(3)] the
magnitude of the document production; and [(4)]
other particular circumstances of the litigation that
make responding to discovery unusually easy (such
as, here, the fact that many of the same documents
were the subject of discovery in an earlier action) or
unusually hard.394
attorney’s files under the protection of the work-product doctrine.- Aciting Hunhall Pharms.>
Inc. v. Discus Dental, Inc., 994 F. Supp. 1202, 1204 (C.D. Cal. 1998))).
390. XYZ Corp. v. United States (In re Keeper of the Records of XYZ Corp.), 348
F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2003); see also United States v. Doe (In re Grand Jury Proceedings), 219
F.3d 173> 113 A2d Cir. 2000@ A5Whether fairness requires disclosure has been decided by the
courts on a case-by-case basis, and depends primarily on the specific context in which the
privilege is asserted.-@.
391. See, e.g., Greater Newburyport Clamshell All. v. Pub. Serv. Co., 838 F.2d 13, 22
A1st Cir. 1011@ Aholding that the client need reveal only information 5for which defendants
have so far shown a true need and without which they may be unfairly prejudiced in their
defense-@$ cf. ,nited .tates v. BilBerian> 022 F.2d 1213> 1202 A2d Cir. 1001@ A5FTEhe attorneyclient privilege cannot at once be used as a shield and a sword.-@.
392. Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 2003), cited in In re Lott, 424
F.3d 446, 453 (6th Cir. 2005).
393. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Court for Dist. of Mont., 408 F.3d
1142, 1149 (9th Cir. 2005).
394. Id.; see also, e.g., Phillips v. C.R. Bard, Inc., 290 F.R.D. 615, 638 (D. Nev. 2013)
(citing the four Burlington factors@$ ,niversal City Hev. Partners> Ltd. v. Ride ( .how Eng’g>
Inc., 230 F.R.D. 688, 698 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (adopting Burlington’s 5thoughtful analysis-@.
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Three more elements have been mined as this technique has become entrenched within and without the Ninth Circuit: 5FA3@E the pre4udice to the
party seeking discovery; [(6)] the flagrancy of the violation; and [(7)]
whether the responding party made a good faith effort to comply with the
discovery rules.-395 In the balancing ratified by this case law, even though
providing the particulars typically contained in a privilege log is characteriBed as 5presumptively sufficient- and boilerplate as 5presumptively insufficient>- no 5mechanistic determination- has ever been commended.396 Instead, courts have reiterated their wariness of both steely rules and standards
5too amorphous to provide practical guidance to litigants and Fcertain toE ex<
pose[] parties to greater chance of inadvertently waiving privileges.-397 For
all this fluidity, two constants can be spotted within this area of law. First,
under Burlington> no waiver occurs 5when the court is provided enough spec<
ificity to evaluate whether each document is protected.-398 Second, per this
same opinion, privileges can be waived, whether Rule 33 or Rule 34 is in
play,399 for even as the law’s many privileges retain their importance>400 they
conflict with the rules’ lenient discovery policy.401
ii.

Initial Complications

Adhering to this precedent, the finding of waiver in cases involving substantive boilerplate invites two complications. First, numerous courts hold
that 5a party cannot ‘inadvertently’ waive a privilege> much less have itwaived by an agent’s oversight.402 This fact, when conjoined with a recognition that substantive boilerplate is habitually used and historically common,
395. Casale v. 7ationwide Children’s Hosp.> 7o. 2:11-cv-1124, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 42548, at *24, 2014 WL 1308748, at *8 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 28, 2014).
396. Burlington, 408 F.3d at 1149; see also, e.g., Bullion Monarch Mining, Inc. v.
Newmont USA Ltd., 271 F.R.D. 643, 647648 (D. Nev. 2010) (quoting Burlington, 408 F.3d
at 1149); Terrell v. OTS, Inc., No. 1:09-cv-626-RWS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24270, at *36
4, 2011 WL 864501, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 9, 2011) (same).
397. Universal City Dev. Partners, Ltd.> 230 F.R.H. at 201 Aas to Rule 43’s reasonable
time standard).
398. United States v. Ary, 518 F.3d 775, 784 (10th Cir. 2008).
399. See, e.g., Broom, Clarkson, Lanphier & Yamamoto v. Kountze, No. 8:14CV206,
2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 157449, at *25626, 2015 WL 7302226, at *7 (D. Neb. Nov. 18, 2015);
SEC v. ARVCO Capital Research, LLC, 3:12-cv-00221-MMD-WGC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145460, at *31632, 2014 WL 5106100, at *12 (D. Nev. Oct. 10, 2014).
400. See, e.g., ROGER C. PARK, TRIAL OBJECTIONS HANDBOOK § 5 (2d ed. 2015) (discussing the elements of various privileges); EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, THE NEW WIGMORE:
A TREATISE ON EVIDENCE: EVIDENTIARY PRIVILEGES § 5 (2015) (exploring their rationales).
401. See, e.g., STMicroelectronics, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 308 F. Supp. 2d 754, 756
(E.D. Tex. 2004); In re Burlington N., Inc., 822 F.2d 518, 524 (5th Cir. 1987).
402. John T. Hudley, Inadvertent Waiver of Evidentiary Privileges: Can Reformulating the Issue Lead to More Sensible Decisions?, 19 S. ILL. U. L.J. 263, 267668, 268 nn.14615
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undermines waiver’s enthusiasts. Second, and more significantly, the reflexive tendency to treat substantive boilerplate as leading to an automatic waiver
ignores the courts’ detailed and comprehensive approach to the finding of
such a capitulation. Certainly, assuming a party has attempted to comply with
Rule 22Ab@’s technical re'uirements>403 neither conditional nor absolute substantive boilerplate intimates demonstrable bad faith or cavalier disregard of
the Rule’s clear commands if a privilege can be said to arguably exist.404
Whatever the merits of the strict boilerplate tactic, the waiver of evidentiary
privileges has long required a more involved analysis, not a plain prohibition’s recitation and application> as Burlington recognized and its successors
have insisted. To hold otherwise is to ignore the courts’ 5particular[] reluctan[ce] to find waiver of privilege objections unless truly warranted because
of the important policies served by the attorney-client privilege and workproduct doctrine>-405 documents withheld on the basis of a privilege inherently different from things withheld for the sake of administrative convenience.406 Substantive objections, then, simply possess a dissimilar character,
ennobled by time and theory.407
iii.

Rule 26

Parties’ discovery rights and obligations emanate from Rule 22.408
When courts and parties seek to regulate substantive boilerplate, this provision presents its own special problems. Two, one familiar and one peculiar,
most menace.

(1995); see also Lawrence A. Steckman & Richard Granofsky, The Assertion of AttorneyClient Privilege by Counsel in Legal Malpractice Cases: Policy, Privilege, and the Search for
Truth in Cases Involving Implied Waiver, 45 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 839, 851661
(2009610) (summarizing many key cases).
403. See supra Part II.B.1.
404. Indeed, for a court to even adjudicate the matter properly necessitates the profusion of briefing over discovery issues so disliked by parties, courts, and scholars. See Beckerman, supra note 4, at 550; cf. DCP Midstream, LP v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 303 P.3d
1187, 1191 (Colo. 2013) (preferring the practical approach offered by the advisory committee’s notes 5because it avoids the possibility of additional litigation-@.
405. Mills v. Iowa, 285 F.R.D. 411, 413 (S.D. Iowa 2012).
406. See H’/nofrio v. Borough of .easide Park> 7o. 00-6220 (AET), 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75651, at *31633, 2012 WL 1949854, at *667 (D.N.J. May 30, 2012).
407. Arguably, to the extent privileges are viewed as substantive rights, they may not
be abridged by any rules’ extrapolation. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012); cf. Shachmurove,
Claims, supra note 13, at 531633.
408. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
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First, like Rule 34 and unlike Rule 33,409 Rule 26 contains no general
waiver provision.410 Once more, the advisory committee contemplated that
privileges could be waived.411 Again, however, it chose not to adjoin the specific reference to waiver embedded in Rule 33(b)(4) into the rule setting forth
discovery’s expansive parameters. Conse'uently> as still holds true with regards to Rule 37,412 reference to the punishment often sought in the boilerplate cases—waiver—has been omitted in the only rule which addresses the
proper method for withholding privileged but otherwise discoverable information. Concurrently, waiver has been expressly identified as a possible
price for disobedience in a more tapered rule pertaining to only one specific
instrument, i.e. interrogatories under Rule 33. A canon already discussed now
rears its head once more: 5When a statute [or rule] limits a thing to be done
in a particular mode> it includes the negative of any other mode>-413 as it is
5highly improbable that- a drafter> whether Congress or an advisory commit<
tee> 5absent mindedly forgot to mention an intended- sanction 5FiEn view of
. . . FotherE express provisions for enforcFementE.-414 And, regardless of the
committee’s intent and the rule’s purpose> Rule 22’s text> including its pre<
sumptively deliberate omission of waiver as a sanction for discovery violations, generally must decide this dispute.415 Heeding this logic, which unfortunately pits commentary versus language,416 an automatic waiver rule re'uires an approved text’s rewriting> a task beyond the courts’ finite competence.417
More subtle, a second defect enfeebles the strict approach to waiver’s
exploitation in cases involving substantive boilerplate. In its first clause, Rule

409. See supra Part IV.B.1.i.
410. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also Ritacca v. Abbott Labs., 203 F.R.D. 332, 3346
35 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (discussing the law of waiver).
411. FED. R. CIV. P. 22 advisory committee’s note to 1003 amendment A5To withhold
materials without [providing notice as described in Rule 26(b)(5)] is contrary to the rule, subjects the party to sanctions under Rule 37(b)(2), and may be viewed as a waiver of the privilege
or protection.-@$ see, e.g.> !nderson v. Hale> 202 F.R.H. 341> 333 A7.H. :ll. 2001@ A5!lthough
this result is not mandated by the [r]ules, the Advisory Committee contemplated the sanction.-@.
412. See supra Part IV.B.1.ii.
413. 7at’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. 7at’l !ss’n of R.R. Passengers> 414 ,... 433> 431
(1974) (quoting Botany Worsted Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)).
414. Transamerica Mortg. Advisors (Tama) v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 20 (1979) (quoting
Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677, 742 (1979).
415. See supra Part IV.A.
416. Cf. Design Strategy, Inc. v. Davis, 469 F.3d 284, 298 (2d Cir. 2006) (refusing to
honor an advisory committee’s 5characteriBation- of a rule as it could not 5be s'uared with . .
. [its] plain language-@; see also Martin v. Winn-Dixie Louisiana, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 3d 794,
808609 (M.D. La. Sept. 2015) (adhering to the same course).
417. Shachmurove, Claims, supra note 13, at 528634.
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22Ab@A1@ provides: 5Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivi<
leged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or defense and proportional
to the needs of the case . . . .-418 Thus, by its own terms, Rule 26 classifies
privileged material as non-discoverable, and while improperly designated
material cannot qualify, verifiably privileged material necessarily does so.419
The failure to comply with Rule 26(b)(5) by the provision of a minimally
sufficient privilege log may rightly entitle the propounding party to damages.
But it cannot> if the text of Rule 22Ab@A1@ marks out discovery’s outer limits>
gift that party with access to privileged documents. Ineluctably tagged, such
materials have been expressly removed from Rule 22Ab@A1@’s expansive> but
still definite, ambit in the first instance.420 Accordingly, to order waiver of
any and all valid ob4ections upon a party’s use of substantive boilerplate af<
fords the proponent with a cache of documents to which it is not entitled
under the rules’ unambiguous text. ! lawyer’s improper privilege log or im<
precise description does not, in this sense, denude matter of its privileged
fiber. !ssuming the relevant predicates for a specific shield’s invocation
have been satisfied, the documents at issue are innately privileged, their quiddity not extirpated by a lawyer’s carelessness. Following this reasoning> sub<
stantive boilerplate’s expenditure should not lead to waiver as to a valid re<
monstrance under Rule 26, as the rule itself authorizes discovery of no more
than non-privileged matters. Any other result embraces a second asymmetry,421 one not in derogation of a practical evenhandedness but rather impliedly forbidden by discovery’s delimitated range. However unsatisfactory
a respondent’s conduct may strike an observer> Rule 22Ab@A1@ sets legitimately privileged material beyond an opponent’s offended grasp. !lbeit
wasteful> that privilege’s assertion via empty boilerplate cannot alter this lit<
eral verity.

4.

Summary

The font of much frustration, each form of boilerplate has been the subject of a uniquely defective exegesis. Three errors taint the approach to all
forms of boilerplate: Rule 34’s dearth of any waiver clause> Rule 37’s persis<
tent ambiguity, and the asymmetrical effect of any pro-waiver presumption.

418. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); see also supra Part II.B.1.
419. See ReedHycalog UK, Ltd. v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations Inc., 251 F.R.D.
231> 241 AE.H. Tex. 2001@ A5The Court adheres to a policy of liberal discovery> but where a
claim of privilege renders an item undiscoverable, the Court will allow a party to withhold
that item.-@.
420. Various comments to the new Rule 34 emphasize this point. ADVISORY COMM.
ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 166. Others, naturally, disagree. ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL
RULES, supra note 63, at 166.
421. See supra Part IV.B.1.iii.
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Rule 34’s vagueness applies only to the judicial distaste for conditional boilerplate, whether administrative or substantive. The final two objections—the
high bar to cross for most privileges to be waived and Rule 22’s own textual
constraints—can be made only as to the courts’ ordinary treatment of substantive boilerplate. Like in much of law, the cogency of these grounds is
disputable. Even so, a parsing of the rules reveals a cardinal truth: as written
this corpus neither countenances indiscriminate boilerplate nor compels
waiver’s finding upon boilerplate’s outlay in responses to Rule 34 requests.

V.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Nevertheless, the concerns about such objections are well-founded, if
overblown.422 In the interest of impeding their proliferation, the rules need
only be changed a little for the weakness discussed in this Article to be addressed. In fact, the addition of a handful of clauses will serve to place the
courts’ authority to rein in this excess on a firmer textual footing than the
rules presently provide. Inchoate and incomplete, a beginning and no more,
these six may do423:

Relevant

Proposed Addition

Rule
Rule 26(b)(1)



!fter 5nonprivileged>- input language indicating
that even privileged matters may be embraced by
Rule 26’s discoverability standard as a conse'uence of a party’s actions.
Proposed Addition: 5,nless otherwise limited by
court order, the scope of discovery is as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter (or, if originally privileged, over
which privilege has been waived, purposely or inad-

422. See ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES, supra note 63, at 165669.
423. The below chart quotes extensively from various rules’ text. In the interest of
readability and presentation, however, no pincites will be used
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Proposed Addition

Rule
vertently), that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the
action, the amount in controversy> the parties’ rela<
tive access to relevant information> the parties’ re<
sources, the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or expense of
the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit.
Information within this scope of discovery need not
be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.-

Rule



26(b)(2)(C)

Add language allowing court to limit any discovery
not specifically made, a restriction similar to that
added to Rule 34(b)(2)(C) on December 1, 2015,
and encompassing respondents only. Subsection iii
would become iv, serving as the ultimate safety
valve.
Proposed Addition: 5. . . Aiii@ the proposed discovery
has not been requested with reasonable specificity .
. .-

Rule
34(b)(2)(C)



Add the waiver clause in Rule 33(b)(4) as a third
sentence to Rule 34(b)(2)(C).
Proposed Addition: 5Any ground not stated in a
timely objection is waived unless the court, for good
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Proposed Addition

Rule
cause, excuses the failure.

Add a specific prohibition on conditional objections as a second addition after the insertion of
foregoing clause.
Proposed Addition: 5Any response made subject to
an objection waives any and all valid objections related to that request.-

Rule 37(c)(1)



!dd 5waiver- to the list of sanctions in Rule
37(c)(1) and specify that this sanction is intended
to be redundant. Subsection iii would become iv.
Proposed Addition: 5. . . Aiii@ may find any and all
valid objections to have been waived, whether or not
allowed for expressly in the relevant rule . . .-

Rule 37(d)



Clarify the scope of Rule 37Ad@ by adding 5. . . to
production of document- to its current title:
Proposed Addition: 5Party’s Failure to !ttend :ts
Own Deposition, Serve Answers to Interrogatories,
Respond to a Request for Inspection, or Production
of Documents.-
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CONCLUSION

Wedded to an ideal> the rules’ drafters built an open network for the
delineation of issues and the distillation of facts.424 Even as initially disregarded fears were realized with maddening frequency, this image retained its
hold. More information was sought; more data was withheld; and the rules
were toyed with in the hopes of striking equilibrium. In time, boilerplate objections to interrogatories and requests for production of documents became
the reformers’ focus> their indiscriminate use seen as anathema to the reali<
zation of an already dimmed aspiration. Naturally, resting on sundry provisions and embedded purposes, courts would begin to construe them as automatic waivers and strike them down as tantamount to unpardonable silence
(at best) or malicious obstruction (at worst). In this response, the shadows of
Pound and Clark can be glimpsed.
In the process, however, even after the recent amendments to Rules 26
and 34, gaps in the controlling texts have gone unnoticed. That Rule 34 contains no waiver clause, Rule 37 boosts ominous silences, a certain unobvious
asymmetry typifies discovery, Rule 34 only vaguely hints at the impropriety
of conditional boilerplate, and Rule 26 places privileged matter beyond discovery’s lawful ken—all these pestering bugs have lain unaddressed. Once
they are considered fully, as modern tenets adjure, serious doubts about the
prevailing approach to policing boilerplate responses to Rule 34 requests via
a waiver’s imposition grow in strength. The ma4ority’s goal may be commendable, but it is not yet clearly supportable. Rather, if such castigation is
to be fairly meted out without offense to the law’s interpretive and procedural
constraints> Rule 34’s reform remains undone> either 5petty tinkering-425 or

424. See supra Part II.B.
425. Frank F. Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 REV. LITIG. 1,
38 (1982) (quoting Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 A.B.A. REP. 395 (1906)).
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5comprehensive reform- re'uired still>426 as an apt creed compels indeed.427
With due precaution, by all means.428

426. History may then come full circle, from Field to Pound to Field once more. See
Subrin, Equity, supra note 3, at 947648 (observing that Pound, one of the inspirational figures
behind the rules> 5suggested less definition and more 4udicial discretion-@$ see also Richard L.
Marcus, Discovery Containment Redux, 39 B.C. L. REV. 747, 772-75 (1998) (discussing the
1993 amendments to the Rules and how they represented an attempt to seemingly limit costly
discretion). Of course, one may disagree with such changes and find the whole process both
misdirected and misbegotten. See, e.g., Jeffrey Stempel, Refocusing Away from Rules Reform
and Devoting More Attention to the Deciders, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 335, 346648 (2009610)
Adiscussing the varied and contradictory responses to the Rules’ amendments over the last
twenty years); Stempel, supra note 40> at 332 A5FTEhere has been a significant shrinkage in a
litigant’s ability to obtain information> which tends to advantage the disputants who would
prefer to provide less information[, post-1976]. For the most part, this group is comprised of
defendants.-@$ .tephen 7. .ubrin> Teaching Civil Procedure While You Watch It Disintegrate,
59 BROOK. L. REV. 1155, 1156657 (1993) (denouncing many post-1970 changes to the rules
for erring too greatly in the direction of restricting claims and reducing adjudication in favor
of encouraging settlement). After all, cases with larger stakes are bound to have higher costs,
and their expensiveness is the product of reality rather than a defective procedural system. See
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 786 (2010) (noting that an oft-cited study by the Federal Judicial
Center had actually 5found that discovery and overall litigation costs were largely proportionate to stakes> and that the stakes in a case were the single best predictor of overall cost-@. But
see, e.g., J. Maria Glover, The Federal Rules of Civil Settlement, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1713,
1731 A2012@ A5!symmetrical cost imposition is usually most pronounced during the discovery
process. In general, access to discovery is granted without limitation once a motion to dismiss
is denied, enabling claimants to impose significant, asymmetric production costs on the opposing party.-@$ .cott Hodson> New Pleading, New Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 64
A2010@ A5Though it is not clear whether high discovery costs are really the wide-scale problem
some believe, at least some discovery is disproportionately high, and both unfairness and inefficiency result from subjecting defendants to high discovery costs, which they generally
must bear, just to get summary judgment on a frivolous claim that never had a chance in the
first place.-@.
427. Jerome
Lederer,
Mechanic’s
Creed,
FED.
AVIATION
ADMIN.,
https://www.faasafety.gov/files/gslac/library/documents/2013/Feb/74231/MechanicsCreed.pdf (last visited on Dec. 23, 2016).
428. See ALDO LEOPOLD, Conservation, in ROUND RIVER 145642 A1003@ A5To keep
every cog and wheel is the first precaution of intelligent tinkering.-@.

